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WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 46 • January 1994 • No. 2

CONTENTS

The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico — *Jonathan Fox* — 151

The Political Underpinnings of Privatization: A Typology — *Harvey B. Feigenbaum* and *Jeffrey R. Henig* — 185

"Less Filling, Tastes Great": The Realist-Neoliberal Debate — *Emerson M. S. Niou* and *Peter C. Ordeshook* — 209

Review Articles

The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect — *Bin Yu* — 235

Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab World — *Jill Crystal* — 262

The Contributors — ii

Abstracts — iii

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ABSTRACTS

The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship

lessons from mexico

By JONATHAN FOX

The consolidation of democratic regimes requires the extension of political rights to the entire citizenry, but this process does not necessarily follow from electoral competition. The transition from authoritarian clientelism to respect for associational autonomy is an important dimension of democratization, unfolding unevenly through iterative cycles of conflict among authoritarian rulers, reformist elites, and autonomous social movements. This process is illustrated by a study of changing bargaining relations between rural development agencies and grassroots indigenous movements in Mexico. The results suggest that the transition from clientelism to citizenship involves three distinct patterns of state-society relations within the same nation-state: redoubts of persistent authoritarianism can coexist with both new enclaves of pluralist tolerance and large gray areas of "semiclientelism."

The Political Underpinnings of Privatization

a typology

By HARVEY B. FEIGENBAUM and JEFFREY R. HENIG

In shifting responsibilities from government to market, privatization has the potential to alter the institutional framework through which citizens normally conceive and pursue their individual and shared interests. But the literature has presented it as a relatively apolitical adaptation to changing conditions. Rather than a choice among means to achieve broadly shared goals, privatization often takes the form of a strategy to realign institutions so as to privilege the goals of some groups over the competing aspirations of other groups. Drawing primarily on the experience of Western, industrialized nations, a political typology is developed that distinguishes between privatizations undertaken for different reasons—whether pragmatic, tactical, or systemic.

"Less Filling, Tastes Great"

the realist-neoliberal debate

By EMERSON M. S. NIOU and PETER C. ORDESHOOK

This essay examines and reformulates the realist-neoliberal debate. It focuses initially on the issue of the attribution of instrumental goals to states—the goals they pursue as a function of the environment they confront—and argues not only that such goals are epiphenomena of other things but also that their specification constitutes a mere redescription of the alternative equilibria that states can achieve in anarchic systems. The world orders that realists and neoliberals envision are but alternative equilibria to a more general game. In that game cooperation, regardless of its form, must be endogenously enforced, and a debate over instrumental goals (whether it is best to model states as relative or absolute resource maximizers) is not central to the development of a theory that explains and predicts world orders.

Instead, the realist-neoliberal debate should be recast. The central research agenda should be to develop models that illuminate the following: how the equilibrium to a game in which states structure international affairs influences the types of issue-specific subgames states play; how countries coordinate to equilibria of different types; how the coordination problems associated with different equilibria can be characterized; how institutions emerge endogenously to sustain different equilibria; how states can enhance the attractiveness of an equilibrium; and how states can signal commitments to the strategies that are part of that equilibrium.

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THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECT
By BIN YU

This article examines the state of the field in the Western study of Chinese foreign policy. After briefly surveying the earlier generations of scholarship, it critiques the current narrow focus and apolitical tendency in studying Chinese foreign policy–making institutions and perceptions of foreign policy makers and specialists. The author argues for a more balanced and more comprehensive approach that combines analytical vigor and empirical validity.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND ITS ADVERSARIES IN THE ARAB WORLD
By JILL CRYSTAL

While scholars outside the Arab world often link authoritarianism there to some dark cultural template involving religious doctrine or family structure, scholars of the region ground their explanations in political economy, in the historical evolution of the state, in patterns of state-society interactions, and in ideological appeals. To understand authoritarian outcomes, they draw attention to economic transformations, to social actors and the importance of organized social groups, to the role of state efforts to contain them in shaping political outcomes, to the repressive institutions that sometimes arise from this process, and to weaknesses of state ideologies that arise to justify authoritarian outcomes. Their work allows us to unpack the phenomenon of authoritarianism by reorganizing it into three different sets of forces: those that precipitate authoritarianism, those that sustain it, and those that resist it. The result is a clearer and more nuanced understanding of the range of factors that affect the likelihood of any state resorting to violence.

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THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION FROM CLIENTELISM TO CITIZENSHIP

Lessons from Mexico

By JONATHAN FOX*

ELECTORAL competition is necessary but not sufficient for the consolidation of democratic regimes: not all elections are free and fair; nor do they necessarily lead to actual civilian rule or respect for human rights. If there is more to democracy than elections, then there is more to democratization than the transition to elections. But in spite of the rich literature on the emergence of electoral competition, the dynamics of political transitions toward respect for other fundamental democratic rights is still not well understood.

Political democracy is defined here in classic procedural terms: free and fair electoral contestation for governing offices based on universal suffrage, guaranteed freedoms of association and expression, accountability through the rule of law, and civilian control of the military.[1] Although analyses of democratization typically acknowledge that these are all necessary criteria, most examine only electoral competition.[2] This study, however, develops a framework for explaining progress toward *another* necessary condition for democratization: respect for associational

* Field research for this project was partially funded by a grant from the Howard Heinz Endowment. A preliminary version of this paper was first presented at "Mexico's National Solidarity Program: A Preliminary Assessment," Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, February 25, 1992. Thanks to Josefina Aranda, Suzanne Berger, Joshua Cohen, Denise Dresser, Manuel Fernández, Paul Haber, Luis Hernández, Kevin Middlebrook, Julio Moguel, Frances Fox Piven, Pablo Policzer, Jennie Purnell, Richard Samuels, Jonathan Schlefer, Ben Ross Schneider, Miguel Tejero, and John Waterbury, as well as many indigenous leaders, government officials, and NGO activists who remain anonymous.

[1] In Karl's terms, this is a middle-range definition of democracy, in that it falls between the narrow Schumpeterian range of contestation needed for strictly intraelite competition and approaches that depend on particular socioeconomic or participatory outcomes. See Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990).

[2] Democratization is defined here as the process of movement toward these conditions, while the consolidation of a democratic regime requires fulfilling all of them. Regimes can therefore be in transition to democracy—further along than liberalization—but still fall short of a democratic threshold. For further discussion, see Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

World Politics 46 (January 1994), 151–84

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autonomy, which allows citizens to organize in defense of their own interests and identities without fear of external intervention or punishment.[3]

Most analysis of the emergence of electoral competition concentrates quite appropriately on high politics—on the pacts that define the rules of contestation and the founding elections that shape much of national politics. But to analyze the effective extension of the full range of citizenship rights *throughout* a society involves studying how most people are actually represented and governed—before, during, and after the historic turning points of high politics. In this process, intermediate associations are crucial complements to political parties because they are potentially more responsive to the inherent diversity of societal interests. Increasingly, political scientists are stressing the Tocquevillian idea that democratic governance depends on the density of associational life in civil society.[4] However, rather than attempt here to explain the empowerment of autonomous organizations in civil society (which often both predates and encourages electoral competition), this study focuses on the empirically related but analytically distinct question of how regimes begin to accept the *right* of citizens to pursue their goals autonomously.

As authoritarian regimes give way to electoral competition, the degree to which the full range of citizenship rights becomes respected varies quite widely both across and within national political systems.[5] For example, a wide range of political systems, including many that hold regular elections, oblige the poor to sacrifice their political rights if they want access to distributive programs. Such conditionality interferes with

[3] On associational autonomy as a democratic right, see Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). Note that autonomy is inherently relational and is therefore a matter of degree. On the difference between autonomy and capacity, see Jonathan Fox, *The Politics of Food in Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), chap. 2.

[4] See, e.g., Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, "Secondary Associations in Democratic Governance," *Politics and Society* 20 (December 1992), on the U.S.; Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), on Italy; Jonathan Fox and Luis Hernández, "Mexico's Difficult Democracy: Grassroots Movements, NGOs and Local Government," *Alternatives* 17 (Spring 1992), on Mexico; and Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, eds., *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), on broader problems of party representation. This paper treats intermediate associations as broadly representative though not necessarily democratic. On the problem of internal democracy within such organizations, see Jonathan Fox, "Democratic Rural Development: Leadership Accountability in Regional Peasant Organizations," *Development and Change* 23, no. 2 (1992). Note also that intermediate associations in developing countries often do not appear as formal organizations; they may be kinship or religiously based community associations, for example, as in many African or Middle Eastern societies.

[5] The guaranteed rights of political citizenship in a democracy include basic civil and political freedoms, majority rule with minority rights, and the equitable administration of justice, as well as respect for associational autonomy.

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the exercise of citizenship rights and therefore undermines the consolidation of democratic regimes.[6] These relations of domination can be broadly understood in terms of *clientelism*, a relationship based on political subordination in exchange for material rewards.

It is, however, undeniably risky to use the concept of political clientelism to frame the study of the construction of the right to associational autonomy. Because analysts have found elements of clientelism in an extraordinarily wide range of hierarchical power relations, the usage can become so broad as to encompass almost any reciprocal exchange between actors of unequal power. Hence, it is difficult to distinguish what is specific to clientelism from most political bargaining more generally. But since its core notion captures the exchange of political rights for social benefits, it is worth trying to sharpen its boundaries.

How do subordinated people make the transition from clients to citizens? This study analyzes how less-than-democratic regimes come to respect autonomous, representative societal organizations as legitimate interlocutors. It draws on the Mexican experience to illustrate one important indicator of this transition: the process by which poor people gain access to whatever material resources the state has to offer without having to forfeit their right to articulate their interests autonomously.

Since clientelism is a form of bargaining, some degree of autonomy between the parties is inherent to it; yet its distinctive meaning derives from the significantly unequal constraints on that autonomy. For the purposes of this argument, the working definition of political clientelism is deliberately narrow, to highlight the process of transition from clientelistic to other kinds of unequal exchanges that permit somewhat greater associational autonomy. The focus here is on specifically *authoritarian* clientelism, where imbalanced bargaining relations require the enduring political subordination of clients and are reinforced by the threat of coercion. Such subordination can take various forms, ranging from vote buying by political machines, as under semicompetitive electoral regimes, to a strict prohibition on collective action, as under most military regimes, to controlled mass mobilization, as in communist or authoritarian populist systems.[7]

[6] Associational autonomy is an especially vital right for the poorest members of society, for two main reasons. First, they are usually the most vulnerable to state-sanctioned coercion should they express discontent. Second, their survival needs make them especially vulnerable to clientelistic incentives. Together, these threats and inducements inhibit autonomous collective action. See Ruth Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,' " *American Political Science Review* 73 (January 1979).

[7] The appearance of subordination should not be confused with actual submission, however; see James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); and idem, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New

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Political Conflict and the Erosion of Clientelism: An Analytical Framework

Although most studies of clientelism focus on how the relationship works rather than on how it changes, one group of analysts does show how political entrepreneurs build clientelistic systems, emphasizing the transition from patrimonial patronage to mass political machines.[8] The role of political action in explaining the breakdown of clientelism has received less attention, however. Most analysts explain the erosion of clientelism in terms of either gradual social changes, such as urbanization and education, or structural economic shifts, such as the commercialization of agriculture. But these secular trends are not sufficient explanations, since political action can either inhibit or accelerate the weakening of clientelism. Thus, where "traditional" patterns of deference erode, the

Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). Others stress the subjective importance of "trust" in such dependent relationships; see Luis Roniger, *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1990). For a view that stresses the role of coercion, see Peter Flynn, "Class, Clientelism, and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 12, no. 2 (1974). For overviews of political clientelism, see Christopher Clapham, ed., *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); S. N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (1980); S. N. Eisenstadt and René Lemarchand, eds., *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981); Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth, 1977); Robert R. Kaufman, "A Patron-Client Concept and Macropolitics: Prospects and Problems," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 3 (1974); Alain Rouquié, "Client Control and Authoritarian Contexts," in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquié, eds., *Elections without Choice* (New York: John Wiley, 1978); Steffen W. Schmidt et al., eds., *Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Arnold Strickon and Sidney Greenfield, eds., *Structure and Process in Latin America: Patronage, Clientage and Power Systems* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972). Note that the literature on political clientelism virtually stopped over a decade ago, long before the flowering of analysis of regime change. Few analysts explore how the persistence of machine politics affects the nature of transitions to civilian rule. For exceptions, see Frances Hagopian, " 'Democracy by Undemocratic Means?' Elites, Political Pacts and Regime Transition in Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (July 1990); idem, "The Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the Brazilian Transition," in Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela (fn. 2); and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Challenges to Democratization in Brazil," *World Policy Journal* 5, no. 2 (1988).

[8] On the construction of political machines, see, among others, Luigi Graziano, "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy," in Schmidt et al. (fn. 7); James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 63 (December 1969); idem, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Martin Shefter, "The Electoral Foundations of the Political Machine: New York City, 1884–1897," in Joel Silbey et al., eds., *The History of American Electoral Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Steffen W. Schmidt, "The Transformation of Clientelism in Rural Colombia," in Schmidt et al. (fn. 7); Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); and Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

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political effectiveness of clientelistic controls can be bolstered by threats of violence.[9] Note, for example, the extraordinary resilience of violent electoral machines in the backlands of Brazil, the Philippines, and Colombia in the 1980s.[10] And as the Mexican case shows, political entrepreneurs can replace rigid, antiquated controls with new, more sophisticated clientelistic arrangements without necessarily moving toward democratic pluralism. Nevertheless, the main point here is that if political action can create (or revive) clientelism, it can also undermine it.[11]

In developing a framework for analyzing the transition from clientelism to respect for citizenship rights, one can draw lessons from the interactive approach to the study of the transition to competitive electoral regimes.[12] For example, many authoritarian regimes became electorally competitive only after extended periods of repeated semicompetitive contests that strengthened democrats and weakened autocrats; this occurred in the 1980s in Brazil, Colombia, the Philippines, and Korea. Similarly, the right to associational autonomy, too, is constructed gradually and unevenly through cycles of conflict that leave nascent democratic forces with political resources to draw on in successive rounds. In contrast to cycles of semicompetitive electoral contests, however, the movements to broaden the political terms of access to social entitlements often unfold on extrainstitutional terrain (political parties, for instance, may not be the key actors), and their periodic cycles are certainly not regularly scheduled. Furthermore, the right to associational autonomy does not simply follow from national electoral change; the opening of political

[9] For discussions of how clientelism can evolve from patrimonial to repressive, increasing the role of coercion, see Anthony Hall, "Patron-Client Relations: Concepts and Terms," in Schmidt et al. (fn. 7); and James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, "How Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy: A Theory with Special Reference to Southeast Asia," in Schmidt et al. (fn. 7).

[10] See the following essays in Jonathan Fox, ed., *The Challenge of Rural Democratisation: Perspectives from Latin America and the Philippines* (London: Frank Cass, 1990) (also published as *Journal of Development Studies* 26 [July 1990]): Candido Grzybowski, "Rural Workers and Democratization in Brazil"; Francisco Lara, Jr., and Horacio Morales, Jr., "The Peasant Movement and the Challenge of Democratization in the Philippines"; and Leon Zamosc, "The Political Crisis and the Prospects for Rural Democracy in Colombia."

[11] Revolutions are the most obvious examples of political processes that can sweep away clientelistic systems, but they are rarely followed by respect for associational autonomy. New webs of clientelism can emerge in their wake, especially in rural areas. See, e.g., Jean C. Oi, "Communism and Clientelism: Rural Politics in China," *World Politics* 37 (January 1985). On the tensions over associational autonomy between peasant movements and left-wing political parties that claim to represent them in Latin America, see Jonathan Fox, "New Terrain for Rural Politics" *Report on the Americas* 25, no. 5 (1992).

[12] See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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access to state entitlements can precede electoral competition, as in Mexico, though it is often encouraged by it.[13]

The causal argument here is that the right to associational autonomy is politically constructed through iterative cycles of conflict among three key actors: autonomous social movements, authoritarian elites reluctant to cede power, and reformist state managers—the latter defined as those willing to accept increased associational autonomy.[14] The argument is based on the assumption that as long as authoritarian elites remain united, there is little room for the construction of citizenship rights. If faced with legitimacy problems, however, authoritarian political elites sometimes split over how to respond—whether with repression or concessions.[15] In the first instance reformists, defined by their greater concern for political legitimacy and resulting preference for negotiation over coercion, may conflict with hard-line colleagues over whether and how to cede access to the state.[16] Second, if and when such cracks appear in the system, social movements often attempt to occupy them from below, demanding broader access to the state while trying to defend their capacity to articulate their own interests. Third, once triggered, these recursive cycles of bargaining between ruling hard-liners, reformist elites, and social movements can gradually increase official tolerance for auton-

[13] Note that the political terms of *access* to social entitlements are distinct from the *levels* of benefits, which are sometimes referred to as "social citizenship" rights. The argument here does not attempt to explain the determinants of the levels of material entitlements; they are logically and historically distinct from regime type in general and from the right to associational autonomy in particular. Democratic regimes, for example, may offer access to a narrow range of social rights without attaching political conditions (food stamps in the U.S.), whereas authoritarian regimes may offer a broad range of material entitlements in exchange for deference (as in communist and populist regimes). Analysts of the construction of rights have tended to focus either on electoral enfranchisement or on the extension of social welfare benefits, but not on the political terms of access to the latter. See, e.g., J. M. Barbalet, *Citizenship* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

[14] Note that this argument does not attempt to account for the emergence of each of these three actors but rather shows how certain patterns of interaction among them can explain the construction of respect for associational autonomy. On cycles of social mobilization and reform, see Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: How They Succeed and Why They Fail* (New York: Pantheon, 1977); and Sidney Tarrow, *Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements and Cycles of Protest*, Occasional Paper no. 21, Western Societies Program (Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989). To frame the issue of associational autonomy as broadly as possible, this discussion does not detail the diverse range of repertoires of action and forms of representation among poor people's movements.

[15] For the purposes of this discussion, the trigger for division within authoritarian regimes is considered here to be contingent. Possible causes include economic crisis, international pressures, military defeat, and the "excessive" use of repression.

[16] When reformists deliberately encourage social mobilization to offset hard-line authoritarian rulers, they can be said to be pursuing a "sandwich strategy" for political change. See Fox (fn. 3). Other examples include the U.S. federal government's antipoverty and civil rights efforts in the early 1960s, Colombian agrarian reform policy in the late 1960s, and Gorbachev's glasnost policies of the late 1980s.

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omous social organizations, often following a pattern of "two steps forward, one step back."[17]

Even though societal actors often fail to win their immediate demands, they may manage to conserve some degree of autonomy in the troughs between cycles of mobilization, a resource to be deployed at the next political opportunity. This process is highly uneven within nation-states. Societal groups gain legitimacy and leverage at very different rates and in different bargaining arenas.[18] This iterative framework suggests that the transition from clientelism to citizenship involves three distinct patterns of state-society relations within the same nation-state: redoubts of persistent authoritarian clientelism can coexist with new enclaves of pluralist tolerance, as well as with large gray areas of "semiclientelism" in between.[19] The analytical challenge is to explain changes in the relative weights of each of these distinct "subnational regimes."

The authoritarian and pluralistic poles of this proposed continuum from clientelism to citizenship are easily defined; but it is the multiplicity of political relationships in between that challenges analysts to develop categories appropriate to systems in transition (especially since many regimes in transition tend to get stuck somewhere short of a democratic threshold). This framework suggests that semiclientelism is a useful category for an exploration of those state-society relationships that fall in between authoritarian clientelism and pluralist citizenship rights.

If the authoritarian-clientelist combination of material inducements and coercive threats is to be effective, elites need to appear to be able to enforce compliance. If instead they lack the means to uncover, oversee, and punish noncompliance, then the deals they strike with their subordinates are much less enforceable. Semiclientelist power relations induce compliance more by the threat of the withdrawal of carrots than by the use of sticks.[20] Semiclientelism differs from authoritarian clientelism be-

[17] Note that in this argument, mass mobilization alone cannot win citizenship rights. If authoritarian elites remain united, they can simply respond with coercion rather than concessions. Even when reformists are present within the state, they can lose; cycles of bargaining may well fail to build democratic rights. If hard-liners prevail, they will repress social movements and purge reformists from the state (as in the downward spiral that followed El Salvador's 1979 reformist coup).

[18] In Mexico, for example, citizen's groups from the north have had much greater success at winning official respect than in the much poorer, largely indigenous southern states. Even within the south, results vary greatly across bargaining arenas; winning access to social programs is much easier than ending impunity for violent officials. Similarly, even in relatively democratic Brazil, official respect for human rights varies directly by the victims' race and region.

[19] Though analytically distinct, these categories often overlap in practice.

[20] Seen from the receiving end, the differences between the withdrawal of benefits and the threat of coercion are quite significant. Both can discourage autonomous collective action, but only one is potentially permanent in its effects.

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cause it relies on unenforceable deals, while it differs from pluralism because state actors still attempt to violate the right to associational autonomy.[21]

The differences between these categories can be illustrated by the example of vote buying, a practice widely considered to violate basic democratic rights. To understand how the balance of power between patrons and clients can shift toward the client, one must examine the differences between authoritarian and semiclientelist vote buying. There is a qualitative difference between having the coercive capacity to require proof of compliance (such mechanisms abound) and using less violent electoral inducements that "trust" the voter to go along with the bargain. In some contexts cultural norms are sufficient to guarantee compliance, but political culture can change as regimes become more competitive.[22] The politics of trust is shaped by institutions. Ballot secrecy, for example, is one of those democratic formalities that is especially important to the weakest members of the polity—those most vulnerable to reprisals for voting the wrong way.[23] If civic mobilization and/or institutional change increases the actual secrecy of the ballot, then citizens can avoid the reprisals associated with rejecting authoritarian vote buyers and vote their conscience.

The Mexican experience is useful for exploring the transitions from clientelism to semiclientelism and citizenship, even though the political system is still largely dominated by an authoritarian corporatist brand of electoral machine politics. First, the Mexican state's hegemony has long

[21] The term pluralism refers here to respect for associational autonomy rather than to the political system as a whole. Access to social programs can be considered pluralistic when it is not conditioned on political subordination.

[22] Taiwan is a case where political attitudes and opportunities are changing quickly, showing how political action can undermine clientelism. Vote buying is still pervasive in Taiwan, and traditional norms of gratitude used to be sufficient to produce compliance. In the last several years, however, partly as the result of effective civic education campaigns, increasing numbers of voters accept the money and only comply symbolically. According to a recent study by the Center for Policy Studies at Sun Yat-Sen University, 44.8% of the population of Taiwan's second largest city were given money for their vote, but only 12.7% of them said they would actually vote for the candidate who bribed them; see Robin Herr, "A Call for Independence in Taiwan," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 5, 1993. Reportedly, one member of the family may return the favor with a vote for the ruling party while the rest feel free to vote their preference.

[23] In Colombia, for example, an apparently small change in ballot procedures after 1990 significantly weakened clientelistic bosses. Until then separate ballots were cast for each party, allowing bosses to check how people were going to vote while they waited in line. After 1990 the system was changed to a single ballot, which greatly increased ballot secrecy. Even where individual ballots might be secret, however, communities that are united in voting for the democratic opposition still reveal their dissent to authoritarian elites. In the key 1987 congressional elections in the Philippines, for example, government military units regularly assembled farmworkers to threaten them with reprisals should their villages vote for pro-land-reform candidates (author's field interviews).

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been based on the successful clientelistic incorporation of the poor; understanding how respect for pluralism can be extended in this especially difficult case can shed light on the dynamics of change under less institutionalized regimes. Second, Mexico's two decades of stop-and-go political openings since the dramatic legitimacy crisis of 1968 make it possible to examine the ambiguous relationship between the liberalization of associational autonomy and increased electoral competition.

The empirical discussion begins with an analysis of Mexico's cycles of societal mobilization from below, openings from above, conflict, and backlash within both state and society. This interactive approach is then applied to an analysis of the determinants of respect for associational autonomy in the case of indigenous peoples' access to rural development programs.[24] The empirical analysis combines change over time in the course of three successive generations of targeted rural development programs with an explanation of the range of outcomes across a development policy that was especially promising in terms of increased respect for associational autonomy.

Filling the Cracks in the Mexican System

Ever since the legitimacy crisis that followed the harsh repression of the 1968 student movement, Mexico's ruling political class has sought ways to accommodate change without ceding power. The result has been recurrent cycles of conflict over the terms of state-society bargaining relations. From below, organizations of civil society have pushed the state to respect associational autonomy. From above, reformists have sought to displace machine-style authoritarian brokers whose intransigence provoked opposition and unrest, by creating alternative bargaining channels that bypassed parties—both official and opposition.

In Mexico machine-style political brokers play the key role in mediating state-society relations, both within and without the corporatist apparatus.[25] The classic political bargain required official incorporation of

[24] Classic individualistic ideas of citizenship may be inappropriate for non-Western social actors. For a critique of the imposition of foreign notions of citizenship on indigenous societies, see Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, "Liberal Democracy and *Ayllu* Democracy: The Case of Northern Potosí, Bolivia," in Fox (fn. 10). In part for this reason, this study analyzes associational autonomy in terms of the state's respect for ethnic and community-based groups rather than in terms of individual members of those communities.

[25] New historical research stresses that the coverage of Mexico's well-known corporatist organizations was partial rather than complete; see Jeffrey W. Rubin, "Popular Mobilization and the Myth of State Corporatism," in Joe Foweraker and Ann Craig, eds., *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990). On rural bosses, see Roger Bartra, ed., *Caciquismo y poder politico en el México rural* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1975); and Fox (fn. 3). On elite political clientelism, see Roderic A. Camp, "Camarillas in

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social groups under state tutelage in exchange for access to social programs. Mass protest that was strictly "social" was sometimes tolerated, but if it was perceived as "political" (that is, as challenging the hegemony of the ruling party) the usual mix of partial concessions with repression shifted toward the latter. Movements were more likely to be labeled as political if they expressed their autonomy by publicly rejecting official subordination.[26]

The pyramid of brokers managed challenges to stability for decades, but as they became increasingly ossified and provoked growing resentment, social groups sought greater autonomy. By the 1980s ascendant technocrats who viewed the old-fashioned brokers as both expensive and politically ineffective moved social policy away from reliance on traditional patronage and generalized subsidies toward measures that ostensibly targeted the poor directly. This process favored a mix of official and nonpartisan social movements. In contrast to the repression of the past, this new bargaining style recognized autonomous movement leaders as legitimate interlocutors as long as they steered clear of overt political opposition.

This new approach shifted the mix of clientelistic carrots and sticks faced by social movements. Where state managers replaced their traditional crude insistence on ruling party control with more subtle forms of controlling access to the system, one can speak of emerging semiclientelist relations. Such relationships are not pluralistic, however, because they still discourage any questioning of the government's broader socioeconomic policies and its controversial electoral practices. Thus, while the transition from clientelism to semiclientelism may look like a step in the direction of responsive government, the erosion of strict controls on voter compliance may also *increase* the incentives for state managers to rely on

Mexican Politics: The Case of the Salinas Cabinet," *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 6 (Winter 1990); Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (February 1992); Susan Kaufman Purcell and John F. H. Purcell, "State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?" *World Politics* 32 (January 1980); and Peter Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[26] This dichotomy of "official versus independent" social movements was especially pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, as collective resistance to the state grew. By the 1990s social movements increasingly stressed autonomy from political parties in general, since contestational "independence" had often involved subordination to opposition parties. See Jonathan Fox and Gustavo Gordillo, "Between State and Market: The Campesinos' Quest for Autonomy," in Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith, eds., *Mexico's Alternative Political Futures* (La Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1989); Foweraker and Craig (fn. 25); and Judith Adler Hellman "The Study of New Social Movements in Latin America and the Question of Autonomy," in Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez, eds., *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).

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electoral fraud to minimize uncertainty. This may be happening in Mexico.[27]

It is important to point out that Mexico's postrevolutionary political class has a long tradition of mobilizing contending social groups to settle its own internal conflicts. With the 1970s and 1980s social movements were better able to retain some degree of autonomy in their bargaining with the state. Insofar as movements could conserve these small increases in tolerance for autonomy in the troughs between waves of mobilization, they could increase their capacity to take advantage of the next political opportunity.

These conflict cycles led to three distinct patterns of interaction between the state and social movements: continued clientelism, modernized semiclientelism, and more pluralistic bargaining, distributed unevenly both geographically and socially. As the autonomous organizations of civil society broadened and deepened their still-nascent roots, the relative weights of these patterns changed and the pluralist enclaves grew over time. The following analysis traces this process in the Mexican environment most hostile to the consolidation of autonomous representative organizations: the poorest, largely indigenous rural regions.[28]

Openings from Above Meet Mobilization from Below

Since the early 1970s reformist policymakers have promoted three successive rural development programs that bypassed and competed with the rest of the state apparatus. These reformists never fully controlled policy implementation, but they were sometimes sufficiently influential to open up alternative channels to antipoverty programs for the rural poor, allowing them to bypass authoritarian bosses. The first cycle of reform was launched during a wave of nationalist populism in the early

[27] Distributing patronage through semiclientelistic means (i.e., nonenforceable deals) can also make fraudulent electoral outcomes seem more politically plausible to the electorate, since even individuals who accepted the incentives but voted their conscience anyway cannot be sure how many others did the same. This in turn undermines the potential for collective action in defense of clean elections.

[28] Although similar cycles of social mobilization can also be found in Mexican urban politics, their emergence in remote rural areas as well shows that the erosion of clientelism can be encouraged by strategic political action and is not driven exclusively by secular socioeconomic trends such as urbanization. On urban politics and the poor, see Vivienne Bennett, "The Evolution of Urban Popular Movements in Mexico between 1968 and 1988," in Escobar and Alvarez (fn. 26); Wayne Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975); Susan Eckstein, *The Poverty of Revolution*, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Fox and Hernández (fn. 4); and Peter Ward, *Welfare Politics in Mexico* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

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1970s, in the wake of the student movement and in response to growing rural protest. The second was initiated in 1979 from above; social pressures had ebbed, but the preemptive goal was to create channels to contain future waves. The third targeted reform responded to the regime's first national electoral challenge in decades, extending into urban areas and building on the policy lessons and organizations left by the previous cycles. In each cycle of distributive reform, high-level, moderate reformists tried to offset more authoritarian elites by recruiting radical reformists at lower levels to promote contained social mobilization. They attempted to create counterweights to displace more rigid elites, though not to share power with the opposition. The goal was to induce and channel conflict in the short run in order to make the regime more stable in the long run.

In practice, most of these distributive programs were either captured by traditional authoritarian elements or delivered through semiclientelistic channels, yet each also involved small but significant openings to the autonomous organizations of civil society. Since this inquiry focuses on the opening of pluralistic access, the discussion concentrates on the dynamics of those exceptional programs that permitted the creation of new political space. The first two rural development reform cycles are reviewed briefly to show how mobilization from below interacted with openings from above. This is followed by an analysis of Mexico's most recent antipoverty strategy, the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL).

The Rural Investment Program (PIDER)

Mexico launched the Program for Rural Development Investments (PIDER) in 1973. After decades of antipeasant policies, rapidly growing social pressures overwhelmed the official corporatist organizations inherited from the land reform of the 1930s. Waves of radical direct action swept the countryside, and guerrilla movements emerged in the most polarized regions. Reformists gained leverage within the state and advocated recognition of some dissident movements as a way of channeling their mobilization. Large-scale World Bank funding for PIDER made this task easier.

PIDER claimed to target the rural poor, rather than the powerful elites who had captured most of the benefits of previous development programs. In practice, however, community participation was largely nominal[29]—except where reformists controlled actual project implemen-

[29] According to one PIDER official: "If participation is stimulated too much it gets out of PIDER's control and brings political problems. It becomes a political problem for PIDER when

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tation. They targeted investments to political hot spots as concessions to independent mass movements. The Community Access Road program, for example, created employment and increased freedom of movement in some of the poorest and most isolated regions, undermining both traditional authoritarian bosses and incipient guerrilla groups. In some areas "PIDER Brigades" successfully organized peasant protest against regional bosses for broader distribution of credit and fertilizer.[30] However, some reformists (including a future president) concerned with restoring the system's legitimacy in the longer run concluded that they needed to open up broader channels of participation and thereby weaken entrenched rural bosses more systematically.[31]

The Village Food Store Program (CONASUPO-COPLAMAR)[32]

The national crisis surrounding the 1976 presidential succession was followed by an emphasis on restoring investor confidence. The partial political opening of antipoverty policy closed up. Reformers then tried to channel dissent by liberalizing electoral politics. As the oil boom revived the economy in the late 1970s, the president's concern shifted to legitimation, which allowed for the creation of a more open channel for delivering resources to the very poor. The National Plan for Depressed Zones and Marginal Groups (COPLAMAR), together with the National Basic Foods Company (CONASUPO), organized an extensive network of village food stores designed to weaken local monopolies over staples in remote rural areas. As with PIDER, the degree to which the CONASUPO-COPLAMAR village store program actually encouraged or tolerated autonomous mo-

it begins to break up or threaten commercial interests"; quoted in Merilee Grindle, "Official Interpretations of Rural Underdevelopment: Mexico in the 1970s," *Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies* 20 (1981), 43. See also Michael Cernea, *A Social Methodology for Community Participation in Local Investment: The Experience of Mexico's PIDER Program*, World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 598 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, August 1983); and Daniel Noah Lindheim, "Regional Development and Deliberate Social Change: Integrated Rural Development in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1986).

[30] In one notable case, the PIDER Brigade was so effective at encouraging autonomous mobilization that the governor expelled it from the state; see Fox (fn. 4).

[31] Notably, Carlos Salinas de Gortari's dissertation concluded that because of the ineffectiveness and corruption of the conventional state apparatus, the regime lost the political payoff associated with increased antipoverty spending: "The State [must] rely on a corps of leaders of local development programs who will be attentive to the problems encountered in the delivery of development projects to targeted communities. . . . They must lead, not in the hierarchic sense of demanding obedience, but in the sense of coordinating and orienting a decision-making process in which the members of affected communities participate." See Carlos Salinas de Gortari, *Political Participation, Public Investment, and Support for the System: A Comparative Study of Rural Communities in Mexico*, Research Report Series 35 (La Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1982), 41–42.

[32] This section draws from the more detailed discussion in Fox (fn. 3).

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bilization varied greatly in practice, but the creation of political space was much more systematic. Radical reformist organizers deliberately encouraged the creation of democratic regional consumer organizations to challenge corrupt private and bureaucratic elites.

The program provided three key resources for community organizing. First, the offer of cheap staple foods created a material incentive for participation to ensure its delivery to the villages. Second, the program's official legitimacy limited the violent repression often directed against autonomous grassroots mobilization. The regional elites whose political and commercial monopolies were threatened did fight back and most of the reformist organizers were eventually purged. The program survived nevertheless. Third, the program gave the community access to transportation, which had formerly been tightly controlled by rent-seeking, often violent elites. With over three thousand trucks, the program could both stock more than twelve thousand village stores and regularly bring together large numbers of otherwise dispersed local delegates to create regionwide community food councils. As one might expect, elites often captured the official channels for poor people's representation: most community food councils were at best consultative and failed to play their intended role as autonomous, "coresponsible" partners in food distribution operations. But unlike previous populist reforms, CONASUPO-COPLAMAR did not systematically make political subordination a condition of material benefits.

While participatory traditions had survived at the village level, especially in indigenous areas, only rarely had isolated communities been able to overcome the powerful obstacles to *regionwide* organization. Regional peasant organizations are especially important in representing the interests of the rural poor because they have the potential to combine the clout of a larger group with the responsiveness of smaller associations. Village-level groups are easily isolated by their enemies, while national peasant organizations are usually democratic only insofar as they are made up of representative regional building blocks. In areas where loyalties rarely extended beyond family and village, the warehouses and food councils encouraged the emergence of regional collective identities. This targeted social program survived Mexico's post-1982 economic crisis; it had generated an organized, relatively autonomous constituency, which greatly raised the potential political cost to the state of reneging on its commitment to the program. By the time the rural consumer movement peaked in 1985, more than one-fourth of community food councils had gained the capacity to articulate their interests autonomously, as evidenced by their willingness to join a national network to protest corrupt and au-

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thoritarian policy implementation. For one to two million of Mexico's most impoverished rural people, the food councils were among the first genuinely mass-based, regionwide representative organizations of any kind.[33]

Thus, the community food councils became a new, two-way bridge between state and societal actors. From above, state reformists structured new patterns of representation within rural society. From below, these new channels offered opportunities for autonomous interest articulation in some regions, which in turn left an imprint on the state. This "objective alliance" between social movements and reformists within the government food distribution company permitted the consolidation of effective mechanisms of citizen oversight, making it the first national experience with what would later be called *concertación social*.[34] This new bargaining relationship moved away from traditional forms of subordination to a mix of semiclientelism and respect for autonomy.

Revitalizing Single-Party Rule: The National Solidarity Program

After the 1982 collapse of the oil/debt boom, social spending was reduced by cutting generalized programs and clientelistic patronage while strengthening the more targeted programs.[35] By the mid-1980s, with the ruling party under unprecedented electoral pressure from the Right, some federal-level reformists ceded new space to the Left in the nonelectoral arena. Where autonomous social organizations were sufficiently powerful, reformists sometimes stopped requiring overt political subordination in exchange for material concessions, as in the case of Mexico City's housing movements in the aftermath of the earthquake. The reformists were still overshadowed, however, by the technocrats who made macroeconomic policy, the "dinosaurs" in the corporatist sectors of the party, and the government "alchemists" who continued to handle elections. Then, in the 1988 presidential election, Mexico's dominant party was shaken by a surprise challenge from the voters.

After a hotly disputed race marred by widespread fraud, President Carlos Salinas took office declaring the end of the one-party system. He promised a new relationship between state and society, seeking to revive citizen confidence by bypassing both the opposition and the traditional

[33] For the geographic distribution of autonomous Food Councils, see Fox (fn. 3).

[34] *Concertación* in the Mexican context has been translated in a variety of ways, ranging from "social dialogue" to "corporative agreements."

[35] This shift was especially clear in the area of urban consumer food subsidies, which supported a wide range of staples until the mid-1980s. Then the government began limiting food subsidies to tortillas and milk for means-tested low-income city dwellers.

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corporatist apparatus. The traditional bureaucratic and corporatist channels were too inefficient to buffer the social costs of austerity that had fueled the 1988 opposition. Social spending would be increased, but targeted through new, less leaky channels that would have the largest possible positive impact on the president's public image. Social spending was brought under the umbrella of the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL), which claimed to shift the balance of power away from the bureaucracy and toward organized citizens.[36] The impact on poverty was debated, but it worked politically; the president and Solidarity both had very high 1991 opinion poll ratings, much higher than those of the official party.[37]

Solidarity was clearly politically motivated in that it skillfully allocated disproportionate amounts of resources to recover areas of strong center-left electoral opposition. For example, 12 percent of Solidarity's entire 1992 budget went to the relatively small state of Michoacán, the main base of the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), just before the heated gubernatorial elections.[38] One-fourth of the twenty-five hundred Solidarity promoters nationally were deployed there. The geographical targeting of spending to swing districts does not necessarily mean that access to the program's benefits was systematically conditioned on traditional forms of subordination, however.[39]

[36] Solidarity proclaimed that its "new dynamic . . . breaks with bureaucratic atavism and administrative rigidity. Public servants increasingly share a vocation for dialogue, agreement, *concertación* and direct, coresponsible work with the citizenry, which also assumes an increasingly active and leading role in the actions intended to improve their standard of living." See Carlos Rojas et al., *Solidaridad a Debate* (Mexico City: El Nacional, 1991), 23.

[37] For comprehensive overviews of PRONASOL politics, see Denise Dresser, *Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity Program*, Current Issues Brief no. 3 (La Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991); idem, "Pronasol: los dilemas de la gobernabilidad," *El Cotidiano* 49 (July–August 1992). See also the *Los Angeles Times* poll, October 22, 1991. Solidarity spending rose sharply just before the 1991 midterm elections and was widely credited with helping to revive the official party's electoral fortunes, although its impact is difficult to disentangle from reduced inflation and the beginnings of economic growth. For journalistic accounts of direct electoral use of Solidarity funding, see Pascal Beltrán del Rio, "Solidaridad, oxígeno para el PRI, en el rescate de votos," *Proceso* 718 (August 6, 1990); idem, "El memorandum de Pichardo, prueba de que el Pronasol es para servir al PRI," *Proceso* 730 (October 29, 1990); Guillermo Correa, "EL PRONASOL, que nacío como esperanza, ha generado corrupción y protestas," *Proceso* 727 (October 8, 1990); and Ciro Gómez Leyva, "Solidaridad gratuita en todas las pantallas," *Este País* 7 (October 1991).

[38] Tim Golden, "Point of Attack for Mexico's Retooled Party Machine: The Leftist Stronghold," *New York Times*, July 12, 1992. See also Jesús Cantú, "Solidaridad, además de electorero, se manejó en Michoacán coercitivamente," *Proceso* 819 (July 13, 1992). In addition, the governor's election campaign expenses reportedly topped U.S. $30 million, almost $80 per vote officially cast for the PRI; see Elías Chávez, "Michoacán: cada voto costó 239,188 pesos; cada voto del PRD costó 6,916 pesos," *Proceso* 821 (July 27, 1992). For a state-level statistical analysis of electoral targeting, see Juan Molinar and Jeffrey Weldon, "Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National Solidarity," in Wayne Cornelius, Ann Craig, and Jonathan Fox, eds., *Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy* (La Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, forthcoming).

[39] So far, much of the debate surrounding Solidarity's political character has been based

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Solidarity officially targets the urban poor, peasants, and indigenous peoples, with various programs for sewage and potable water, health, education, food distribution, electrification, street paving, housing, and soft loans for low-income rural producers.[40] Its early accomplishments in building physical infrastructure were dramatic, delivering services to thousands of communities. At the receiving end, Solidarity usually required beneficiaries to form local Solidarity committees, which in turn could choose from a fixed menu of public works (for example, electrification, paved roads, school repair).

Although Solidarity's official discourse stressing participation and coresponsibility was drawn from earlier PIDER and village food-store programs of the 1970s and 1980s, four differences were especially notable. First, Solidarity responded directly to an electoral challenge. Second, it focused on the municipality, not just federal agencies, for delivery of services. Third, it concentrated on the urban poor, using lessons from rural development. Fourth, its ideological thrust was much more prominent, promoting the idea of a partnership between state and society.

Most Solidarity funding was distributed through targeted grants to state and municipal governments.[41] The actual degree of public accountability and antipoverty targeting depended in part on whether local governments were democratically elected. Even where majority rule prevailed, however, there was no guarantee that Solidarity funding would

more on ideological polemic than on empirical evidence, but the most plausible hypothesis is that, on balance, most of the electorally targeted spending was probably delivered through semiclientelist means. The basis for this general proposition, which will not be tested here, is that since most Solidarity programs were delivered from outside the community, they lacked the official party's once-powerful capacity to monitor and punish noncompliance at the individual level. As long as fraud remains an option for the regime, however, it can reduce the importance of individual compliance. Recently, most electoral manipulation appears to have occurred before election day. For example, over one hundred thousand likely opposition voters were allegedly "shaved" from the registration rolls in Michoacán, especially in urban PRD strongholds. See Ted Bardacke, "The Lion Learns New Tricks," *El Financiero Internacional*, July 20, 1992. It must also be noted that the regime still uses sticks as well as carrots; selective political violence against the Left also continues with impunity. The PRD reported that 230 of its members had been killed for political reasons since 1988 (*La Jornada*, May 11, 1993). See also America's Watch, *Human Rights in Mexico: A Policy of Impunity* (New York: America's Watch, 1990); idem, "Unceasing Abuses: Human Rights in Mexico One Year after the Introduction of Reform" (New York: America's Watch, September 1991); and PRD Human Rights Commission, *The Political Violence in Mexico: A Human Rights Affair* (Mexico City: Human Rights Commission Parliamentary Group, April 1992).

[40] In addition to provision of public goods, this wide range of programs also included many with benefits that were much more divisible and therefore more vulnerable to local elite diversion (for example, soft loans for peasant producers). This distinction is central to the analysis of targeting. See Judith Tendler, *Rural Projects through Urban Eyes: An Interpretation of the World Bank's New-Style Rural Development Projects* Working Paper 532 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982).

[41] Solidarity spending is allocated at the president's discretion, as distinct from Mexico's official revenue-sharing, which is allocated according to technical formulas. See John Bailey, "Centralism and Political Change in Mexico: The Case of National Solidarity," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 38).

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reach the poorest in society. Even if public works were built in poor regions, the electoral logic of high-profile bridges, highways, park benches, and basketball courts had little to do with alleviating poverty. According to one top Solidarity policymaker, for example, less than 40 percent of its 1991 budget should really be considered antipoverty spending, since the rest consisted of untargeted public works.

Solidarity's declared emphasis on strengthening the municipality differed notably from previous reforms of social policy. Where opposition political parties managed both to win over the majority of voters and to get their municipal victories recognized, federal funders appeared not to discriminate, since Solidarity spent money in almost all opposition municipalities. But many opposition mayors protested that the program bypassed them completely, linking the state and federal government directly to local Solidarity committees in their jurisdictions. The most notable case was Michoacán's state capital, the largest city with a PRD mayor.[42] Moreover, where democracy did not prevail at the municipal level and citizens' groups persisted in pressing charges of fraud, they tended to be excluded from Solidarity.

Overall, Solidarity appeared to centralize power, promoting a symbolic link between the president and the local community, often bypassing both traditional political bosses and the opposition. This provoked serious subterranean conflicts between "*salinistas*" at the federal level and more traditional state authorities in the ruling party.[43] Solidarity proclaimed the creation of over one hundred thousand local committees, with an average of about 120 members each, and they became increasingly important as counterweights to the official party apparatus. One top Solidarity official estimates that as many as 40 percent of the committees had actually become local actors by 1993. In conflict with the party's traditional corporatist sectors, the president openly encouraged the local Solidarity committees to build statewide and possibly national organizations with what he called the "new mass politics of the Mexican state."[44]

[42] See Cantú (fn. 38). On the PRD, see Jonathan Fox and Julio Moguel, "Pluralism and Anti-Poverty Policy in Mexico: The Experience of Left Opposition Municipal Governments," in Victoria Rodríguez and Peter Ward, eds., *Opposition Government in Mexico: Past Experiences and Future Opportunities* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, forthcoming); and on the National Action Party state government in Baja California Norte, see Gerardo Albarrán de Alba, "Con Pronasol, la necesidad de la gente se usa electoralmente: Ruffo," *Proceso*, no. 829, September 21, 1992. The pattern was not consistent, since some opposition municipalities of both Right and Left managed to bargain for control over PRONASOL resources.

[43] See Dresser (fn. 37, 1991 and 1992); and Jorge Fernández, "El PRI ante su propia transición," *Unomásuno*, November 7, 1991.

[44] In this context, the president reportedly once told the following to a longtime friend, a

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Solidarity had a mixed record with autonomous social organizations, recognizing some while challenging others. In some cases, Solidarity agreements permitted independent poor people's organizations to bypass hostile governors; this kind of federal-local alliance permitted the Popular Defense Committee (CDP) to win the mayoralty of the state capital of Durango, displacing regional PRI elites.[45] Where especially authoritarian governors managed to exclude autonomous social organizations, however, they used Solidarity programs to promote competing development and welfare projects and reinforced the most authoritarian elements within the ruling party (for example, in Guerrero). In many areas the local Solidarity committees appeared to reflect the "modernization" of clientelistic control, as poor people in need of basic services shifted their patrons from regional elites to federal officials.

The broader question is, what exactly was the combination of clientelist, semiclientelist, and pluralistic patterns of policy implementation embedded within Solidarity's "new mass politics"? Because of the extraordinary heterogeneity of the programs under Solidarity's banner, systematic generalization awaits further empirical research. The remainder of this essay explains the limits and possibilities for respect for associational autonomy in a limiting case, one of the most potentially "propluralism" Solidarity programs.

Targeting the Poorest: Solidarity Bolsters the National Indigenous Institute

The National Indigenous Institute (INI) carries out some of Solidarity's most innovative development projects. Mexico's fifty-six indigenous peoples represent 10–15 percent of the nation's population and almost one-third of the fourteen million Mexicans officially considered to be in "extreme poverty." With Solidarity, INI's budget increased eighteenfold

historic radical leader of the urban popular movement: "You were my teacher: everywhere I go I leave a base of support." At a meeting of five hundred representatives of five thousand urban Solidarity committees, for example, the president called for the creation of a national neighborhood network outside the ruling party. See Emilio Lomas, "La democracia ya no es de las cúpulas, afirma Salinas," *La Jornada*, September 13, 1991; idem, "Salinas: nueva relación Estado-sociedad civil," *La Jornada*, September 15, 1991. Midway through the Salinas presidency, his advisers secretly debated three options—use the committees to build a new reform party, fold them openly into the official party, or keep them relatively nonpartisan. The latter position reportedly won.

[45] The CDP won the mayoralty in 1992 without allying with either the PAN or the PRD, leading some observers to suggest its access to Solidarity resources moderated its approach to national politics. See Paul Haber, "Collective Dissent in Mexico: The Political Outcome of Contemporary Urban Popular Movements" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1992); idem, "Political Change in Durango: The Role of National Solidarity," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 38).

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during the first three years of the Salinas government.[46] Most indigenous peoples also happen to live in the rural central and southern regions that provided Salinas with his official margin of victory in the 1988 presidential elections.[47] Most of INI's budget had tended to go to its own staff rather than to indigenous economic development.[48] With Solidarity funding, however, INI could transform itself from a service provider into an actual economic development agency.[49] But money alone was not enough; INI's capacity to implement innovative policy also depended on the role of a reform faction still embedded in the agency since past openings. Since its founding in 1948, INI's history has been shaped by a shifting internal balance of forces among three factions: authoritarian patrons primarily identified with the ruling party and local elites, semiclientelist opponents of local elite domination of indigenous peoples who did not support independent demand making, and pluralists who supported autonomous self-organization for indigenous rights. The latter group has long provided only a minority of local outreach staff, who rarely managed to have any input into INI policy-making. INI officials stressed that they could be "faithful" to Solidarity principles of participation, pluralism, and transparency because most of their development funds were distributed directly, bypassing municipal and state authorities that were often openly racist.[50]

[46] According to INI's annual report, its budget for the 1991 fiscal year was U.S. $140 million. President Salinas named Arturo Warman, PIDER veteran and one of Mexico's most distinguished anthropologists, as INI director. Solidarity's overall coordinator, Carlos Rojas, had worked for INI in Veracruz.

[47] Many Mexican anthropologists see indigenous voting patterns in terms of local "short-term considerations that have nothing to do with political programs that propose alternative models for the future. The vote is seen more as a resource for here and now, [for] finishing a road, building a school or a drinking water system; [the] small benefits that help to resolve ancestral problems which shape their daily lives"; see Guillermo Bonfil, *Mexico Profundo: Una civilización negada* (Mexico City: Grijalbo/CONACULT, 1990), iii. Indeed, parties are not present in most indigenous regions (though this began to change after 1988). The analytical problem is to distinguish cause from effect. If opposition political parties fail to champion indigenous rights, then isolated villagers have few incentives to take the serious risks inherent in partisan collective action, especially when it so often appears unviable. As voters, they may not lack national political preferences as much as they lack meaningful national political choices.

[48] E.g., see Juan Flores, "Proyectos de Etnodesarrollo = los ricos más ricos y los pobres más pobres," *Etnias* 2 (January 1991); and Alvaro González, Teresa Valdivia, and Martha Rees, "Evaluación de los Programas Agrícolas del INI: Chiapas, Puebla y Oaxaca" (Paper presented at the Society for Applied Anthropology, Oaxaca, April 1987).

[49] INI's other new initiatives during the Salinas administration included a human rights program that released over six thousand indigenous prisoners, as well as promotion of a constitutional amendment that for the first time officially recognized Mexico as a multicultural society. As of mid-1993 human rights groups campaigned for the freedom of several thousand indigenous prisoners who remained in jail without due process.

[50] One INI official also stressed that his staff was different from that of most Solidarity programs because they were "usually not in any political party. It's very unusual that INI personnel are in the PRI—but they aren't in the [opposition] PRD either. They aren't people

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INI had nominally supported the participation of indigenous organizations since the mid-1970s, but for the first time the agency committed itself explicitly to a pluralistic bargaining process. Now, INI was to

> contribute to *the strengthening of indigenous organizations, increasing their autonomy and their capacity for representation and [project] management*. . . . All the representative and legally constituted organizations can be subjects of these *concertación* processes, without any political or religious discrimination. . . . *Public institutions will abstain from intervening in the internal decisions of the organizations with which* INI *has concerted actions.*[51]

How did INI put these policy guidelines into practice? This question is best answered by examining INI's largest economic development program, the Regional Solidarity Funds (FRS).[52] In principle, these funds went farther than most other Solidarity programs in developing a pluralist relationship between the state and organized citizens, for two reasons. First, the state devolved *regional* development decision making to civil society, rather than micromanaging each local project from above. Second, the interlocutors were supposed to be *systematically* made up of autonomous councils of representative organizations, in contrast to the ad hoc and discretionary relationships with autonomous groups that predominated elsewhere.[53] Ostensibly, elected officials were not involved, and government-affiliated organizations participated in the Regional Funds just like any other producer group.[54]

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who are going to induce [i.e., manipulate] or condition." He claimed that because they work in such remote regions, "they will work with existing organizations—they can't invent others."

[51] INI, 1990, 41–42; emphasis added. Participation is limited to policy implementation here. INI continued to reject the long-standing demands of indigenous groups for greater involvement in the policy process itself. Some of INI's most reformist policymakers tried this in 1983, but they were quickly purged.

[52] INI's other main economic program was its support for coffee producers after the abrupt withdrawal of the Mexican Coffee Institute from the market. Two-thirds of coffee producers are indigenous, accounting for 30 percent of national production and one-third of coffee lands; see INI, *Programa Nacional de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, 1991–1994* (Mexico City: INI, 1990), 17. INI's coffee program involved both pluralistic relations with autonomous producer organizations and semiclientelist relations with INI-sponsored local Solidarity committees. See Luis Hernández and Fernando Celis, "Solidarity and the New Campesino Movement: The Case of Coffee Production," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 38).

[53] INI described the FRS's in explicitly political terms: "The Funds are an innovative process [to] increase the participatory role of civil society in decision making and in the definition of policy, which reflects a change in state-society relations. The relationship of coresponsibility established between the government and the indigenous population implies a turnaround in the role of [government] institutions to avoid reproducing paternalistic and vertical attitudes that interfere with indigenous peoples' development"; see INI, "Manual de Operación de los Fondos Regionales de Solidaridad para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas" (Unpublished manuscript, Mexico City, November 1991), 2. This statement was dropped from the version eventually published for mass distribution in 1993.

[54] INI also encouraged the FRS's to go beyond economic support for production projects and

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The Regional Funds were launched in 1990. Each INI field outreach office convened a general assembly of the formal and informal community-based social and economic organizations in its area of influence. The general assembly was to elect a leadership council (LC), which would actually operate the fund and evaluate project proposals submitted from the organizations of the region. Loans could be for a single crop cycle or for as long as several years and could cover a broad range or economic activities. In theory, those with regionwide multiplier effects were to be given preference over projects whose benefits were limited to small groups. In practice, however, projects ranged from tiny family enterprises and corrupt clientelistic payoffs to long-term investments in group marketing that actually had regionwide development impact.

After the first two years INI's internal evaluations found that between one-fourth and one-third of the Regional Funds were being consolidated under indigenous organization control, a comparable share were failing, in part due to capture by authoritarian elites, and a plurality were still run by INI outreach staff.[55] A variety of factors account for the mixed performance, including continuing INI semiclientelism, uneven levels of indigenous organizational development, and outright authoritarian exclusion. The most consolidated funds emerged in regions where two factors came together: first, that indigenous producer groups were already well organized, and second, that INI officials were either willing or obliged to cede power over funding.

Leadership Council Consolidation: Are Adversaries Included?

The Regional Funds were the most promising "propluralism" case within Solidarity, but to what degree did the state actually share power with civil society? The answer requires a detailed study of who was actually represented by each leadership council and of the extent to which those that were representative gained autonomy vis-à-vis INI. Administrators were to provide technical support for project design but were not to intervene in the actual decision-making process. Nevertheless, the official financial procedures required that local INI directors co-sign project

become advocates for indigenous communities in the broader public investment allocation process; the effort was largely unsuccessful.

[55] The more consolidated Regional Funds were reportedly in Veracruz, Chiapas, and Oaxaca, while those in the Huasteca, Chihuahua, and the Yucatán peninsula did poorly. Tabasco was especially disastrous: the governor tried to impose a corrupt crony as local INI director, which provoked a mass protest movement, and then rejected any development aid that could possibly reach potential opposition sympathizers. Not coincidentally, the state PRD leader, Manuel López Obrador, had won a broad indigenous following during his tenure as local INI director in the early 1980s.

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loan checks. This gave each director potential veto power over the decisions of the leadership councils, provoking serious debate between grassroots organizations and INI officials.

The field study of the politics of access to the Regional Solidarity Funds focused on the southern state of Oaxaca, which accounted for twenty of the almost one hundred Regional Funds in 1992.[56] INI's Oaxaca staff used evaluation categories that paralleled the traditional clientelist, semiclientelist, and pluralist patterns suggested above. They categorized the leadership councils as: (1) LCs whose development was blocked by the intervention of political parties, local economic or political bosses or conflicts between local groups, (2) LCs that were INI-run (that is, semiclientelist), (3) LCs that gained autonomy from the INI, using the fund to consolidate their organizing process and pursue regional development strategies. According to INI's confidential evaluations, toward the end of their first year, of the twenty Oaxaca LCs, five were blocked or taken over by political bosses, ten were still run by the INI, and five were gaining autonomy. This general pattern was confirmed by the author's direct field study, together with a survey of independent indigenous leaders and nongovernmental development experts from throughout the state. This survey also found a consensus that after the first two years of Regional Fund operations, at least six leadership councils had reached "consolidation," meaning that autonomous groups played a leading role in allocating resources.[57] This survey found that only three of the twenty Oaxaca leadership councils excluded representative indigenous organizations.

Perhaps the single most revealing indicator of relative pluralism was the presence of affiliates of the nonpartisan Oaxaca State Network of Coffee Producing Organizations (CEPCO), the most consolidated autonomous grassroots economic organization in the state, including over twenty thousand mainly indigenous producers.[58] In most leadership

[56] Oaxaca is one of Mexico's poorest states and at least 44% of the state's population speaks one of the state's seventeen indigenous languages; Rafael Blanco Rivera, "Oaxaca, 1980," *Cuadernos de Demografía Indígena* (Mexico City: INI, Dirección de Investigación y Promoción Cultural, 1991).

[57] These leadership councils were based in Jamiltepec, Miahuatlán, Huautla, Tlacolula, Guelatao, and Cuicatlán. It must be stressed that "consolidation" does *not* imply that all or even most member groups of an LC were representative grassroots groups. Five of Oaxaca's twenty LCs were not "test" cases because of the lack of autonomous indigenous producer organizations in those regions as of mid-1992. For details, see Jonathan Fox, "Targeting the Poorest: The Role of the National Indigenous Institute in Mexico's Solidarity Program," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 38).

[58] Most CEPCO member groups are nonpartisan or operate within the PRI, although a few sympathize with the PRD. CEPCO's main activity is buying, processing, and selling coffee, setting a floor price following the withdrawal of the state from the market in 1989, and representing about one-third of Oaxaca's small coffee producers. Much of the state government

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councils they shared power (and therefore funds) with both corporatist and other autonomous organizations, often for the first time. Several CEPCO members claimed to be underrepresented in the councils, but only in two LCs out of thirteen were they excluded.[59] Overall, the Regional Funds program constituted a small fraction of overall Solidarity funding, even in largely indigenous rural areas, but it was unusual because the pluralistic access was officially supposed to include the entire universe of representative groups in each region, in contrast to the ad hoc and discretional entry points autonomous groups faced in other Solidarity programs.

The "War of Position" for Pluralist Inclusion

The potential distribution of pluralistic leadership councils depended fundamentally on the varying "thickness" of Mexico's organized indigenous civil society—in some regions richly textured, in others quite thin or still heavily structured by clientelism. Some regions had experienced two decades of the ebb and flow of protest and mobilization, often beginning with issues of land rights and then focusing on issues of ethnic identity and human rights.[60] Most of the movements that managed to offset entrenched regional political and economic elites had previously received some kind of support, or at least toleration, from reformist programs like PIDER or CONASUPO-COPLAMAR; each brief and partial opening of political space for new levels of regionwide collective action left the movements better able to take advantage of future cracks in the system.

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and the corporatist apparatus felt threatened by CEPCO's success at providing an alternative. See Julio Moguel and Josefina Aranda, "La Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca," in Julio Moguel, Carlota Botey, and Luis Hernández, eds., *Autonomía y nuevos sujetos sociales en el desarrollo rural* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI/CEHAM, 1992).

[59] A robust notion of pluralism would go beyond this inclusion/exclusion dichotomy and involve some degree of proportional representation. Funds include groups ranging in size from tiny kinship groups to producer associations representing thousands of families, yet in most leadership councils each has the same vote. Some INI directors used their clientele as counterweights to keep more broadly representative groups in the minority. The Mazateca highlands leadership council led the first experiment in institutionalizing proportional representation in the leadership councils, weighting the number of assembly delegates according to the membership of each participating organization. The INI convened this process in an apparent effort to undermine the outspoken CEPCO-affiliated leadership of the Mazateca region's LC and to strengthen the official corporatist group, but the independent coffee producers swept the elections.

[60] Recent indigenous movements have been most intense in Chiapas, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, Veracruz, and Guerrero. See Maria Consuelo Mejía Pineiros and Sergio Sarmiento, *La lucha indígena: un reto a la ortodoxia* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1987); Carole Nagengast and Michael Kearney, "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism," *Latin American Research Review* 25, no. 2 (1990); Sergio Sarmiento, "Movimiento indio y modernización," *Cuadernos Agrarios* 2, new series (1991); and the journals *Etnias* and *Ojarasca* (formerly *México Indígena*).

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This "accumulation of forces" was very uneven, however, and many regions still lacked autonomous groups with the necessary bargaining power and organizational capacity to handle development projects. INI officials in these regions continued to control the Regional Funds, according to both nongovernment development organizations and INI's own internal evaluations.

If the map of representative societal groups was uneven, so was INI's commitment to the program's pluralist principles. The directors of each of the almost one hundred outreach centers were key actors, responsible for convening the elections for leadership councils in their region. They also retained the power to co-sign the development project checks. According to high-level "pro-pluralism" INI staff, *fewer than half* of the outreach directors "understood" the goals of the Regional Funds program (that is, were willing to relinquish their traditional discretional authority over funding). Both state and societal actors willing to share power were distributed unevenly throughout the country, and possibilities for respect for associational autonomy were greatest where they overlapped. Where consolidated, representative organizations already existed and INI directors were willing to devolve effective power over Regional Fund resource allocation, "virtuous circles" of pluralistic policy implementation emerged. These nascent processes nevertheless faced two major obstacles at higher levels in the political system. The first was resistance from more authoritarian political elites, often entrenched in state governments, and the second was INI's own semiclientelistic tendencies.

Governors are strategic authoritarian elements within the regime, in part because they can resist reform efforts in the name of federalism.[61] In states where indigenous peoples joined the electoral opposition, authoritarian elites usually blocked the Regional Funds program (for example, Tabasco, Michoacán, Guerrero). INI may have had more room for maneuver in Oaxaca in part because the state lacked a statewide electoral challenge. Yet the most authoritarian response to the program was in a state with virtually no electoral competition at all—Chiapas. Governors of Chiapas, one of Mexico's most socially polarized states, tend to be among the most repressive and patrimonial. Indigenous organizations in Chiapas were nevertheless highly developed in many regions, reportedly leading to consolidation among almost half of the Regional Funds in the state, according to INI's survey. INI and indigenous producer organizations were sufficiently successful at building tolerant relationships such that the governor jailed three top INI officials on trumped-up charges of

[61] The rate at which presidents remove governors is an excellent indicator of the degree of intrastate conflict in Mexico. During the first three years of the Salinas administration, nine of the thirty-one governors had been forced to resign.

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fraud. Autonomous indigenous organizations marched to defend them. As one leader put it:

> Their only crime was to work with everyone, whether or not they are sympathizers of the government. . . . We demand that they respect us, now that we're learning [to carry out development projects], that they don't block our work. . . . This is a political problem—they blame the INI for everything that happens in Chiapas, but we want to make clear that these are our decisions.[62]

The other main threat to pluralistic inclusion of autonomous groups was INI's political imperative to demonstrate its loyalty to the government's broader policy agenda. For example, in the brief period of public debate before President Salinas announced his historic 1991 privatization of the land-reform system, INI was perceived as being concerned about the possible social cost.[63] Once the constitutional reform was announced and the national debate peaked, however, INI's director closed ranks in support, calling a last-minute national meeting of five hundred Regional Fund representatives to meet the president. The first reaction of Oaxaca's twenty leadership councils was to reject the "invitation." They felt that since their membership had not yet had the opportunity to discuss the proposed reform, they were in no position to go to a national meeting of de facto acclamation. Some even expressed concern for their physical safety upon their return to their communities, since they would be perceived as having supported the reform. After an extended open debate a desperate appeal from INI's Oaxaca state director helped to swing a 14–6 vote in favor of going to Mexico City. If he failed to deliver his ostensible base in a major INI effort to show the agency's loyalty to this key presidential project, he risked being replaced by a less flexible director. Regardless of their vote, most fund leaders felt the INI had betrayed its promise to treat them like citizens.

Although this heavy-handed "roundup" for the presidential meeting resonated with traditional clientelism, it was actually more semiclientelist in content. The reformists attempted to condition access, but indige-

[62] Rosa Rojas, "Indígenas de Chiapas piden se libere a 3 funcionarios del INI," *La Jornada*, March 21, 1992. Leaders of the Chiapas funds were also involved in the successful Xi 'Nich human rights protest march to Mexico City in early 1992. The national leader of Mexico's Independent Front of Indian Peoples (FIPI)—a frequent INI critic—confirmed that the Chiapas Regional Funds were remarkably open to independent groups. See Margarito Xib Ruiz Hernández, "Todo indigenismo es lo mismo," *Ojarasca* (February 1993).

[63] See Matilde Pérez, "El ejido es un sistema equitativo y eficaz: INI," *La Jornada*, October 23, 1991. For a political analysis of the 1991 reform of Mexico's land-tenure system, see Jonathan Fox, "Political Change in Mexico's New Peasant Economy," in Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcacitas, eds., *The Politics of Economic Restructuring in Mexico* (La Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, forthcoming).

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nous leaders freely debated the strategy and tactics of their response. They faced the threat of the withdrawal of carrots, not sticks. Several months later, when INI officials asked the same state council of Regional Fund leaders to meet with the government's candidate for governor of Oaxaca, they again debated how to respond. Again, the vote was 14 to 6 to invite the official candidate, but on the condition that the statewide council invite all other candidates for governor as well. INI arranged the meeting but "forgot" to invite the opposition candidates. The indigenous leaders proceeded to meet with opposition leaders on their own; this time they used their autonomy to open new terrain for civic pluralism.

In summary, an important minority of the Regional Solidarity Funds made progress toward developing more tolerant relationships between reformist branches of the state and many of Mexico's autonomous indigenous organizations. This process also led to new degrees of power sharing between politically and ethnically diverse indigenous organizations themselves. Nevertheless, this process lagged in much of the country because of entrenched semiclientelism, authoritarian exclusion and backlash, and the uneven degrees of consolidation among autonomous indigenous groups themselves.[64]

Toward Pluralism without Democracy

Since the early 1970s successive waves of rural development reform opened small but significant cracks in the system, permitting greater space for more tolerant bargaining relations between the state and society in some of Mexico's poorest regions. The openings were small because they were limited to those few regions and policy areas where reformists effectively intervened in the implementation of rural development policy. The openings were significant because they offered political and economic resources that fostered the consolidation of growing representative and autonomous social organizations.

Even some of society's weakest actors—indigenous smallholder move-

[64] As of mid-1993 the future of the Regional Solidarity Fund program was in doubt. The Social Development Ministry, which controls overall Solidarity funding, had frozen most of INI's 1992 allocations for the Regional Solidarity Funds, blaming lagging repayment rates. Difficulties with repayment were not surprising, given the problems of profitability throughout the agricultural sector; but since the government was very flexible with much larger debts from other agricultural borrowers, such as owners of large coffee plantations or the buyers of privatized sugar mills, slow repayment rates alone were not an especially credible explanation for defunding the program. INI had been politically weakened by the transfer of its influential director to the newly created post of agrarian attorney general. This left INI's Regional Funds vulnerable to powerful antipluralist elements within the Social Development Ministry itself, which wanted to take project decision-making power away from the leadership councils.

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ments—increased their capacity to bargain with the state while retaining important degrees of autonomy. Some chose to abstain from overt electoral challenges, mainly to avoid losing semiclientelistic access to significant resources. But if representative leadership remained in place, they could then choose to engage in open opposition politics if and when the political opportunity structure changed. In a gradual "war of position," social movements and state reformists pushed back the boundaries of the politically possible.[65] With the National Solidarity Program, political action from both above and below further eroded classic clientelism, in urban as well as rural areas. Semiclientelism largely took its place, along with enclaves of pluralist bargaining.

Yet the relationship between the distributive and electoral realms of politics remains problematic. In the electoral arena, Mexico's gradual liberalization began in the early 1970s and was largely limited to the Congress, the weakest branch of government.[66] Both the vote-counting process and the broadcast media remained virtually closed to independent scrutiny. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s the regime began an uncertain process of selective democratization, recognizing some opposition victories (usually from the Right) but not others (usually from the Left). The regime began to accept electoral defeats more often, but in response to mass civic antifraud protests rather than because of actual ballot results. As of 1992 most contested elections were still settled through protest and negotiation *after* the actual voting process was over, a process known as the "second round."[67]

One indicator of the ambiguous relationship between distributive and electoral politics is the uncertain relationship between the liberalization of access to distributive programs and the limited democratization in the electoral arena. Was more open access to social programs a substitute for

[65] Distributive reform thus became political reform, as Przeworski defines it: "a modification of the organization of conflicts that alters the prior probabilities of realizing group interests given their resources." See Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 58.

[66] See Wayne Cornelius, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico, 1976–1985," in Judith Gentleman, ed., *Mexican Politics in Transition* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987); and Kevin Middlebrook, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 65). On electoral change in the 1980s, see Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (fn. 26). For a comparative discussion of Mexico's transition that explores the distinction between the formal regime and the actual political system, see Antonio Camou, "Once tesis sobre la 'transición' mexicana: Gobernabilidad y democracia," *Nexos* 55 (February 1992).

[67] The regime was able to manage this uncertain process largely because the most contested races—for governors and mayors—were staggered so that the ruling party faced only one or two difficult states at a time.

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further electoral democratization, or did it occur in spite of its absence? Did the relatively open distributive policies analyzed here simply constitute the exception that proves the rule of Mexican authoritarianism, in that each partial opening of social programs merely bought votes to reinforce electoral hegemony? Generalization is difficult because electoral conflict had a contradictory impact on most of Solidarity's distributive programs: it simultaneously pressured reformists to encourage the legitimacy of pluralism, created an incentive for them to use the programs as a semiclientelistic mechanism to discourage electoral opposition, and provoked an authoritarian backlash from clientelistic machine politicians. As a result, implementation of Solidarity involved three *concurrent* scenarios: more of the same authoritarian clientelism; modernized semiclientelism, involving attempted but unenforceable buying of political support; and pluralism, where antipoverty resource allocation was not conditioned on political subordination. The Regional Solidarity Fund experience showed that the trend for state action to divide into these three patterns emerged in both regions with and regions without electoral competition.

The clearest connection between distributive and electoral politics involves social spending in opposition voter strongholds, but the actual electoral impact of such targeting depends on the degree to which clientelistic controls have eroded on the ground. In other words, electoral impact of pork barrel–type spending on potential opposition voters depends not only on the disproportionate *amount* channeled to a given district but also on the degree to which political control mechanisms can actually *enforce* compliance in exchange for these resources. One good indicator of the potential persistence of authoritarian controls is the degree of actual ballot secrecy. The 1992 Michoacán governor's race, for example, which coincided with massive Solidarity funding, saw the right to ballot secrecy violated in one-fifth of the polling places, according to an independent observer group. Ballot secrecy for indigenous people was especially vulnerable, as it was subject to manipulation under the pretext of handling literacy and language problems.[68]

Solidarity's electoral targeting certainly helped to buffer the political impact of the government's controversial macroeconomic program, weakening the opposition in the short run in some areas.[69] In the longer

[68] On the numerous irregularities, including widespread reports of attempts to condition Solidarity funding on PRI votes, see the election observer report by the Convergencia de Organismos Civiles por la Democracia, "Informe de observación electoral," *Perfil de la Jornada*, August 16, 1992.

[69] The regime's willingness to cede legitimacy to some autonomous citizens' groups while continuing to manipulate elections also sharpened divisions within the left-leaning electoral

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run, however, if the state's mechanisms for enforcing voter compliance continue to weaken, then more and more citizens may well accept pork-barrel funding but also still vote their conscience, as civic activism broadens and deepens. Opposition party leaders increasingly urged potential supporters to accept the inducements from the ruling party, especially since they were usually paid for with public funds, and then vote their conscience. Whether this opposition response to official semiclientelism succeeds will depend largely on whether the share of votes that is deposited secretly and counted fairly can be increased.

Because the relationship between distributive and electoral politics can be contradictory—liberalizing in one arena while remaining closed in another—the erosion of clientelistic controls over distributive politics will not necessarily lead to electoral democratization. Indeed, it is possible that the lack of guaranteed enforcement mechanisms inherent in semiclientelism will *increase* incentives for hard-liners in the regime to rely on electoral fraud. The prospects for clean elections are likely to reflect in part the relative strength of more reformist currents within the regime that are willing to consider further political change and in part the efforts of opposition parties and autonomous social actors to broaden and deepen their still uneven roots in society. The prospects for democratization in Mexico will thus depend on how conflict between more and less authoritarian policy currents within the state interacts with growing civic pressure from below.[70]

Conclusions

It is difficult to generalize about how national political change interacts with the process of extending effective citizenship rights to the entire population, largely because the analytical categories for "actually existing" political systems fail to capture important gray areas.[71] Many of the

opposition. When the wounds of the 1988 electoral conflict were still fresh, the PRD harshly condemned social organizations that bargained for Solidarity funds, asserting that they were implicitly recognizing the president's legitimacy. The PRD's stance later softened, but its relationship with important social movements was damaged. See Dresser (fn. 37, 1991); and Haber (fn. 45).

[70] So far, two scenarios predicted by Cornelius and his colleagues are combining: "modernization of authoritarianism with selective pluralism" and "limited power sharing," along the lines of the Indian Congress Party model. See Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (fn. 26); and Wayne Cornelius and Ann Craig, *The Mexican Political System in Transition* (La Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991), 118–19.

[71] As Pye put it, "We need finer shades of typologies of political systems between the classical polar opposites of authoritarian and democratic. In the wake of the crisis of authoritarianism we can expect a wide variety of systems that will become part authoritarian and part free and that will fall far short of any reasonable definitions of democracy." See Lucian

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authoritarian regimes around the world that have now turned to electoral politics are not necessarily in transition to more democratic regimes; they can stabilize far short of democracy.[72] Mexico is not the only country in the early 1990s that holds competitive elections but still fails to reach a democratic threshold. El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru come to mind in Latin America. Asian examples include Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines; in Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, among others. Serbia is the most notable case in Europe. Several of the former Soviet republics may fall into this category as well.

The politics of social policy can tell us a great deal about nonelectoral dimensions of democratization. Many types of regimes are now experimenting with "demand-based" antipoverty funds aimed at making structural economic adjustment politically viable; Mexico's Solidarity program is an especially sophisticated version of this much broader trend. Bolivia's social emergency fund was the first to attract international attention in 1986, and similar programs were carried out by Peru, Chile, Colombia, Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Poland, El Salvador, and Honduras. Like Solidarity, some of these new targeted antipoverty programs created political openings for social movements and nongovernmental organizations, while others reinforced partisan clientelistic controls. El Salvador and Senegal used their programs as instruments of political control, at least until the late 1980s, while in Bolivia, Chile, and Zambia, transitions to electoral democracy permitted pluralistic antipoverty policy. Peru's program largely perpetuated semiclientelism.[73] Across

W. Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," *American Political Science Review* 84 (March 1990), 13.

[72] See Terry Lynn Karl (fn. 1) on "electoralism"; Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Summer 1991); Tina Rosenberg, "Beyond Elections," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991); and Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquié, eds., *Elections without Choice* (New York: John Wiley, 1978). Stable electoral competition is sometimes confused with political democracy; see, e.g., John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Thus Mexico's ruling party holds the world's record for stability, having presided over electoral presidential successions since 1929. Some analysts fall into the opposite trap, assuming that unfair elections are politically meaningless exercises. Note, for example, the surprise military split and subsequent civic uprising following Philippine president Marcos's fraudulent "snap" elections in 1986. See also the debate over the relevance of El Salvador's sharply constrained wartime elections of the mid-1980s in Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1984); Terry Lynn Karl, "Imposing Consent? Electoralism vs. Democratization in El Salvador," in Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985* (La Jolla: UCSD-CILAS, 1986).

[73] On social investment funds, see Carol Graham, "The APRA Government and the Urban Poor: The PIAT Programme in Lima's Pueblos Jóvenes," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23 (February 1991); idem, "The Politics of Protecting the Poor during Adjustment: Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund," *World Development* 20 (September 1992); idem, "Mexico's National Solidarity Program in Comparative Perspective: Demand-Based Poverty Alleviation Pro-

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this disparate group of countries, the degree of political conditionality required for access to these new social funds is a key indicator of the extent of the transition from clientelism to citizenship.

This focus on the politics of social policy shows that the relationship between electoral competition and the erosion of authoritarian clientelism is not obvious. In other words, electoral competition can either strengthen or weaken coercive clientelism, which in turn can be either strengthened or weakened by electoral competition. Each clearly influences the other, but the direction is politically contingent. For example, if elections offer voters alternatives, they can increase clients' leverage over vote-buying patrons (as in Taiwan and Thailand).[74] But clientelistic machines around the world have also shown that the threat of electoral competition can also create incentives for elites to limit political choices sharply. Even under ostensibly democratic regimes, the use of violence with impunity against certain groups or in certain regions can perpetuate authoritarian enclaves (as in rural areas of Brazil, Colombia, and the Philippines).[75] More generally, clientelistic bargaining relations are most imbalanced in authoritarian bastions where clients lack the exit options associated with meaningful electoral alternatives.

Although the spread of seemingly small free spaces in civil society is widely recognized to weaken dictatorships, there is also a connection between uneven degrees of freedom at the local level and national politics—a fact rarely considered when analyzing the prospects for democratic consolidation; that is, the persistence of authoritarian redoubts under competitive electoral systems matters for national politics. The resilience of local authoritarian enclaves constrains national democratic consolidation because margins matter for majority rule.[76] The exclusion of potential swing voters from access to associational autonomy and competitive elections can be enough to determine national political outcomes.

grams in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 38). One could argue that opposition state governments in India carried out comparable programs earlier. See Atul Kohli, *The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and John Echeverrí-Gent, "Public Participation and Poverty Alleviation: The Experience of Reform Communists in India's West Bengal," *World Development* 20 (October 1992).

[74] See Herr (fn. 23); and Philip Shenon, "It's Business as Usual in Thailand (Votes for Sale)," *New York Times*, March 18, 1992; as well as Scott (fn. 8, 1992).

[75] Thus, in 1988 Colombia appeared to take a major step toward greater pluralism by permitting citizens to elect their mayors for the first time. But once elected, many opposition mayors were assassinated by state-sanctioned death squads. See Leah Carroll, "Repression and the Limits to Rural Democratization: The Experience of Leftist County Executives in Colombia, 1988–1990" (Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, April 1991).

[76] By contrast, some analysts consider elections to be democratic if the bulk of the population participates; see, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

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There are many examples in the Americas. Even though Chile had long been considered a consolidated democracy, the national political equation was skewed through the early 1960s by the disenfranchisement of the rural poor.[77] The same was true in Brazil, where the prospect of permitting the illiterates to vote contributed to the 1964 coup. Peru's largely indigenous illiterate population was also denied the vote until the return of electoral rule in 1980. Regional redoubts of exclusion persist even after such formal barriers are removed. In Brazil's 1989 presidential race the candidate of the Left took the large cities, but the Right won with the hinterland, where authoritarian clientelism and semiclientelism are still pervasive.[78] And rural districts gave Salinas his official majority in Mexico's 1988 presidential race.[79] The general point that "subnational authoritarian regimes" can tip the national political balance should not be new to observers of the United States, where the coercive disenfranchisement of African Americans and many poor whites in the South determined national political outcomes for most of the twentieth century.

The question of how effective access to citizenship rights is extended to an *entire* society requires a framework that differs from most approaches to national regime change. While transitions to electorally competitive regimes are usually analyzed in terms of movement back and forth along two dimensions, the erosion of clientelism can evolve in several directions simultaneously. Authoritarian clientelism does not necessarily erode in a linear process toward citizenship. The Mexican experience shows that even as sophisticated state managers can promote semiclientelism as an alternative to citizenship rights, social movements can gnaw at small cracks in the system and try to open them further. The result is a gradual and uneven transition from clientelism to citizenship that involves the coexistence under the same formal regime of three different de facto political systems: entrenched redoubts of authoritarianism, broad swaths of modernized semiclientelism, and enclaves of pluralist tolerance that exhibit elements of citizenship. Where subnational authoritarian regimes survive within nationally competitive electoral systems, the transitions can get stuck and fail to cross the threshold to democratic governance.

[77] See Brian Loveman, "Political Participation and Rural Labor in Chile," in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America*, vol. 2, *Politics and the Poor* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979).

[78] See Fernando Da Silveira Cotrim, *A geografia do voto no Brasil: Eleições de 1989* (Rio de Janeiro: IBASE, 1990). On the persistent clout of the traditional political class, see Hagopian (fn. 7, 1990 and 1992).

[79] See Arturo López et al., *Geografía de las elecciones presidenciales de México, 1988* (Mexico City: Fundación Arturo Rosenblueth, 1989).

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This conclusion implies that the conventional notion of political democratization as a single regime transition should be recast as a set of transitions along the various key dimensions of democracy.[80] What, then, are some of the more general relationships between these different genres of transition? We still lack systematic analyses of the ways in which electoral competition relates to other, also ostensibly minimum conditions for democracy, such as civilian control over the military, effective universal suffrage, an end to vote fraud, or ending impunity for state-sanctioned violence.[81] Such transitions may overlap, they may be mutually dependent in diverse ways, but they are logically and historically distinct.

In conclusion, this study of the transition from clientelistic subordination to citizenship rights of access to the state suggests that the relationship between national electoral competition and the gradual process of constructing respect for associational autonomy throughout society is reciprocal. The net effect of this mutual influence is politically contingent, however. Progress along one dimension of democratization may encourage movement along another, but obstacles in one arena can also hold back the rest of the process.

[80] Because these dimensions evolve along such different paths, Schmitter suggests that it may be useful to understand democracy as a "composite of 'partial regimes,' each of which [is] institutionalized around distinctive sites for the representation of social groups." See Philippe Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups," *American Behavioral Scientist* 35 (March–June 1992), 427.

[81] For general discussions of measurement issues, see Alex Inkeles, ed., *On Measuring Democracy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991). For new studies of degrees of civilian control over the military, see David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America," *Comparative Politics* 25 (October 1992); and Jorge Zaverucha, "The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine, and Brazilian Transitions," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 25 (May 1993).

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THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVATIZATION
A Typology

By HARVEY B. FEIGENBAUM and JEFFREY R. HENIG*

COMING after years of governmental expansion, the seeming breadth and forcefulness of the international movement toward privatization presents an intellectual anomaly. Many of the theories offered to account for the emergence of the welfare state link governmental growth to seemingly inexorable forces such as urbanization and technological change,[1] national security threats,[2] and powerful coalitions of bureaucrats and special interest groups.[3] Since these basic forces do not appear to have reversed or lost steam, their relationship to governmental growth must at the very least be more complex than heretofore presumed.

Privatization, defined broadly as "the shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector,"[4] involves the increased reliance on private actors and market forces to pursue social goals.[5] In its extreme form it represents a self-conscious effort to

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[1] See Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984); and Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[2] See Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, *The Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[3] See Stuart Butler, *Privatizing Federal Spending: A Strategy to Eliminate the Deficit* (New York: Universe Books, 1985).

[4] Stuart Butler, "Privatization for Public Purposes," in William T. Gormley, ed., *Privatization and Its Alternatives* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 17.

[5] In defining privatization this broadly, we are taking sides on an issue of some dispute. Many authors, especially those examining privatization in Europe, limit the concept to sales of nationalized firms and other state assets, whereas we locate the idea in the broader trends of policy advocacy, which emphasize a return to concepts associated with economic liberalism. See Jeffrey R. Henig, Chris Hamnett, and Harvey Feigenbaum, "The Politics of Privatization: A Comparative Perspective," *Governance* 1 (October 1988); Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, eds., *The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Sheila B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn, eds., *Privatiza-*

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"shrink"[6] the governmental apparatus and "roll back" the boundaries of state responsibility.

In shifting responsibilities from government to market, privatization potentially alters the institutional framework through which citizens normally articulate, mediate, and promote their individual and shared interests. The specific consequences of such an institutional restructuring are hardly agreed upon or the same for all: some groups in a more privatized arena would find their interests more clearly defined and more readily promoted; other groups would find the opposite. Because of these consequences, privatization is an intensely political phenomenon and ought to be analyzed as such. Yet much of the literature deemphasizes its consequences for political ideas and political institutions and instead presents it as a pragmatic adaptation of well-tested administrative techniques or a necessary exercise in economic adjustment to structural constraints.

The way societies come to terms with the problems they confront can be directly affected by the language, ideas, and symbols in which public deliberation is couched.[7] We argue that the administrative and economic perspectives of privatization direct attention away from empirical and normative issues of import. As a first step in developing an alternative perspective, we propose a typology of privatization rooted in political goals and consequences.

This typology is an outgrowth of our efforts to understand commonalities in the privatization movements of Great Britain, Western Europe, and the United States—the context in which privatization first surfaced. Hence, much of our presentation and the illustrations we employ are drawn from the experience of advanced industrial countries. We believe, however, that the general conceptualization proposed here is broadly applicable, and accordingly we have tried to highlight possible implications for both Eastern Europe and the developing world.

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tion and the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Paul Starr, "The Meaning of Privatization," in Kamerman and Kahn; and Dennis Swann, *The Retreat of the State: Deregulation and Privatization in the U.K. and U.S.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988). These broader movements are linked by their reliance on similar ideological justifications and political constituencies. As we argue in the body of this paper, overemphasizing the distinctions between specific technological tools for privatization obscures the political dynamics that we hope to bring more fully to light.

[6] See E. S. Savas, *Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1982).

[7] See Robert Reich, ed., *The Power of Public Ideas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988); and Charles E. Lindblom, *Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

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The Administrative and Economic Perspectives

The Administrative Perspective

The administrative perspective presents privatization as a series of options available to public officials seeking to make government work better. In the United States in particular discussion of privatization has reflected this "good government" orientation, which presumes the existence of a relatively well-specified set of public goals. Such public goals are broadly accepted as legitimate, because they have emerged from democratic processes, deliberation by acknowledged experts, or assertion by recognized authorities. With clear and accepted public goals, the central task for public officials is to pursue those ends as efficiently and effectively as possible.

From the administrative perspective, privatization represents a "toolbox" of techniques from which officials may draw those most appropriate to meet the tasks at hand. Among the tools available are contracting out, user fees, vouchers, asset sales, and deregulation. The administrative perspective presumes that government officials seek to serve public interests to the best of their ability, even while it recognizes the limitations posed by imperfect information and the intrusion of personal biases and self-concerns. It also acknowledges that the efficiency and effectiveness of specific initiatives may depend upon the organizational and economic context.

Knowing that there is no single and universal best way for government to pursue the social good, practitioners of the administrative perspective seek to specify the conditions under which different privatization tools (or combinations of tools) are likely to work best.[8] Under some circumstances, it may be appropriate for government to finance a good or service fully and provide it directly. Under different circumstances, it may be best for the government to subsidize beneficiaries, who then purchase the desired services from private producers. Factors such as the tangibility and divisibility of the service, the degree of competition within the private provider community, the availability of information, and the organizational capacity of government must be weighed in considering which technique or mix of techniques to pursue.

[8] See Marc Bendick, Jr., "Privatizing the Delivery of Social Welfare Services: An Idea to Be Taken Seriously," in Kamerman and Kahn (fn. 5); John Donahue, *The Privatization Decision* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); William T. Gormley, Jr., "Two Cheers for Privatization," in Gormley, ed., *Privatization and Its Alternatives* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); and Lester Salamon, *Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1989).

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The Economic Perspective

The economic perspective presents privatization as the inevitable consequence of neoclassical truths that dictate the retraction of a bulky, intrusive, and parasitic welfare state. There are both macro- and microelements to this perspective. The macroargument suggests that there are structural limitations to the relative size and intrusiveness of the public sector, that movement beyond those limits is sustainable only for short periods, and that efforts to challenge this economic reality inevitably result in stagnation and decline.[9] This reasoning resonates in the arguments of both the Left and the Right. The Right, of course, has always argued that the expenses of the welfare state lead to predatory taxation, which reduces profit margins and discourages private investment. Observers on the Left argue that the Keynesian welfare policies of the postwar period, necessary both to legitimate the capitalist regime and to spur productive investment, suffer from political processes that allocate capital irrationally, in response to power rather than to need.[10]

While sharing the macroeconomic assumptions of the Right, public choice theory relies on microeconomic principles to explain the apparent irrationality of the state's capital allocations. The theory locates the source of state expansion in the self-interested behavior of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups (like governmental contractors and beneficiaries of social welfare programs) who gain more in their role as beneficiaries than they lose in their role as taxpayers.[11] This approach characterizes the state sector as composed of individuals rationally pursuing personal material gains; their successes come at the cost of macrolevel inefficiency. Privatization is thus portrayed as a mechanism that takes resources out of the hands of bureaucrats and entrusts them to the more efficient invisible hand of the market.

The economic perspective tends to categorize privatization initiatives in relation to three major values: ownership, competition, and the alignment of benefit with price. Sale of state assets is implicitly treated as the most extreme (and in this sense "best") form of privatization, since it

[9] See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, "Surprises in a World according to Adam Smith," *Business Week*, August 17, 1992, p. 18.

[10] James O'Conner, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 10; Joel Krieger, *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 27.

[11] See Thomas Borcherding, ed., *Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Source of Government Growth* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977); James M. Buchanan, "Why Does Government Grow?" in Borcherding; William A. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (Chicago; Aldine-Atherton, 1971); and Gordon Tullock, "Why Politicians Won't Cut Taxes," *Taxing and Spending* (October–November 1978), 12–14.

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simultaneously reduces the public sector deficit, reduces the size of the governmental apparatus, shifts decision making to private actors presumably more attuned to market signals, and gives more people a direct material stake in promoting economic growth. Increasing reliance on competitive forces without changing ownership—as when governments contract out for public services—leaves the public sector with responsibility for setting and enforcing goals but has the advantages of promoting efficiency and reducing the bureaucracy. Alignment of price with benefit—as when services are funded by user fees rather than general tax revenues—is presumed to retard governmental growth indirectly by reducing the tendency of governments to provide some citizens with more services than they would choose if they were paying for them out of their own pockets.

Limitations of the Two Perspectives

We find both perspectives problematic, on three counts. First, although presentations about privatization often borrow concepts and terminology from both, central premises of the administrative and economic perspectives are inconsistent with one another. Whereas the administrative perspective presumes public officials to be relatively informed, motivated by a commitment to broader interests, and operating with a degree of independence and discretion, the economic perspective sees public officials as unequipped to assess market signals, motivated by a desire to appropriate a greater proportion of the public wealth for themselves, and ultimately constrained by fiscal and monetary forces that operate according to their own logic.

Second, both perspectives obscure important distinctions. The choice of a particular form of privatization can be less significant than how privatization is actually formulated and implemented. It is one thing, for example, to contract out a service to a private provider when public officials can specify the desired goal and intermediary steps precisely, when they have independent sources of information, and when they have the manpower and commitment to oversee providers and terminate those whose performance is unsatisfactory. It is quite another matter to contract out an ill-defined project when officials are dependent upon the private provider for performance data or when the absence of viable competing providers or the existence of political pressures gives the private provider a de facto monopoly. Similarly, it is one thing to sell a state-owned industry that is demonstrably inefficient, that has been reconfigured to promote greater competition in the private sector, and that will

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be effectively overseen by an appropriate regulatory apparatus;[12] it is another to sell off valuable public assets simply to close a short-term budget gap, to transfer a public monopoly into a private monopoly, or to provide a sure profit to valued supporters.

Finally, both perspectives deemphasize political dimensions of privatization that are rooted in the conflicting interests of competing classes and groups. The characterization of privatization as economic adjustment is overly deterministic; it understates the actual variety in behavior one finds among states and citizens facing similar objective conditions; it downplays the motivating power of noneconomic forces such as nationalism, ideology, ethnicity, and race; and it fails to acknowledge the fluidity and indeterminacy of the boundary between public and private in modern societies.[13] While the characterization of privatization as pragmatic adjustment more appropriately recognizes privatization as an option that may be chosen or rejected, it overstates the degree of social consensus on goals and priorities. In addition, by focusing on aggregate benefits and costs, the administrative perspective does not give due consideration to how those costs and benefits are distributed among occupational, racial, and class-based groups; it ignores the potential for privatization initiatives to alter the landscape of political interests; and it fails to confront the broader ideological claims being advanced in the name of privatization.[14]

A Political Perspective

Our principal argument is that the broad privatization movement is, in many of its manifestations, better understood as a political phenomenon than as a technical adjustment to changing conditions or as an applica-

[12] The economics literature includes both advocates and critics of the notion that ownership affects performance. However, in determining the efficiency of an enterprise, more recent work by orthodox economists indicates that the difference between public and private ownership is less important than the degree of competition of a firm's market. See especially Douglas W. Caves and Laurits R. Christensen, "The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads," *Journal of Political Economy* 88 (October 1980).

[13] See Desmond S. King, *The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1987); Martin Rein, "The Social Structure of Institutions: Neither Public nor Private," in Kamerman and Kahn (fn. 5); Starr (fn. 5); and Todd Swanstrom, "Beyond Economism: Urban Political Economy and the Postmodern Challenge" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 18–September 1, 1991).

[14] See Timothy Barnekov, Robin Boyle, and Daniel Rich, *Privatism and Urban Policy in Britain and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Harvey Feigenbaum, "France: From Pragmatic to Tactical Privatization," *Business in the Contemporary World* 5 (Winter 1993); Jeffrey Henig, "Privatization in the United States: Theory and Practice," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Winter 1990); and Starr (fn. 5).

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tion of economic theory.[15] Rather than treating privatization as a choice among *means* to achieve recognized and broadly social goals, we argue that it often takes the form of a strategy to realign institutions and decision-making processes so as to privilege the goals of some groups over the competing aspirations of other groups. As Figure 1 indicates, this political perspective differs from the administrative and economic approaches in three ways: in terms of the primary motivation ascribed to political actors, the central unit of analysis, and the basic conception.

The Typology Introduced

We anchor our typology in the motivations of key actors responsible for promoting privatization in the public arena. There are, we suggest, at least three types of privatization strategies: pragmatic, tactical, and systemic.[16] Pragmatic privatization reflects most of the characteristics associated with the administrative perspective but with one important difference: whereas the administrative perspective presents this set of characteristics as universally applicable, the political perspective considers such pragmatic privatizations to be discrete and context-dependent episodes. Pragmatic privatizations are generally carried out by bureaucratic units somewhat insulated from the push and pull of normal political pressures. American municipal contracts for private provision of public services provide a good illustration. They are frequently introduced as technical solutions to meet an immediate social problem. The

	Administrative	Economic	Political
Emphasized Goal	achievement of socially defined goals	maximization of individual's utilities	redistribution of power and control
Unit of Analysis	discrete societal problem	individual/firm	group/class
Concept of Privatization	tool box	preferred mechanism	weapon

Figure 1
Three Contrasting Approaches

[15] Political choices are not the result of infinite options. Not every policy will work and reality is an ultimate constraint for decision makers who subscribe to even the most resilient ideologies. There are therefore outer, or technical, limits that constrain choice. However, within those technical parameters there is room for political discretion.

[16] A similar typology is developed by Ben Ross Schneider, "Privatization in Brazil and Mexico: Variations on a Statist Theme," in Suleiman and Waterbury (fn. 5). Schneider focuses primarily on decision makers and their motivations in Brazil and Mexico.

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key actors perceive privatization simply as one among several alternative "tools" with which to further recognized societal priorities. In deciding whether and when to privatize, they focus on the specific characteristics of the problem and its context, giving little thought to ideological consistency or political consequences.

Tactical privatizations, by contrast, are advocated to achieve the short-term political goals of particular parties, politicians, or interest groups. They seek to alter the balance of power by attracting allies and rewarding supporters. In some cases, privatization appeals tactically as a form of "political product differentiation." For example, the program of asset sales by the 1986–88 Chirac government in France seems to have been aimed primarily at winning election by promoting a distinctive program that differed from the otherwise conservative policies of the socialists.

Systemic privatization strategies like those now being pursued in Eastern Europe are intended to reshape the entire society by fundamentally altering economic and political institutions and by transforming economic and political interests. Systemic privatization seeks (1) to lower people's expectations of what government can and should be held responsible for, (2) to reduce the public sector's oversight and enforcement infrastructure, and (3) to transform the interest group landscape to make it less supportive of governmental growth.

Our typology is an analytic construct intended, in the best Weberian tradition, to sharpen and focus understanding by abstracting key underlying dimensions of social behavior. As such, it inevitably shares some of the disadvantages that are typical of the genre. First, by posing certain categories as "pure" types, it tends to understate the complexity of the phenomenon under review. Policies often have multiple authors who have different agendas, so specific privatization initiatives rarely constitute pure examples of one type or another. Some may be attracted to a policy because of its long-term implications; thus Margaret Thatcher advocated privatization as a method to transform Britain into a "people's capitalism." Others, by contrast, look for short-term electoral benefits, such as selling profitable state-owned enterprises in order to reduce a politically embarrassing deficit.[17] Nonpartisan city managers may privatize city services as a way of dealing with restricted budgets, but they may get the idea from position papers churned out by highly politicized think tanks;[18] and some with ambitions for higher office may favor pri-

[17] Categorization of policies may also be a function of timing: French tactical privatizations might have become systemic had the conservatives not lost the 1988 elections. We are grateful to Mark Kesselman on this point.

[18] On the importance of think tanks, see, e.g., Henry Nau, *The Myth of the American*

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vatization as a way to build a reputation for innovation. Indeed, multiple justifications are a source of broad appeal. Policies come about because they attract coalitions of complementary, though hardly identical, interests. Privatization is no exception.

Like most other typologies, too, ours risks freezing events into a static framework that belies the dynamism of political life. Strategies can evolve, and privatization initiatives undertaken in pursuit of one set of objectives might change in type as different constituencies mobilize to gain influence or as key actors reinterpret their interests in the light of changing events.

Finally, in anchoring our typology in the motivations of key actors, we are focusing attention on one key dimension—intended effects—to the possible exclusion of another key dimension, having to do with actual effects. There is many a spill between cup and mouth, and we do not mean to imply that privatization efforts promoted in the hopes of inducing systemic change will necessarily have more than an incremental effect—even if fully implemented. We decided to focus on motivation because there is already a basis for examining the forms of privatization enacted, their stated rationales, and the coalitions promoting them in an effort to infer political objectives. By contrast, it is still premature to determine empirically the effects of relatively recent privatization initiatives.

Whether such limitations outweigh the contributions of a typology depends on the particulars of its formulation and the ways in which it is employed. Typologies are most likely to do harm when they reify the unimportant and when they are presented as ends in themselves, rather than as conceptual tools to be used for empirical probing of important phenomena. In the discussion that follows, we highlight the illustrative value of the typology without losing sight of some of the more complex and dynamic aspects of the cases involved. In addition, we begin to build upon our initial typology by moving from motivations to actual effects.

With these caveats in mind, we offer the following analysis of the political underpinnings of each kind of privatization strategy.

Pragmatic Privatizations

Struck by the appearance of so many diverse privatization projects around the world in the early 1980s, Raymond Vernon proposed a pragmatic explanation: these policies were a "reflection largely of the drying

Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 1. On the evolution of think tanks, see Kent R. Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 22 (September 1989).

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up of cash in that period."[19] They did not reflect a basic ideological shift, even though much policy learning about the virtues and disadvantages of state intervention had taken place.

Pragmatic privatizations are short-term, often ad hoc solutions to immediate problems—for example, the need for cash. The Italian conglomerate IRI sold off a number of its affiliates for that reason.[20] So did St. Gobain in France, despite official policy to the contrary.[21] The Italian nationalized railroad, FS, introduced market-oriented reforms largely to reduce the possibilities for corruption.[22]

The home of pragmatic privatization may well be the United States. This is especially true at the municipal level. Many privatizations of city services, as well as user fees, began as early as 1932, thus considerably predating the policy fashion of the 1980s. "These diverse governmental arrangements did *not* represent a broad but heretofore unacknowledged privatization movement, but a series of pragmatic adjustments, more often undertaken in the context of an expanding public sector rather than in a deliberate effort to shrink the governmental realm."[23]

The American experience in privatizing public services suggests an apolitical conception, which, in its more sophisticated form, can be expressed as a contrast between the goals of the public and private sectors. The public sector in this sense is conceived of as essentially the civil service, while the private sector is viewed as the world of hierarchically organized firms. Thus the former organization emphasizes due process, administrative fairness, and protection of citizens' rights, while the latter emphasizes flexibility, adaptation to changing technologies, and overall economic efficiency.[24] Privatization, in this view, offers an administrative solution to a functional problem, that is, a change in organization to achieve goals for which private firms are deemed better suited.

This separation of public and private spheres is, of course, a kind of ideology[25] that is frequently expressed in a superficially apolitical form. This is especially true of the technocratic outlook inherent in the city manager form of local government in the United States, an inheritance

[19] Vernon, ed., *The Promise of Privatization: A Challenge for U.S. Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 19.

[20] Ibid., 16.

[21] Vivian Schmidt, "Industrial Management under the Socialists in France: Decentralized *Dirigisme* at the National and Local Levels," *Comparative Politics* 21 (October 1988), 61.

[22] Haig Simonian, "Little Push from the Market Will Speed Italy's Trains," *Financial Times*, June 12, 1991, p. 4. Of course, as any accountant will note, the market alone offers no guarantees against profit skimming and unscrupulous behavior by managers.

[23] Henig (fn. 14), 657.

[24] Donahue (fn. 8), 216.

[25] Arnaud Sales, "The Private, the Public and Civil Society: Social Realms and Power Structure," *International Political Science Review* 12, no. 4 (1991).

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of the Progressive Era (late nineteenth to early twentieth century), and in the "nonpartisan" good government slates in French municipal elections since the 1960s.[26] Thus, privatization was more likely to appear pragmatic at the local level in these two countries than in Britain, where partisan politics remained out in the open and led in fact to systematic efforts under Margaret Thatcher to draw authority away from Labour-dominated councils.

The examples of pragmatic privatization cited above are suggestive for some of the political characteristics of the genre. Not only are they projects undertaken with little thought to ideology, but they also occur in an environment that is not *highly politicized*. That is, they tend to occur in policy areas that do not encourage, or have been insulated from, "the mobilization of bias," to use Schattschneider's famous expression.[27] Rather than actually being *apolitical*, pragmatic privatizations tend to turn up in areas that already have been successfully *de*politicized, and they reinforce that depoliticization: "A long list of ideas concerning individualism, free private enterprise, localism, privacy and economy in government seems to be designed to privatize conflict or to restrict its scope or to limit the use of public authority to enlarge the scope of conflict. A tremendous amount of conflict is controlled by keeping it so private that it is almost invisible."[28]

This is not to say that the apolitical intent of pragmatic privatizers is insincere. By and large they see their actions as serving the general interests of their constituents, or at least of the majority of them. Thus, city managers may be well aware that privatizing garbage collections hurts the interest of public sector unions (where private firms would pay lower wages), for example, but by saving money at the expense of a fairly small group, they hope to make funds available for other worthy purposes, such as education.

Pragmatic privatization is depoliticized especially when carried out by managers of public firms, who see the issuance of stock to private shareholders or the sale of subsidiaries as merely instrumental techniques to assure their firms' short-term profitability or long-term strategy.[29] The obverse, however, may be entirely political, as when France's president

[26] Of course, the French national administration has based its power on the notion that technocratic solutions are apolitical. See Ezra N. Suleiman, *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Jacques Elul, *The Technological Society* (New York: Vintage, 1964), for a statement of the creed.

[27] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975).

[28] Ibid., 7.

[29] See, e.g. William Dawkins, "France's Restive State Sector Senses Freedom," *Financial Times*, April 11, 1991, p. 3.

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Mitterrand specifically precluded additional hiving off of public firms to conform to his "ni . . . ni . . . [neither . . . nor . . .]" electoral promise of neither new nationalizations nor new privatizations.[30]

Some forms of pragmatic privatization may, however, be crisis driven, inaugurated to solve an internal budgetary crisis or external balance of payments deficit in conjunction with an austerity plan. This is frequently the case in Third World countries. Some would hold that Mexico and Ghana are representative of this form of pragmatic privatization.[31] Motives here are not always pure, however; nor are decisions taken in a vacuum. Whether or not decision makers choose to privatize may be as much a function of coercion (or at least suasion) on the part of external financial authorities as a function of objective financial conditions or nonprivatizing alternatives.[32]

Tactical Privatizations

Whereas pragmatic privatizations occur for the most part in depoliticized and restricted arenas, tactical privatizations occur in situations that are directly political, if not necessarily overtly so. These privatizations are intended for the short-term political benefit of those backing the policy, although there may also be other, long-term impacts. Privatization policies may be intended to appeal to specific groups of voters or to reward political friends. Recent evidence of both of these are easily found in Britain and France.

The French case offers the clearest illustration. Privatization of nationalized companies initiated by the Chirac government of 1986–88 came about for tactical reasons. The usual justifications that the state companies were poorly run were belied by profit and loss statements that were increasingly positive under state management.[33] Privatization, that

[30] See, e.g., the *Financial Times* editorial, "Dilemmas of Dirigisme," April 8, 1991, p. 14. For an example of the gymnastics the state exercised to work within the ban, see Eric Le Boucher "L'Etat actionnaire à la recherche des moyens pour soutenir l'aéronautique et l'électronique," *Le Monde*, February 22, 1991, reprinted in the *Selection Hebdomadaire du Journal "Le Monde,"* February 27, 1991, p. 11. In some instances, the political naïveté of pragmatic privatizers may have unintended political effects on constituencies of the ruling political coalition; thus, the privatization in Mexico injured the labor unions supporting the Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI). See Schneider (fn. 16).

[31] See, especially, Rod Alence, "Moments of Truth: The State, Economic Institutions, and the Political Economy of Export Instability in Gold Coast/Ghana, 1937–1984" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, forthcoming).

[32] See Don Babai, "The World Bank and the IMF: Rolling Back the State or Backing Its Role?" in Vernon (fn. 19).

[33] Harvey Feigenbaum, "Democracy at the Margins: The International System and Policy Change in France," in Richard E. Foglesong and Joel D. Wolfe, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 92–93. More recently, some industries, especially Bull and Thomsen, the state electronics groups, fell on harder times; see Le Boucher (fn. 30),

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is, offered the conservative parties a platform that would distinguish them from the socialists. Since 1983 the socialists had slowly deregulated the economy, reduced taxes, and liberalized capital markets.[34] While they had deregulated for pragmatic reasons, largely because they had no other ideas after the failure of the 1981 economic program,[35] this left the conservatives with little to call their own. Thus they blamed France's problems on the public sector, especially on the nationalizations of the socialists.

The Thatcher government followed a similar electoral logic. Privatization had not been part of the government's initial economic agenda but turned out to be a useful tactic in the run-up to the first reelection campaign:

> Margaret Thatcher, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and Sir Keith Joseph recognized the need for a policy initiative that would revitalize their free-market ideology when monetarism lost its appeal due to its excessively deflationary consequences during 1981. Not only did privatization respond to the party's natural constituency by increasing profit opportunities, it also provided a new direction in the face of the rapid contraction of industrial production and the dramatic increase in unemployment.[36]

Moreover, once safely returned to office, the Thatcher government was willing to risk crowding out private investment[37] by using privatization to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement, as the rise or persistence of the PSBR would be politically embarrassing.[38]

Following the first rule of politics that one punishes one's enemies and rewards one's friends, the second tactical advantage of privatizing public

11. However, the problems of the enterprises had more to do with their respective sectors than with their ownership. This calls to mind a similar analysis of British industries by Richard Pryke, *The Nationalised Industries: Policies and Performance since 1968* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), 264.

[34] See Michael Loriaux, *France after Hegemony* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[35] While the socialists liberalized the French economy largely because they could think of no alternative after employing state interventionism à outrance in the first two years of their mandate, they suffered from the fact that they pursued pragmatic privatizations in an arena that was highly politicized (national politics). They paid the price at the polls in 1986: their traditional constituency saw them as having abandoned socialism, while centrist voters simply reacted to the stagnation of the economy.

A similar case can be made for Mexico's abandoning its traditional dirigisme in the 1980s; that is, there was nothing left to try (we are grateful to Eduardo Margain of the Interamerican Development Bank for this point). However, the Mexican government, with its idiosyncratic form of "democracy," did not have to worry about losing at the polls.

[36] Joel Wolfe, "Reorganizing Interest Representation: A Political Analysis of Privatization in Britain," in Foglesong and Wolfe (fn. 33), 19.

[37] That is, investors or banks who might provide funds for capital goods or expansion in already private companies would instead take their money and buy shares in privatized firms.

[38] Ezra N. Suleiman, "Privatization in Britain and France," in Suleiman and Waterbury (fn. 5), 114–15.

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companies was that the shares in the newly privatized firms could be sold to friends of the conservatives at a generous discount.[39] This tendency to reward one's friends was true for both Britain and France.[40] In Britain, where a number of motives supported various privatizations, tactical politics were occasionally covert, as in the case of private asset sales.[41] But they were often overt, as Peter Self summarizes:

> The Thatcherite strategy clearly shows that it is just as possible (and a lot quicker) to provide private profits out of running down the state as out of building it up. The beneficiaries of this strategy include not only those groups, such as public industry management and employees, . . . who must be bribed into compliance, but City institutions making a fortune from the privatisation boom and the top quintile of households who are the main gainers from the tax reliefs financed by the sale of public assets.[42]

As the label suggests, tactical privatization is not an end in itself. Where pragmatic privatization selects its targets based on pressing problems or indications of poor performance, tactical privatization is guided more by political opportunism and the amount of "booty" at stake. Thus, privatization may in some instances be a target of opportunity, either where strong allies are at hand or where resistance is weak. An example of the former might be the sale of a national airline supported by private transportation interests. An example of the latter might be Bush administration initiatives intended to sell public housing; such initiatives benefit from the political weakness of the lower-income and minority residents of public housing and from fragmentation, disarray, and dispiritedness among the organizations that have historically taken up their cause.

Part of the strategy is to neutralize short-term opposition to a long-term project. Thus, privatization may be sweetened by offering discount shares to managers and employees.[43] As Self puts it, "The necessary tactics, however, are not a frontal attack upon the system (which would be doomed to failure because of the political accumulation of vested interests), but piecemeal changes which offer transitional or new political benefits to groups disadvantaged by each step of the process."[44] Or, as Stuart

[39] See Michel Durupty, *Les Privatizations en France* (Paris: La Documentation Française, Notes et Etudes documentaires, no. 4857), 117–20; *Le Monde*, September 17, 1988.

[40] See Michel Bauer, "State Directed Privatization: The Case of France," *West European Politics* 11 (October 1988).

[41] Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser, *Privatizing Public Enterprises* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 105–29.

[42] Self, "What's Wrong with Government? The Problem of Public Choice," *Political Quarterly* 61 (January–March 1990).

[43] See Oliver Letwin, *Privatising the World* (London: Cassell Educational, 1988).

[44] Self (fn. 42), 26.

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Butler notes about the British strategy to break down the coalition normally likely to oppose the sale of British Telecom: "This was accomplished by offering key constituents free or discounted stock, together with below-market pricing of the issue, so that the stockholders could be sure of an immediate benefit through appreciation of their holdings."[45]

Third World countries may exercise a different kind of tactical privatization. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund frequently demand privatization plans as a prerequisite to receiving funds.[46] While international lending institutions may be satisfied if a country merely introduces market principles into the public sector, rather than full-scale sale of assets, liberalization is the price of the loan.[47] The World Bank recommended liquidation or divestiture of state assets in twenty-five of the thirty-eight structural adjustment loans it made to developing countries between 1980 and 1986. In addition, it recommended increased market orientation of state firms in thirty-six of the thirty-eight loans.[48] When the international financial community is in a position to provide Third World leaders with immediate injections of funds, in-kind services, and a degree of legitimacy, local governments may be induced to liberalize for tactical reasons, even if their leaders are not convinced of the long-term advantage of free markets for the majority of their citizens.[49]

Tactical privatizations also explain some of the inconsistencies of privatization programs. The Thatcher government, for instance, privatized the national gas utility as a single monopoly despite the commitment of the government to competitive market principles. It did this because the sale of the monopoly intact offered the possibility of the quickest sale, which would give the privatization program the appearance of dynamism after the stock market disaster of October 1987. The French conservatives sacrificed chances to reduce deficits by selling companies at discounts to political friends who could have afforded more. The ironies

[45] Butler, "Changing the Political Dynamic of Government," in Steve H. Hanke, ed., *Prospects for Privatization* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1987), 10–11.

[46] See Babai (fn. 32).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Compiled from Babai (fn. 32), Annex 1, 276–81 (the annex was compiled from World Bank internal documents). Loans were made to the following countries (some more than once): Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

[49] As mentioned in the discussion above, tactical motives may be reinforced by pragmatic ones if the country in question is experiencing a balance of payments or budgetary crisis. Politicians who are unconvinced by neoclassical logic may nevertheless find their hands forced by the lack of alternatives. Here tactical and pragmatic privatizations merge empirically, even if we may *analytically* distinguish the sets of motives for such privatizations.

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may reach their apogee in the Third World, however: the principal purchaser of public enterprises in Morocco is the king.[50]

Systemic Privatization

Systemic privatization is the most ideological and the most far-reaching in its potential impact. Rather than being the technocratic solution to a discrete number of specific problems, it aims at permanently changing class relations.

Systemic privatization may take any of three forms. The first involves a nontransient change in the capacity of already mobilized interests to pursue their agendas as currently conceived. In this situation the withdrawal of the state results in a substantial and not readily reversible decrease in the power of working classes relative to that of organized elites. This may be the case when privatization efforts function primarily to undermine the power of organized labor, for example, by relocating jobs from a unionized public sector to a nonunionized private sector.[51] We label this form of systemic privatization a "power shift."

The second form of systemic privatization involves a nontransient change in the values, culture, and expectations of the active public. It results in a broadening of the sphere of activities regarded as personal and private and a shrinking of the sphere of activities considered to constitute legitimate areas for public scrutiny and intervention. The effect of privatization in this sense is to delegitimize the public sector by subtly imbuing broader constituencies with the ideological perspective already shared by the advocates of privatization. In Britain the intent of some key actors was to transform permanently the way citizens related to each other and especially to break down class bonds. The idea was to change British society from a Marxian world of class conflict to a Hobbesian world of atomized individuals. In Hall's words:

> [Privatization] displaces an existing structure of oppositions—"them" versus "us." It sets in its place an alternative set of equivalents: "them and us equals we." Then it positions we "the people"—in a particular relation to capital: behind it, dominated by its imperatives (profitability, accumulation): yet at the same time yoked to it, identified with it.[52]

Paradoxically, privatization policies become the mechanism by which the state delegitimizes itself and through which the privileged strata extend

[50] We are grateful to Charles-Albert Michalet for pointing this out.

[51] Wolfe (fn. 36), 20.

[52] Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Right Show," in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, eds., *The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), quoted in Wolfe (fn. 36), 18.

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their cultural hegemony.[53] This form of systemic privatization constitutes what we call a "perceptual shift."

The third form of systemic privatization involves nontransient restructuring of the institutional arrangements of the society (legal, political, economic) so that the array of incentives presented to individuals and groups encourages a greater reliance on private and market-oriented solutions. The intended effect is to rearrange the institutional assignment of responsibilities, shifting basic decision processes from a public to a private realm. As Madsen Pirie, an influential British advocate of such systemic privatization, argues: "The transfer of public undertakings to the private sector takes away their status as political entities and transforms them instead into economic entities. Once they are free of the state, most of the decisions made about them will become economic ones."[54] This form of systemic privatization constitutes an "institutional shift." The impact of the institutional shift is to change the mechanism of social control from overt bureaucratic and political structures to the less accountable and more subtle forces of the market.[55]

In evaluating changes in systems of institutionalized accountability, one must distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic countries. While privatization alters the nature of control in all countries, the degree of accountability may change in different directions, depending on the preexisting form of bureaucratic control and on the kind of regulatory apparatus put in place after privatization. Thus, on the one hand, privatization in formerly nondemocratic countries may lead to greater accountability if the previous bureaucracies were not accountable at all. And on the other hand, the loss of accountability in democratic countries may be compensated for or even improved upon if states set up a regulatory apparatus that can obviate potential abuses of private companies.[56]

[53] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 260; Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75–76.

[54] Pirie, *Privatization* (Hants: Wildwood Press, 1988), 53.

[55] Wolfe (fn. 36), 17. This escape from accountability may be initiated for ideological reasons, but it also may dovetail with more tactical concerns of self-interested politicians. Political behavior in democracies is often explained by the desire of elected officials to avoid blame, rather than by their desire to achieve substantive results. See Kent R. Weaver, "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," *Journal of Public Policy* 6, no. 4 (1986). Thus, for instance, by privatizing a national railroad, members of Parliament are absolved from complaints about poor or disappearing service. By privatizing a nationalized corporation, the government sheds responsibility for layoffs. Former French prime minister Raymond Barre told the authors that one of his reasons for not wanting to nationalize French industries that were in trouble was to avoid taking responsibility for layoffs. Personal communication with Harvey Feigenbaum, George Washington University, spring 1983.

[56] Alex Nove has argued, for example, that a public monopoly that is not subjected to a regulatory authority may be more prone to abuse its position than a private monopoly that is

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The accountability issue may also help explain the motives of privatizers in newly democratic countries. In Spain public ownership was associated with Franco's rule, so that privatization was not only offered as a pragmatic solution to the country's problems by neoclassically trained technocrats, but could also be championed by the socialists as an advancement in democratization.[57] Whether motivated by neoclassical economic thought or by democratic ideology, the effect of such privatization remains systemic.

Sometimes institutional restructuring changes class relationships by creating new interests, perhaps even *new classes*. That is what appears to be happening in Eastern Europe, at least to the extent that privatized firms are being turned over to citizens, rather than to foreign investors.[58] Private firms have their own interests, and state firms, once privatized, can be expected to have preferences that diverge from those of government. It can also be assumed, if the Western experience is a guide, that the newly private firms will try to influence public policy in directions beneficial to their own interest.[59]

Conceptualizing Political Interests

Administrative and economic perspectives leave much of the story of privatization unaccounted for. Both are based on the assumption that the most relevant interests are relatively stable, unified, and apparent. They differ in the particular interests they consider most relevant: the admin-

held rigorously accountable for its actions by a public utilities commission. See Nove, *Efficiency Criteria for Nationalised Industries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). We would argue, however, that a government shift from state ownership to a regulatory form of oversight *with the intent of increasing its effectiveness* as a protector of public interests constitutes pragmatic rather than systemic privatization. This is not because the state is less interventionist, but because it has changed the form of intervention. See Harvey Feigenbaum, *The Politics of Public Enterprise* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). Whether the overall impact is, indeed, to increase the role of the state is, of course, important. Such examples highlight the need to pay attention to consequence as well as motivation.

[57] See Nancy Bermeo, "The Politics of Public Enterprise in Portugal, Spain and Greece," in Suleiman and Waterbury (fn. 5); and Sofia Perez, "The Politics of Financial Liberalization in Spain," in Michael Loriaux et al., "Financial Liberalization in Interventionist States" (Manuscript).

[58] In fact the very uncertainty generated by the transition to a market system seems to have resulted in a particularly resilient form of interest group found in market societies: the Mafia. To be fair to the proponents of privatization, however, this latter phenomenon must be viewed as an unintended consequence of policy.

[59] One way systemic privatizations can be identified empirically is by the time horizon of the privatizers. Where pragmatic privatizations attack an immediate *practical* problem and tactical privatizations are aimed at an immediate *political* problem, systemic privatizations are in for the long term. As a Czech official put it when he went to London in search of foreign investors in the newly privatized Czech economy, "So we seek partners for the rest of our lives, not just for one night"; Glenn Frankel, "Czechs Head West to Pitch Privatization of Industries," *Washington Post*, June 14, 1991, p. A-24.

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istrative perspective builds on a conception of a politically defined public interest, and the economic perspective builds on a conception of privately defined individual interests. The political perspective, by contrast, assumes that interests are divided and in conflict. Not surprisingly, the latter perspective is better suited to understanding both the intensity of the battles that privatization initiatives frequently spark and the resistance by mobilized political forces to delegating privatization decisions to institutionally depoliticized units and technical criteria.

Figure 2 illustrates how our political typology highlights those differences among privatization initiatives that are obscured when too much attention is paid to the distinctions between specific conventional privatization techniques. Both the administrative and economic perspectives emphasize the choices governments make (see the vertical dimension of the figure). We believe that within each of the three columns the differences between privatization techniques such as asset sales, contracting

	Pragmatic	**Tactical**	**Systemic**
Key Motives	public sector "triage" • reduce budget drain • adjust to changing circumstance	short-term shift in party or interest group clout • attract voters • reward supporters • product differentiation	long-term shift in balance of power • lower expectations of government • reduce government capacity • transform political stakes
Illustrations of Conventional Privatization Techniques			
asset sales	hiving off costly public enterprise where private provision has become a viable alternative	selling profitable public assets at discounted prices as form of patronage	selling public housing in order to convert tenants into a (more conservative) homeowner's mentality
contracting out	competitive bidding among private firms to provide service where contracting agency has enforcement capacity	awarding "sweetheart" contract to campaign contributor	shifting governmentally provided services to private providers to build new interest group to lobby for further reductions
deregulation	deregulating sectors that are not natural monopolies, coupled with protection of consumer interests	reduced enforcement of regulations that fall heavily on supporters	across-the-board delegitimization of regulatory intervention and government capacity to oversee and enforce
user fees	raising new revenues and diversifying revenue alternatives	making it possible for the governing party to cut (or avoid raising) an unpopular tax	reducing the net progressivity of public policies

FIGURE 2
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF PRIVATIZATION

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out, deregulation, and user fees—while potentially quite important[60]—are less significant than the differences encountered when one moves along the horizontal dimension. An asset sale of the pragmatic type can be understood in similar terms as a pragmatic deregulation initiative, and its implications are likely to be similar as well. But a pragmatically motivated asset sale differs sharply in origin and implications from one determined by tactical or systemic concerns.

The traditional pluralist and class-based paradigms are particularly well suited to investigating tactical privatization and the variant of systemic privatization that is related to what we have called power shifts. Understanding the potential for systemic change due to perceptual and institutional shifts calls for a more sophisticated approach—one quicker to recognize the senses in which political interests can be malleable and the institutional biases that make some types of interests more likely to be articulated and acted upon.

Broad shifts of the systemic privatization type alter the fundamental rules of the game by which political actors assess their interests and weigh their strategic alternatives. By also dramatically reconfiguring the array of opportunities for private advantage and undermining the institutional capacity of the public sector to respond to citizens' needs, systemic privatization promises some groups the possibility of operating in an environment in which the "mobilization of bias"[61] is in their favor, although their interests may not universally or automatically prevail.

In addition to shifting the evaluative lenses through which political actors assess their political interests, systemic privatization has the potential to create new interests. Not only does it create new private corporations or privatized conglomerates, but through sales of stock to institutional or atomized investors it also creates agglomerations of private actors who are linked by ownership networks that create newly shared interests.[62] These new interest groups may try to influence political institutions when public policy threatens them or when they see new opportunities for gain. Privatization permanently affects the interest group environment within which governments operate.[63] Moreover, these nonincremental changes in both state and society create opportunities for

[60] As Salamon notes, "Each instrument has its own distinctive procedures, its own organizational relationships, its own skill requirements—in short, its own political economy"; Salamon (fn. 8), 8.

[61] Schattschneider (fn. 27).

[62] Groups of privatized firms in France were clustered together around various financial institutions that became core stockholders, remolding French industry into something resembling Japanese "corporate groups."

[63] See Feigenbaum (fn. 14).

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political entrepreneurs to mobilize new nodes of collective action. Thus, privatization may free the state from some constituencies but create new ones. In this way, the successful achievement of public policy today can create obstacles to public policy in the future.

From Motive to Consequence

Of most interest to us is the nearly simultaneous emergence of privatization across a wide variety of national settings. For this reason we have anchored our typology in political motivation—in the expectation that the subjectively defined interests of influential actors will reveal the most about the processes of agenda formation and policy initiation.

Nonetheless, it is possible that the consequences intended by such political actors may never materialize. Their actions may even backfire; indeed, efforts to promote broad structural realignments probably fail much more often than they succeed.[64] Hawkins, for example, argues that the 1957 West German systemic privatization initiative prefigured the Thatcher model in many respects.[65] Like the Thatcher approach, the intent was at least in part to win over a broad segment of the middle and working class to stock ownership and, presumably, to greater allegiance to capitalism and market forces, but the long-term effect on stock ownership and popular perspectives was limited.[66] Even more modest objectives that do not entail systemic changes may fail to be met, either because of flawed strategies or implementation by the groups pursuing those objectives or because of effective countermeasures taken by opposing groups.

Such failed efforts may leave no mark at all on the distribution of power, citizens' perceptions of the proper role of government, or the capacity and formal authority of public institutions. In some cases, however, they will have consequences that simply differ qualitatively from those intended by the principal actors. Figure 3 extends our initial typology by incorporating those cases in which motive and consequence are not allied. The horizontal dimension represents the three types of privatization as defined by the motivation of the principal initiators; the vertical dimension represents the ultimate consequences for government,

[64] Although, as noted already, the substantial payoffs if successful may make pursuit of systemic changes rational nevertheless.

[65] See Richard A. Hawkins, "Privatisation in Western Germany, 1957 to 1990," *National Westminster Bank Review* (November 1991).

[66] "The Western Germany economy did not see a long-term extension of share ownership. Furthermore, Esser has argued that 'people's capitalism' is unpopular in contemporary Western Germany and does not win votes"; Hawkins (fn. 65), 21. Hawkins refers in this quote to J. Esser, "Symbolic Privatisation: The Politics of Privatisation in West Germany," *West European Politics* 11, no. 4 (1988).

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Consequence \ Motivation	Pragmatic	Tactical	Systemic
increase efficiency and capacity of government	state or province institutes users' fees for those entering public parks; revenues are directed to improved maintenance and expansion of park facilities	conservative party sells public utility to "friends," but state regulatory apparatus expanded in scope and capacity	effort to privatize rapidly results in sharp economic decline and popular unrest, leading to gradual reassertion of state intervention
benefit a particular political entrepreneur, party, or interest group.	city manager contracts out garbage collection; no gain in efficiency, but private firm gains lucrative contract	economic elites finance conservative party campaign; subsequently, those interests are prime beneficiaries of new government's privatization initiatives	program to privatize state enterprises in order to build a new entrepreneurial and pro-democratic class, is co-opted by preexisting state elite
structural reallocation of power among classes; diminished capacity, authority, and legitimacy of the state	developing nation privatizes as condition of international aid; increases power of indigenous priviledged classes	progressive politician adopts privatization platform in order to blunt conservative criticisms; implementation radically weakens union constituencies	conservative party successfully implements program to sell off state enterprises, cut back public bureaucracy, shrink social welfare responsibility

a. Shaded cells are those in which eventual consequences match the intentions of the initial key proponents

FIGURE 3
FROM MOTIVATION TO CONSEQUENCE[a]

interest groups, and social classes. A brief illustration of the pattern of privatization represented is contained within each cell.

Here, again, we must emphasize that our typology is intended as an analytic tool, not as an end in itself: it has the potential to open new avenues for theoretical consideration and empirical evaluation. Under what circumstances are broadly conceived efforts to introduce radical market-oriented reforms, for example, likely to be co-opted by political entrepreneurs or private interests? Under what conditions do more narrowly and pragmatically conceived privatization initiatives develop an unanticipated momentum that snowballs into a broader realignment of

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society and state? Pursuing the answers to such questions will require that the typology presented here be operationalized more precisely and—as the record of privatization becomes more established—that the consequences of privatization policies be more rigorously investigated. Nonetheless we are willing to hazard a few preliminary conclusions.

Conclusions

Most models of political behavior presume—usually correctly—a relatively stable institutional environment. But sharp changes—whether in the rapid assembly of the New Deal programs and agencies in the United States, the wholesale dismantling of the public enterprise sector in Britain, or the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe—can alter the landscape so sharply that normal assumptions about political rationality, motivation, and strategy no longer apply. Changing the balance between public and private in such dramatic ways profoundly reorients political actions. Hence, systemic privatization mandates new presumptions about political behavior and policy change that relate to political rationality, governmental responsibility and capacity, and the stickiness of systemic change.

First, conventional assumptions about political rationality become problematic in the face of opportunities to achieve systemic privatization. For its instigators, the pursuit of systemic privatization is like betting on a long shot or buying speculative stocks on margin: probabilities of failure are high, but so are the rewards of success. Information for calculating those probabilities is in short supply. Moreover, assessing rationality in this context is difficult; as often as not, strategies predicated on achieving a systemic shift will appear irrational. The Reagan administration's early proposals to sell large tracts of federally owned parkland despite widespread popular misgivings are an example; so are Margaret Thatcher's proposals to privatize elements of the National Health Service. Political backlash against these efforts was substantial and costly. But Thatcher's sale of public housing demonstrates the potential payoffs—a sizable boost to the treasury, shedding of a long-term governmental obligation, and transformation of working-class renters into homeowners presumably more susceptible to Tory appeals.

Second, structural shifts in governmental capacity and responsibility—not simply variations in financing, ownership, regulation, and service provision—should be the central focus in distinguishing between types of privatization. The administrative and economic perspectives identify privatization by shifts in financing (from general taxes to user

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fees), ownership (sale of public assets), regulation (reduction in rules and oversight), and service provision (contracting out to private providers). Whether such shifts decrease or increase the role of private versus public sector forces, however, depends upon the specifics of form and implementation.

Third, the most important political criterion for evaluating privatization alternatives is whether they represent substantial and not easily reversible reductions in state responsibility and capacity. By state responsibility we mean de facto assignment of responsibility as determined by public values and expectations as well as formal legal definition.[67] By state capacity we mean the de facto ability of public institutions to mount resourceful, targeted, comprehensive, informed, and sustained efforts to fulfill their responsibilities. Revenues raised and number of employees are two ready indicators of capacity, but they hardly tell the whole story. Large state apparatuses can be flabby and lack direction. Lean ones can make up for lack of size through efficiency, strong leadership, good information systems, and public support. Distinguishing between privatization efforts on the basis of their long-term impact on governmental responsibility and capacity acknowledges the sharp qualitative distinction between privatization as a tool for improving government performance and privatization as an assault on the basic foundations of the welfare state.

Finally, some policy decisions are less readily reversible than others. Not only do the interests of constituencies often change with privatization, but once in place, the new policies may engender new groups as well as behavior, groups endowed with powers that leave them entrenched and sometimes impossible to remove. Whether this takes the form of the creation of a new class (as seems to have occurred with some of the privatizations in Eastern Europe), the selling of a nation's assets to foreigners (as happened frequently in the Third World or Europe), or simply improving the competitive position of some groups with regard to others in the same society, the results of privatization may be permanent. This is, of course, what the opponents of privatization fear and what the advocates of privatization are counting on.

[67] Sometimes responsibility can be determined only by observation over time; for instance, we might consider government to be responsible for ensuring sufficient employment opportunities if a rise in unemployment level above some threshold mobilizes powerful political forces that induce governmental response.

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"LESS FILLING, TASTES GREAT"
The Realist-Neoliberal Debate

By EMERSON M. S. NIOU and PETER C. ORDESHOOK*

THE debate between realists and neoliberals focuses on two issues: (1) delineating the goals that best account for the actions of states, especially patterns of cooperation and conflict; and (2) assessing whether institutions of different types can ameliorate conflict in an otherwise anarchic environment. Realists for their part concede that states may be concerned in the long run with absolute welfare; but they also believe that states, faced with inevitable threats to their survival, *must* concern themselves with relative position as measured by military capability, economic productivity, and the like—thereby attenuating the likelihood of cooperation and the role of institutions as facilitators of cooperation. Neoliberals, by contrast, draw on the lessons of scenarios such as the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma and the myriad instances of actual cooperation in international politics and hence see less reason for supposing that states are concerned *necessarily* with relative gain. Consequently, they see greater opportunity for cooperation and an expanded role for institutions as facilitators of that cooperation.

This debate remains unresolved. Thus, out of frustration or a belief that logical argument cannot settle the matter, some look for answers from empirical evidence: "The next scholarly task is to conduct tests of the two approaches."[1] We argue here, however, that this conclusion is premature. First, we cannot formulate a critical test of these two approaches, because both sides of the debate speak more in terms of general tendencies and employ concepts (for example, power, regime, hegemon, relative gain) that, although treated as theoretical primitives, are too imprecise to lend themselves to discriminating hypotheses. Second, neither a theoretical nor an empirical focus on state goals can make the decisive theoretical contribution. Aside from some specification of "basic" goals such as that each state prefers to maximize the welfare of its society, understanding international politics does not require a prior determina-

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[1] Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), 503.

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tion of instrumental goals. Such goals must be endogenous to any theory that might resolve the debate. Finally, although generality is sought with appeals to ideas drawn from the rational-choice paradigm and game theory in particular, both sides misconstrue the content of those ideas or draw misleading implications from them. Nevertheless, we can discern a general perspective in which the debate is transformed from an inconclusive discussion of goals into a more productive assessment of the likelihood that states will coordinate cooperatively or competitively, where this likelihood depends on things such as prior subjective beliefs, chance events, and the ease with which states can signal their intentions.

Elaborating these arguments, we begin in Section I with two uncontroversial propositions: that states share the basic goal of absolute welfare maximization (as measured by some calculation of the "resources" at its disposal) and that they become concerned about their position relative to other states only when circumstances establish such a concern as instrumental to realizing basic objectives. To be productive, the realist-neoliberal debate over the implications of these two propositions must consider the analysis of equilibria of complete systems in which instrumental goals and circumstances are jointly and simultaneously determined, rather than argue whether anarchic systems necessarily imply an instrumental goal of relative resource maximization, whether the possibility of cooperation allows for the maximization of absolute resources, or whether relative resource maximization implies the outcomes that realists foresee. Instead of supposing that we must choose between modeling states as maximizers of absolute or relative gain, these instrumental goals should be treated merely as part of the description of the equilibria that systems of countries can achieve.

Next, we argue in Section II that although metaphorical appeals to parts of game theory like the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes illustrate fundamental aspects of cooperation in anarchic systems, we need to take advantage of more general principles to achieve a general understanding of when a world order corresponding to the one envisioned by realists is likely to prevail and when that envisioned by neoliberals is more likely. Because virtually every ongoing social process possesses a multiplicity of equilibria, opportunities to cooperate and the concomitant problem of coordinating to one of these equilibria are omnipresent. If cooperation involves the joint selection of strategies that avoid mutually disadvantageous outcomes in favor of an advantageous equilibrium relative to the status quo or vector of individual security values,[2] and if coordination is the selection of a particular equilibrium on

[2] See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 54.

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the basis of individual beliefs about actions that derive from something other than the abstract properties of that equilibrium, then for broad classes of circumstances, cooperation cannot be expected to occur reliably without coordination.

It follows that the study of those things that facilitate or impede coordination is a necessary feature of any theory of international processes. Indeed, Section III emphasizes that the concept of coordination already plays a central role in international relations theory insofar as that theory conceptualizes the institutions and regimes that service wholly cooperative arrangements and those that service more conflictual world orders as mechanisms for coordinating states to particular outcomes or as manifestations of coordination.[3] We also argue in this section that domestic and international politics are not, as is oftentimes asserted, conceptually distinct. It is incorrect to hold that international affairs are anarchic and that domestic affairs are something else; rather, the appearance of difference derives from the extent to which coordination occurs at one level of human interaction and not at another.

To have any confidence in our arguments, however, we must be certain that the different world orders identified by realists and neoliberals—those in which states are concerned primarily with survival and relative gains versus those in which states cooperate on a more comprehensive basis and pursue absolute gains, respectively—can coexist as equilibria in the same general model. That would allow us to explore the circumstances under which one equilibrium or the other might be more attractive. To that end, in Section IV we review a specific model of anarchic systems in which those world orders do coexist.

The central premise of this essay is that the realist-neoliberal debate can yield a general theory only if it is recast to focus on the likelihood that states will coordinate to achieve equilibria of different types. The argument over the type of international system that prevails and the instrumental goals of states is an argument over whether states are more likely to coordinate to wholly noncooperative outcomes, to partially cooperative outcomes characterized by competing alliances, or to wholly cooperative outcomes such as an all-encompassing system of collective security. Within these world orders, we should also examine how states

[3] For relevant examples of an understanding of the centrality of coordination to international politics, see Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980); Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982); Duncan Snidal, "Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 79 (September 1985); Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43 (April 1991); Geoffrey Garrett, "Power Politics and European Integration" (Mimeo, Stanford University, 1992).

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enhance the attractiveness of different equilibria, how they signal commitments to the strategies that lead to them, and ultimately how cooperation and conflict across different issue-areas reinforce or undermine the alternative world orders that characterize the interactions of states generally.

I. Goals as Endogenous

The dispute over goals is summarized by the following assertions: from one side that "in a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest"[4] and more ambiguously from the other side that "under different systemic conditions states will define their self-interest differently. . . . Where survival is at stake efforts to maintain autonomy may take precedence over all other activities; but where the environment is relatively benign energies will also be directed to fulfilling other goals."[5] Of course, the issue of goals is secondary to the issue of whether cooperation can emerge and be sustained in an anarchic environment, that is, in an environment in which agreements among countries to abide by particular strategies cannot be maintained by exogenous mechanisms of enforcement. Instead, such agreements must be maintained, if they can be at all, by the individual self-interest of those who are party to them. In game-theoretic terms, cooperative outcomes must correspond to an equilibrium to the noncooperative game that models choice sequences, information, and the relation of outcomes to the choices countries confront.

The lesson of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma—that the absence of exogenous enforcement need not preclude cooperation, including that which encompasses all persons—confronts realists with a special challenge and imparts to the issue of goals its apparent relevance.[6] Correspondingly, realists meet this challenge with the argument that the dilemma does not model the core of international politics. This argument is defended, in turn, by the view that the imperatives of anarchic systems

[4] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 107.

[5] Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 62. Of course, any such discussion should contend with the difficulties associated with attributing goals to collectivities; see, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951). Nevertheless, the concept of the state as a rational unitary decision maker remains a convenient abstraction that allows us to ignore *temporarily* how international affairs affect domestic politics and how domestic politics transforms the goals of individuals into state actions.

[6] Michael Taylor, *Anarchy and Cooperation* (New York: Wiley, 1976); Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

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compel states to be primarily concerned with relative gains. As Powell summarizes the realist view, "If . . . one state can turn a relative gain to its advantage and the disadvantage of others, then [the system's constraints] will induce a concern for relative gains and this may impede cooperation absent any superior authority to ensure that these gains not be used in this way."[7] Thus, in the realist view, the imperatives of survival confront states with a security dilemma and not a Prisoners' Dilemma—with a dilemma that admits of the elimination of subsets of states rather than merely some inefficient outcome. This compels states to be primarily concerned with relative gain, which renders competition constant sum and in turn precludes all but limited cooperation.

Thus, we can restate the realist-neoliberal debate. First, since the debate is largely over the instrumental goals states pursue as a function of their environment, we can assume that both realists and neoliberals accept the following proposition:

> P1. A state's fundamental goal is absolute welfare maximization, which, ignoring the complexities introduced by contemporary social choice theory, can be operationalized in terms of the maximization of some aggregate measure of the resources at a country's disposal. However, a state may act as if it pursues other objectives whenever circumstances require it do so to achieve this goal.

To this assumption realists and most neoliberals add the proposition that "domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. . . . International systems are decentralized and anarchic. The ordering principles of the two structures are distinctly different, indeed, contrary to each other."[8] That is,

> P2. International affairs differ from domestic affairs in that international affairs lack (exogenous) mechanisms for enforcing agreements.

On the basis of P1 and P2, the realist argument, stated starkly, becomes:

> P3. The anarchic environment of international politics compels states to be concerned at all times with survival, which requires that they supplant the pursuit of absolute welfare maximization with the instrumental goal of relative resource maximization.
>
> P4. A concern with relative resource maximization renders the lessons of the Prisoners' Dilemma irrelevant and makes cooperation, except in the form of competing alliances, impossible or merely temporary.

[7] Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," *American Political Science Review* 85 (December 1991), 1306.

[8] Waltz (fn. 4).

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Neoliberals, on the other hand, substitute these propositions for P3 and P4:

> P3'. In those instances in which the mutual (absolute) gains from cooperation are sufficiently great, the Prisoners' Dilemma teaches us that the absence of exogenous mechanisms of enforcement does not preclude effective cooperation.
>
> P4'. Although survival may take precedence over all other activities, at other times states can pursue other goals.

Much of the debate over goals can be set in the context of these propositions, and doing so reveals the incompleteness of both arguments. First, consider P4 and the assertion that "under zero-sum conditions there is no basis for regimes and no reason to coordinate policies, because one actor's loss is another's gain."[9] Not only is this assertion wrong for scenarios with more than two people (since a subset of people can gain at the expense of others), but it is also suspect for two-person situations. We can of course make cooperation impossible by transforming the Prisoners' Dilemma in Game 1 to Game 2 (see Figure 1) with the assumption that players maximize payoff differences. However, suppose states also consider absolute resources at the margin; that is, suppose they have lexicographic preferences and thus consider absolute position when they are otherwise indifferent about their relative position. Then the ordinal utilities in Game 3 describe the preference of both players. Notice now that Game 3 is also a Prisoners' Dilemma. Hence, even a minor "adjustment" in the assumption that states maximize relative position readmits the possibility of cooperation.

Such examples alert us to the fact that conclusions about cooperation depend on how goals are modeled. This problem is compounded, moreover, by the inherent ambiguity in formalizing relative resource maximization when the number of countries exceeds two. For example, ignoring how the R_i's are defined or measured, let $(R_1, R_2, \ldots R_n)$ denote the resources controlled by countries $1, 2, \ldots n$. Then perhaps the most straightforward way to formalize relative gain maximization is to as-

5, 5	20, 0
0, 20	10, 10

Game 1

0, 0	20, −20
−20, 20	0, 0

Game 2

2, 2	4, 1
1, 4	3, 3

Game 3

FIGURE 1

[9] Krasner (fn. 3), 338.

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sume that state i simply maximizes its proportion of resources in the system; that is,

$$\frac{R_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} R_j}$$

However, to facilitate the derivation of results, Snidal formulates this goal as the maximization of the following function:[10]

$$R_i - \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{R_j}{n}$$

Both formulations, though, ignore the possibility that i's proportion of resources can increase even as another country surpasses i. Hence, rather than being concerned with averages, country i might be concerned with its position relative to the largest country in the system and thereby maximize,

$$R_i - MAX_{j \neq i} [R_j]$$

Alternatively, why not suppose that country i focuses its attention on some subset of countries—those near its borders or outside of its alliance—and thereby maximizes its position relative to the largest country in this subset?

Certainly, we can imagine other formulations that are consistent with the hypothesis that countries maximize relative resources. But because, as the discussion of Games 1–3 reveals, conclusions may depend on how we formalize things and because there is ambiguity about the "correct" formulation, we can see that basing a model on some specific formalization is unlikely to be productive. Because, in accordance with proposition P1, the goals we observe are derivative of circumstances, the appropriate formulation can be discerned only from a more comprehensive theory that allows us to derive the algebraic representation of instrumental goals from the primary ones of survival and absolute resource maximization.

This raises a problem that neither the realist nor the neoliberal argument addresses fully: that "national policies both influence and are influenced by the types of world order which prevails at the time."[11] That is, the degree to which a state must concern itself with relative resources depends on the willingness of other states to cooperate; but that willingness is itself dependent on the goals of other states, which depend on the goal and actions of the state in question, and so on.

[10] Duncan Snidal, "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (December 1991).

[11] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 1493.

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To restate Wright's argument and to identify what is missing from or unstated in the arguments summarized by P3–P4 and P3'–P4', suppose $G = G(E)$ denotes the dependence of goals on the environment a state confronts, where that environment includes descriptions of the capabilities of states, the choices they confront, domestic political constraints and responses to international events, and beliefs about the choices that others will make in the future. But notice that if the environment includes the strategies of countries in the system (for example, military preparations, alliances, trade policies), which are themselves dependent on goals, then E is a function of G and we must write $E = E(G)$. It follows that we cannot solve separately for G or E. Instead, we must solve for both variables simultaneously because the consequences of goals and of alternative environmental conditions are identified only by solving for an *equilibrium* value of these variables. That is, we must find those $[G^*, E^*]$ such that if E^* is the environment of states, then states act as if their goals are $G^* = G(E^*)$; and if G^* denotes the goals of states, then they choose strategies such that $E^* = E(G^*)$ pertains. And because there is no reason to suppose that such equilibria are unique, it also follows that we must learn (1) whether the interaction of states is likely to lead to an equilibrium, (2) how the character of an equilibrium depends on other things such as the initial beliefs of decision makers, and (3), in general, the circumstances under which one equilibrium is selected over another or whether in fact any equilibrium will be achieved.

This argument is relevant to a number of studies that seek to resolve the debate in favor of one side or the other. Snidal, for example, purports to show that assumption P4 is erroneous—that the realists' predictions about the impossibility of cooperation do not follow from their assumptions about goals.[12] Snidal's argument is flawed, however, in that he fails to allow the resulting strategic imperatives to influence the determinants of goals. In his notation, the weight r given to relative resource maximization ought to be made functionally dependent on the environment that r helps establish. Assuming that r is an exogenously determined constant allows for only a partial and necessarily inconclusive argument.

By contrast, Krasner defends the view that "power needs to be given pride of place" within the neoliberal framework. He argues that in proposition P3' neoliberals give too much weight to the resolution of "market failure" and too little to the bargaining among states that determines which Pareto-efficient outcome prevails.[13] Interactions among states are

[12] Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 85 (September 1991).

[13] Krasner (fn. 3), 366.

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not exclusively concerned with ensuring Pareto efficiency; they can also be a competition for advantage in which power determines final outcomes. However, if we accept Krasner's definition of power as "the ability to determine who plays the game, or to define the rules, or to change the values within the payoff matrix," then generalizing his analysis requires a model of a more inclusive game in which players select these parameters.[14] For example, the idea that power determines the ability to influence bargaining outcomes establishes power as an instrumental variable whose weight is dictated by its value with respect to realizing some more basic goal. It follows that Krasner's argument is incomplete. Although he is convincing in his empirical analysis that there is at least one equilibrium environment E^* in which $G^* = \{\text{power maximization}\}$, we cannot be certain that this equilibrium is unique until we specify a strategic environment in which states choose (implicitly or explicitly) to make decisions on the basis of power. Such an environment models anarchic systems and renders E and G endogenous.

Powell avoids ad hoc formulations of goals and approaches this theoretical ideal by offering a specific mechanism that renders goals endogenous.[15] But even his analysis, which formalizes P4', is incomplete (deliberately so, since his objective is merely to show how the goal of absolute gain is rationally transformed into a concern with relative gain). The determinants of goals are the "constraints defining the system [that] create opportunities for one state to turn relative gains to its advantage and to the disadvantage of others."[16] In addition to technology, these constraints include the actions of third parties, fourth parties, and so on (Powell's model is two-person), as well as the institutional structures set up to influence those actions. But because such constraints are clearly endogenous, Powell's analysis cannot supply any definitive resolution of the realist-neoliberal debate.

II. The Multiplicity of Equilibria

The preceding discussion argues that goals and environment are endogenous and simultaneously determined, that the realist-neoliberal debate takes inadequate account of this fact, and that we are unlikely to resolve the debate merely by postulating a goal and seeing if certain consequences follow from it. Instead, we must formulate a more comprehensive analysis that renders E and G endogenous. But, in anticipation of

[14] Ibid, 342.
[15] Powell (fn. 7).
[16] Ibid., 1315.

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what such an analysis is likely to reveal, notice that nothing we have said establishes that [E^*,G^*] will exist or, if it exists, that it will be unique and will correspond to the scenario described by either realists or neoliberals. Indeed, there are sound reasons for supposing that [E^*,G^*] will exist but that it will not be unique and that this fact suggests a research agenda different from the one pursued in arguments over instrumental goals.

Owing to an initial focus on single-play versions of the Prisoners' Dilemma, political scientists became especially concerned that the absence of an effective way to enforce agreements precluded socially rational cooperation. Thus, sustaining cooperation as an equilibrium to a noncooperative game by supposing that the dilemma is repeated seemed like a critical theoretical result. However, another game, the two-person Battle of the Sexes, served to emphasize the relevance of coordination in political processes.[17] Referring to Game 4 (see Figure 2) and recalling that an equilibrium is a vector of strategies, one for each player, such that no one has an incentive to change his or her strategy unilaterally, the important feature of this game is that it has two pure strategy equilibria, (a_1,b_1) and (a_2,b_2), that are neither equivalent (each person prefers a different equilibrium) nor formed by interchangeable strategies (combining strategies from different equilibria need not yield an equilibrium). Thus, each player can choose a strategy that is part of some equilibrium and yet an equilibrium *outcome* does not prevail, for example, the strategy pair (a_1,b_2).

There are two approaches to "solving" the problem illustrated by the Battle of the Sexes, only one of which is generally valid. The first operates on the assumption that the inability of the analyst to predict outcomes or of players to "solve" a game derives from the failure to take full account of strategic circumstances, including, for instance, the "power" of players to coerce each other by implementing strategies not portrayed in a game. Game 4 in particular appears to confront players with a situation in which they might try to assure an equilibrium through some process of "preplay" bargaining and in which prediction

	b_1	b_2
a_1	5, 1	0, 0
a_2	0, 0	1, 5

Game 4

	b_1	b_2
a_1	100, 100	0, 0
a_2	0, 0	1, 1

Game 5

FIGURE 2

[17] See, e.g., Stein (fn. 3); Snidal (fn. 3); and Krasner (fn. 3).

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requires an analysis of those things that might affect the ability of one player to coerce or otherwise influence the actions of the other. Set in the usual context of international relations theory, this approach seeks to resurrect the relevance of "power" for situations that might otherwise be modeled as nonconstant sum.

The second approach argues that any expansion of strategic possibilities would most likely generate larger Battle of the Sexes–type games with a multiplicity of nonequivalent, noninterchangeable equilibria. In this view, prediction continues to require an appeal to things other than formal definitions of equilibria. In particular, prediction requires an appeal to those things that generate rational expectations—initial beliefs about choices that are self-fulfilling prophecies (focal points in Schelling's terminology).[18] Referring to Game 4, suppose on the basis of past behavior or even the mere labeling of strategies that, first, 1 believes 2 thinks that he will choose a_1 so that 2 will choose b_1 and, second, that 2 believes 1 thinks that she will choose b_1 so that 1 will choose a_1. Because the choices implied by these beliefs are an equilibrium, beliefs are consistent and we can say that persons 1 and 2 have "coordinated to (a_1,b_1)." In Game 5, which also has two nonequivalent, noninterchangeable pure strategy equilibria, consistent beliefs are likely to arise from the attractiveness of (a_1,b_1), and so this game seems to have an easily identified solution. More generally, though, one must be prepared to find that these beliefs and conjectures (these subjective evaluations of circumstances) derive from a great many things that analysts may not even be capable of observing, with the further understanding that "even seemingly trivial aspects of the way the game is presented [can] determine the focal equilibrium that the players implement."[19]

Thus far, we have not said much that is new. We want to emphasize, however, that because the things the Battle of the Sexes illustrates apply to virtually all social processes, the approach just outlined cannot provide a definitive general resolution of matters. Support for this argument is provided, in part, by any one of the folk theorems of game theory, which show that the primary lesson drawn from the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma about the possibility of cooperation without exogenous enforcement does not require the dilemma for its validity.[20] If people give the future sufficient weight and if they must choose strategies today that will

[18] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
[19] Roger B. Myerson, *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 113.
[20] Ibid.; and Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, *Game Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).

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be followed during all subsequent repetitions of some game, then we can sustain *any* utility outcome as an equilibrium in *any* ongoing (repeated) social process, provided only that that outcome yields each person a payoff that exceeds what that person can guarantee from unilateral (uncoordinated) action. The mechanism supporting this result is that if processes are repeated, including processes that allow the players to renegotiate agreements at different stages of their interaction, then people have a great many strategies (an infinity of them) and these strategies can be used to expand the sets of payoff outcomes that can be sustained as equilibria.

Although these folk theorems apply only to repeated games and share other limitations, the analysis of other general classes of games in the game-theoretic literature reveals that multiple equilibria characterize nearly any relatively complex situation. "It does not greatly matter whether it is the Battle of the Sexes that is repeated, or some other game. . . . What is important is that the whole spectrum of equilibria becomes available as a possible source of social contracts."[21] To the extent, then, that equilibria can be classified as cooperative or noncooperative, the possibility of cooperation *and* noncooperation must be deemed endemic to all social processes. If our sole criterion for assessing whether an outcome is feasible is whether it corresponds to an equilibrium, then just as we cannot preclude outcomes associated with cooperative strategies, we also cannot preclude outcomes labeled noncooperative.

These facts, then, support the view that the first approach to resolving Battle of the Sexes–type issues—expanding the strategies available to players by incorporating more things into the analysis—is unlikely to meet with much success. Trying to achieve an unambiguous prediction by incorporating preplay bargaining and considerations of power (especially if the expansion allows infinite sequences of moves or an uncertain number of finite sequences) is more likely to result in an increase in the number of equilibria, thereby complicating the task of predicting whether and how players will coordinate to any one equilibrium. Correspondingly, these facts establish that states are unlikely to cooperate if they cannot also coordinate, since without coordination there is no reason to suppose that any equilibrium will be achieved. Finally, prediction and explanation requires not only that we learn the strategies that support different outcomes but that we also learn how states coordinate and whether the requirements to coordinate to one type of equilibrium differ from the requirements to coordinate to another type.

[21] Ken Binmore, "Game Theory and the Social Contract I: Playing Fair" (Mimeo, University of Michigan, 1992).

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III. Coordination, Constitutions, and Regimes

If the problem of coordination is as pervasive as suggested here, then at least two things should be true. First, this problem should manifest itself in all social processes, not merely in international ones. Second, this problem should, in one form or another, be recognized in the literature on international relations, or at least one should be able to reinterpret a good part of that literature in terms of the problem of coordination.

With respect to the first thing, let us reconsider the validity of proposition P2: why does the concept of power seem less central in domestic affairs than it does in international affairs, and do the means whereby people coordinate provide an alternative explanation for the appearance of a difference between international and domestic affairs? With respect to domestic politics, at one level we could attempt to account for policy outcomes in, say, a democratic society by referring to the power of interest groups, the media, the courts versus the legislature, or the legislature versus the executive. But closer inspection would reveal that many of the things associated with power or its determinants derive, whether implicitly or explicitly, from a constitution that defines the rules of "legitimate" political action. Presidential power derives from the manner in which that office is filled and from that office's ability to marshal public opinion; legislative power derives from the constitutional authority to tax and make law; and interest group power, from its ability to facilitate the reelection of legislators according to constitutionally prescribed rules, and so on. Thus, understanding domestic politics in terms of a specific constellation of power requires an understanding of why society's members implicitly or explicitly accede to the terms of a constitution that helps define and allocate power.

Of course, like international relations theorists, constitutional theorists are also concerned with the matter of endogenous enforcement—how a constitution's provisions are sustained, how a "piece of parchment" can contribute to political stability, and how correspondingly such a document can establish power relationships. The endogenous enforcement of constitutional provisions, like the issues that ostensibly separate realists and neoliberals, has long been debated owing to the seemingly paradoxical requirement that stable constitutions enforce themselves.

The essence of this paradox and the corresponding source of the temptation to account for stability in terms of power relations is revealed if we attempt to conceptualize a constitution as a contract that sets the terms of a market exchange.[22] Viewing a constitution thus necessarily

[22] Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, *The Reason of Rules* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

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leads to the question of who or what enforces the contract. That, in turn, leads to the search for the ultimate source of enforcement authority in society. But answering that the courts, the legislature, or the imperatives of electoral competition are the source of enforcement only pushes the problem back: who, one then asks, enforces the court's prerogatives, the legislature's jurisdiction, or the laws that regulate elections?

At least at the constitutional level, then, a state is in principle no less anarchic than an international system in the sense that the enforcement of constitutional agreements must be endogenous. Nevertheless, domestic and international politics appear distinct by virtue of the fact that being a state requires that people achieve some minimal level of coordination with respect to the implicit or explicit rules of domestic social process. Without denying the relevance of social norms, custom, and culture, even if we restrict our attention to formalized "democratic" rules, there are a great many alternative equilibria of rules. Thus, to realize the mutual benefits of a stable and coherent political system, the members of society must select one of these equilibria and thereby establish a stable set of expectations about legitimate process for the present and the future. Written constitutions are a route to that end.

It follows that constitutions are best conceptualized as mechanisms that coordinate society to an equilibrium of rules.[23] A constitution is stable and self-enforcing if it establishes a set of self-fulfilling expectations about due process, rights, and legitimate ways of making collective decisions. Moreover, conceptualizing constitutions in this way shows them to be part of the social fabric that coordinates society in general, as part of the regime that describes society and the state. And it leads to more practical questions such as how to craft rules to compete with other things that can coordinate social action (for example, ethnicity, religion, language).

It is true that the salience of the issue of exogenous enforcement fades once a constitution becomes a stable part of society. At that point, students of domestic politics can attend to other matters such as the details of judicial, legislative, or electoral process without regard to how the rules specifying the roles of judiciary, legislature, or elections are ultimately enforced. Lurking in the background, however, is the fact that the rules defining these branches and their power are sustained because acceptance of them describes some of the elements of social coordination.

[23] David Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Russell Hardin, "Why a Constitution," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism* (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Constitutional Stability," *Constitutional Political Economy* 3 (1992).

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Of course, realists might make the case that international and domestic politics are distinct by arguing that power dictates outcomes in preconstitutional societies and that an international system is best described as such a society. Correspondingly, restating Krasner's argument, power, rather than some implicit adherence to rules, structures coordination.[24] Aside from noting that we have never observed a "state of nature" in which people act on some basis other than beliefs about the actions of others in a wholly uncoordinated fashion, we can also reassert our previous conclusion that such an expansion of considerations is more likely to expand the set of equilibria in our analysis than it is to provide any resolution of matters. For example, suppose, in asking how tyrants enforce their edicts, we respond: "Through coercion administered by the military or the police." But then we must ask: "Why do the military and police follow?" and our answer is "Because, given their private motives, the tyrant coordinates their actions to those ends better than any other entity." Even if everyone prefers to defect, they need not do so unless another coordinator (revolutionary leader) appears, because each person will otherwise anticipate that his or her defection will result in punishment.

Now consider a context in which Krasner's arguments seem more compelling—the period between tyranny and constitutional democracy when rules are negotiated. We agree that it is naïve to suppose that society in this period is merely "avoiding inefficient outcomes." Even those committed to democratic processes will seek a political order that best serves their interests. Constitutions are the product of forces in which agreements appear to be dictated by some notion, however ambiguous, of "relative power." But if we attempt to model this process of constitutional selection, then the elements of power should be part of that model. And barring the unlikely circumstance of a unique equilibrium, we must once again appeal to ideas about how people coordinate in order to predict the ways in which power will manifest itself. Moreover, as we illustrate in the next section, we can no longer appeal to the concept of power to explain coordination, since its components are already part of our description of the situation and since it is that description that occasioned multiple equilibria.

The concept of coordination, then, is key to understanding constitutional stability; it follows from our argument that realists, at least, must do more than argue that international and domestic politics are conceptually distinct. Instead, they must explain why they believe that coordi-

[24] Krasner (fn. 3).

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nation can more readily be achieved at one level of social interaction than at another.

To what extent is the relevance of coordination already understood in international relations theory? Consider the concept of a hegemon and the reasons why the notion of regime is introduced to explain stability and cooperation in a period of posthegemonic decline. Rarely, if ever, is one country so predominant that it can impose its will on all states when its actions are uniformly opposed. It is more reasonable to view a hegemon as a state that, by its uncommon weight in international affairs, coordinates the actions of other states to some mutually beneficial outcome or that coordinates punishment strategies in the event one or another deviates from any agreement.

In focusing on a hegemon's coordinating function, we see why that role need not evaporate in the event of the hegemon's decline. If the equilibrium achieved under the hegemon is sufficiently advantageous to all states, the ex-hegemon may continue as the primary instrument of coordination long after it loses its near-predominant status or even after it loses its status as the leading power. What does disappear with the hegemon's decline, however, is its ability to punish individual states unilaterally and the expectation that it will do so. Thus, decline before countries develop other ways to coordinate can greatly disrupt a system's ability to maintain the prevailing equilibrium if that system experiences some exogenous shock.

In any event, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the cooperative equilibria achieved under a hegemon is more susceptible to disruption after a hegemon declines. And it is at this point that the neoliberal offers the idea of "regime" as a substitute for the hegemon's role. Indeed, the neoliberal's definition of a regime corresponds nearly identically to such a mechanism—"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge,"[25] "a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted,"[26] "recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge,"[27] and "rules of behavior that allow actor expectations to converge."[28] Hence, in a way that is wholly consistent with the requirements set by game theory for achieving specific equilibria, neoliberalism places

[25] Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.

[26] John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," *International Organization* 29 (Autumn 1975), 570.

[27] Young (fn. 3), 337.

[28] Stein (fn. 3), 127.

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the study of regimes as coordination mechanisms at the heart of international relations theory.

Cooperative outcomes, though, are only one class of equilibria, and coordination may also involve disputes over the selection of outcomes "along the Pareto frontier"—outcomes that may or may not entail overt conflict and the formation of competing alliances. Thus, to the extent that the realist view can be interpreted as an argument about the "naturalness" of coordination to a class of equilibria other than the ones neoliberals envision as feasible, realists and neoliberals are debating the relative ease with which states can coordinate to one equilibrium rather than another. Realists argue that it is "more natural" to coordinate to competitive equilibria (or to equilibria in which subsets of states—alliances—coordinate against other subsets), whereas neoliberals contend that institutions of various descriptions can effectively coordinate states to different (more universally cooperative) outcomes.

IV. A Model with "Realist" and "Neoliberal" Equilibria

A restatement of the realist-neoliberal debate in terms of coordination takes us only part of the way toward freeing the discussion from a focus on instrumental goals. We now want to show, in addition, that both realist and neoliberal equilibria can coexist. On the one hand, we want to assess the argument that realist equilibria somehow impose fewer requirements on coordination than do the equilibria postulated by neoliberals. On the other hand, we want to assess whether an anarchic system can occasion equilibria in which power plays little or no role in addition to equilibria in which power is the central concern of states.

In searching for an appropriate model, we might begin again with the Prisoners' Dilemma. The usual representations of this dilemma do not allow for the elimination of states, even though Powell's analysis suggests routes around the problem.[29] Thus, the existence of a cooperative equilibrium there cannot be interpreted as a solution to any "security dilemma" that states confront. Moreover, unless we focus on n-person formulations and on strategies other than, say, Tit-for-Tat, the dilemma can mislead us about the viability of the neoliberal position. Analyses of the two-person dilemma focus on two equilibria: a "cooperative" one in which all mutual gains are realized through an equilibrium of various types of punishment strategies and a "non-cooperative" one in which the players forgo these gains and choose myopically dominant strategies. Of

[29] Powell (fn. 7); Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

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these two equilibria, one is clearly more attractive than the other, so we might conjecture that coordination to it can be realized without great difficulty. But realists argue that reality offers states more compelling equilibria in which they form antagonistic alliances designed either to preclude the dominance of others (balance of power) or to subjugate others. Hence, the issue is not whether countries must choose between wholly cooperative equilibria (for example, collective security) and wholly competitive equilibria, but whether they can also coordinate to equilibria corresponding to competitive alliance structures.

One approach suggested by these criticisms is to consider n-person versions of the dilemma, strategies that allow only subsets of players to cooperate, and models that somehow nest Prisoners' Dilemmas and Battle of the Sexes scenarios.[30] But rather than forcing ourselves into the straitjacket of particular scenarios, a more productive approach would be to look at analyses that directly model the sources of conflict and cooperation, that allow for the elimination of countries, that allow for alliances, and that allow for collective security arrangements in which countries try to ensure against conflict in any form. Thus, it is useful to consider Niou and Ordeshook's analysis of cooperation; although a highly stylized characterization, it focuses on sustaining cooperation in a system in which there are no exogenous enforcement mechanisms.[31] Moreover, because it does this in a zero-sum environment, this model allows us to investigate the possibilities of cooperation that do not depend, as in the repeated dilemma, merely on there being gains of sufficient magnitude from trade. Cooperation, if it emerges at all, does so because defection from cooperative arrangements is punished by other states, each of which must weigh the advantage of participating in a punishment versus defecting themselves, conditional on their beliefs about the strategies of all other states in the system.

There is no reason to delve into the complexities of this model, which treats technical issues about stochastic games. It is sufficient to note that the model begins with the assumption that countries maximize some resource that measures their ability to overcome each other and that is in fixed supply. The game-theoretic structure of the model assumes that countries can propose alliances designed either to threaten other countries or to enforce collective security agreements; that alliance partners are given the chance to accept or reject offers; that threatened countries

[30] Garrett (fn. 3).

[31] Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Stability in Anarchic International Systems," *American Political Science Review* 84 (December 1990); and idem, "Realism versus Neoliberalism," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (May 1991).

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can propose either counterthreats or resource transfers designed to "buy off" one or more of the threatening countries; that uncountered threats are implemented; that successful counters become new threats; and that unless a terminal state (a decision point at which no one has an incentive to make a threat), this threat-counterthreat scenario is repeated, possibly ad infinitum.[32]

Consider the simplest possibility—a three-country case—since this illustrates two of the three main types of (subgame perfect) equilibria. Specifically, if countries 1, 2, and 3 initially hold the resources $150 > R_1 > R_2 > R_3 > 0$, where $R_1 + R_2 + R_3 = 300$, then, those two equilibria are described thus:

E1. If given the first move, country 1 threatens (150,0,150), 2 threatens (0,150,150), and 3 passes or threatens (150,0,150) or (0,150,150). If 1 (or 2) offers (150,150,0) as the initial threat, then 2 (or 1) rejects; otherwise, the proposed partner accepts participation in the threat. If threatened with a loss of resources, 1 (2) transfers to the largest threatening country. If 3 is threatened, then it counters with (150,0,150) or (0,150,150) and 1 or 2 accepts participation in the counter, in which case 2 or 1 must transfer resources. The equilibrium outcome is an even chance lottery between $(150,R_1+R_2-150,R_3)$ and $(R_1+R_2-150,150,R_3)$.

E2. No state makes an initial threat, but if one is offered, the proposed partner "rejects." If the initial threat is rejected, then the "defecting" state is punished by being threatened in the next stage (and this threat is accepted). If two players defect by making and accepting an initial threat or by failing to punish, then play the game as described in E1. The equilibrium outcome here is the initial status quo, (R_1,R_2,R_3).

[32] To illustrate this game's structure, suppose there are three countries with the initial distribution of resources (120,100,80). Then the sequence of moves is as follows:

Step 1. A country, chosen at random, moves first. Suppose this country is 1 and suppose it can threaten (150,150,0), (150,0,150), or "pass."

Step 2. If 1 passes, then 2 moves; and if 2 also passes, 3 moves (all moves parallel those of state 1 in the obvious way).

Step 3. If 1 threatens at step 1, its partner must decide whether to participate in the threat. If the partner declines to participate, then 2 moves as in step 2.

Step 4. If 1's partner accepts, the threatened state (2 if 1 threatens (150,0,150), 3 if 1 threatens (150,150,0)) must choose between transferring resources to 1 or offering a counterthreat. Counters for 2 are (0,150,150) and (150,150,0) whereas counters for 3 are (150,0,150) and (0,150,150).

Step 5. Suppose that if 2 or 3 proposes a transfer, it transfers to make 1 indifferent between its threat and the transfer. Hence, if 2 transfers, it proposes (150,70,80) whereas 3 proposes (150,100,50). Assume 1 accepts the transfer to avoid any cost of implementing a threat. And suppose that once anyone controls half the resources in the system, the game ends, because any subsequent action gives that country the opportunity to take advantage of conflicts, to become predominant, and to overcome all states in the system.

Step 6. If a threatened country instead proposes a counterthreat, its partner chooses between accepting or rejecting.

Step 7. If the counter is rejected, the original threat is implemented.

Step 8. If the counter is accepted, it becomes a new threat, and as in step 2, the threatened player much choose either a new counter or a transfer.

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The first equilibrium corresponds to pure conflict in which a threat is made at the first opportunity and the threatened country, 1 or 2, survives only by buying off the largest threatening country. No country is eliminated, but only because each has sufficient resources to make a "game ending" transfer and because no one wants to allow anyone else to be predominant. Moreover, extensions of this analysis to n-countries reveals that countries can be eliminated or can become more susceptible to being forced to make a resource transfer if their resources diminish too greatly or if other states increase their resources too much. Hence, in an E1-type equilibrium, states are necessarily concerned with power and relative gain.

In contrast, the second equilibrium corresponds to an all-encompassing collective security system in which everyone agrees not to make an initial threat and defectors are punished by the remaining countries. Collective security here need not have a purely military connotation; it can refer also to various economic agreements that are enforced by punishment strategies applied to those who defect from trade, monetary, or other such agreements. Whatever its interpretation, cooperation (in the form of the absence of threats) is self-enforcing here, because punishments eliminate the benefits of defection and because administering those punishments is rational. In game-theoretic terms, this equilibrium (as well as the first) is *subgame perfect*.

We also want to emphasize that an E2-type equilibrium exists regardless of the number of countries and regardless of the distribution of resources. Moving somewhat beyond the confines of the formal analysis, it can be reasonably argued that in such an equilibrium states can pursue those subsidiary policies that generate mutual gains and, as in domestic politics, they can focus their attention on the construction of those institutional structures that regulate the Prisoners' Dilemma–type scenarios that arise among states outside of purely military considerations. Put simply, in an E2-type equilibrium, states need not concern themselves with relative gain at the expense of absolute gain.

Letting $(R_1,R_2,R_3) = (120,100,80)$, the situation that confronts the three countries in our example, then, is summarized by Game 6, which illustrates the game that results if each country must choose between playing in accordance with E1 or E2 (see Figure 3). For example, if 1 chooses E1 and 2 and 3 play according to E2, then 1 offers the initial threat (150,0,150), but 3 rejects and 2 and 3 subsequently punish 1 with the threat (0,150,150), thereby forcing 1 to transfer resources to 2. Hence, we enter (70,150,80) in cell (E1,E2,E2). In contrast, if 1 and 3 choose E1 but 2 chooses E2, then 1 and 3 threaten 2 and force a transfer to 1. Hence,

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	E1	
	E1	E2
E1	110, 110, 80	150, 70, 80
E2	70, 150, 80	110, 110, 80

	E2	
	E1	E2
E1	110, 110, 80	70, 150, 80
E2	150, 70, 80	120, 100, 80

Game 6

FIGURE 3

we enter (150,70,80) in cell (E1,E2,E1). If 1 and 2 choose E1 but 3 chooses E2, then either 1 or 2 makes an initial threat (depending on whom nature chooses first), 3 rejects, and the defector is punished so that either (150,70,80) or (70,150,80) prevails. Hence, we enter (110,100,80) in cell (E1,E1,E2). Notice now that this game has the two pure strategy equilibria, (E1,E1,E1) and (E2,E2,E2), we describe. But like Game 4, these equilibria are neither equivalent nor interchangeable: 1 prefers (E2,E2,E2), 2 prefers (E1,E1,E1), and combinations of E1 and E2 are not equilibria. Hence, without a way to coordinate, there is no reason to suppose that one equilibrium or the other will be achieved or, indeed, whether any equilibrium at all will prevail.

The relevance of this example, then, is this: First, both cooperative and competitive world orders (equilibria) can coexist within the structure of a single model. Second, since we have already incorporated power into the analysis by way of defining legitimate threats and counters, we cannot now use power to predict which equilibrium will prevail. Third, neither equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the other, so there is no reason to suppose, as in Game 5 or in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, that states will coordinate "naturally" to one equilibrium rather than the other because of the relative efficiency of outcomes. Fourth, the existence of a collective security equilibrium does not depend on the assumption that states maximize absolute gain, nor does a competitive equilibrium depend on the assumption that states maximize relative gain—both assumptions are equivalent here because total resources are constant in our model. Thus, the resolution of the debate over goals is not, per se, an essential step to explaining cooperation or to establishing competitive and cooperative outcomes as equilibria. Finally, because states can be eliminated in an E1-type equilibrium (if $n > 3$) and because only "big" states can be beneficiaries of resource transfers, states should be concerned with relative resources (or at least with the possibility that their position makes them especially vulnerable to elimination). But since states cannot be eliminated if an E2-type equilibrium prevails, coordination to this equi-

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librium allows states to maximize absolute resources. In this way, then, the model allows instrumental goals to be endogenously determined as a part of the description of the equilibrium that prevails.

V. The Debate Reconsidered

The preceding discussion reveals that learning how states coordinate to achieve one equilibrium rather than another or none at all is an essential part of any general theory of international processes. If there are multiple equilibria in so simple a model as the one just described, then we can be confident that this multiplicity characterizes an even more complex reality. In fact, if countries in our model can partition themselves into exhaustive and disjoint subsets prior to the game's first move and if we call each element of a partition an alliance, then there is a more general class of equilibria that admits of a concern with relative and absolute gains, and that is described thus:[33]

> E3. Members of the same alliance then play as in E2 with respect to each other, and as in either E1 or E2 with respect those outside of their alliance. That is, an alliance is a collective security arrangement in which alliance members are punished for any defection. And depending on an alliance's size, it either plays as in E1 against excluded members (if it is "small") and therefore is an "aggressive" alliance, or (if it is "large") it plays as in E2 and enforces a universal collective security system.

Thus, in addition to the extremes of an all-encompassing collective security arrangement versus one in which agreements are forged at the time threats are made, there are intermediate possibilities so that coordination involves the selection of an equilibrium from a potentially vast menu.

But having thus established that both realist and neoliberal equilibria can coexist, the question remains as to whether states can coordinate more easily to one type than to another. Hence, looking first at the arguments realists might muster in support of the view that an E1-type equilibrium is more likely to be realized, and allowing ourselves the liberty of moving beyond the strict confines of our analysis, notice first that collective security calls for states to "do nothing" until there is a defection that warrants punishment. Hence, as the game unfolds, states might reasonably question whether others are abiding by noncompetitive strategies or whether they are merely postponing making a threat until cir-

[33] Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliance in Anarchic International Systems," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (June 1994).

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cumstances (for example, exogenously induced changes in the distribution of resources) are favorable to that purpose (in which case, if they plan ahead, cooperation "unravels" and competition prevails).

Second, although E2 requires that defectors be punished, making the first move to punish is rational only if the partners maintain their commitment to it. Because a collective security equilibrium is subgame perfect in our model, doing so is rational here. But as a practical matter we should not ignore the possibility that a defection of one type increases the perceived likelihood of further defections, so that defection has an influence on beliefs that goes beyond what our current analysis allows. Our example, after all, assumes that all countries have perfect foresight, whereas if there is something left to chance, then the viability of a collective security agreement may be reduced if beliefs are conditional on the actions of states as the game unfolds.

Third, that collective security is an equilibrium means only that no state has an incentive to defect *unilaterally* from the agreement. This does not mean that states cannot gain if two or more defect simultaneously. For example, if states 2 and 3 defect from (E2,E2,E2) to (E2,E1,E1), then 2 gains and 3 loses nothing. And, again stepping outside the limits of our formal analysis, 2 can presumably reward 3 somehow for its compliance. Indeed, if we are willing to assume that states can coordinate to achieve one type of equilibrium, then we should be willing to assume that subsets of them can coordinate to achieve other ends, including aggressive alliances designed to take advantage of the compliance of others.

Finally, the realist can rely simply on the different characteristics of equilibria in our model. Although (E1,E1,E1) and (E2,E2,E2) are both equilibria, (E2,E2,E2) is less stable because it is not *strong*. If 1 defects and threatens (150,0,150), the strategy E2 calls for 3 to "reject" so that 2 and 3 punish 1. But since 3 cannot gain or lose resources, it is indifferent toward rejecting or accepting 1's offer. Thus, (E2,E2,E2) is an equilibrium in a weak sense: 3 has neither a positive incentive to defect from E2 nor a positive incentive to abide by it. And this weakness may be precisely what realists refer to when they argue that even if states agree to play cooperatively, they must nevertheless make preparations for a more conflictual world.

This assessment should not be interpreted as unqualified support for the realist view, however. Rather, the "weakness" of a collective security equilibrium in our model suggests that the equilibria neoliberals hypothesize (as opposed to the type realists predict) require "strengthening" if they are to be realized or otherwise maintained. Indeed, it seems likely that the attractiveness of a collective security equilibrium can be more

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readily enhanced than a conflictual one. There are positive externalities in the world that are arguably more difficult to realize when states are concerned about threats to their sovereignty. Without modeling such things directly, it seems reasonable to suppose that states can coordinate to stable monetary systems and efficient trade policies, to name a few examples, only when they are not concerned that their partners pose a military threat: if realizing mutually beneficial externalities requires nurturing in the form of signals that agreements will be adhered to, then competition in a military domain may lead (coordinate) states to act competitively in other domains. We are not surprised, then, that neoliberals emphasize regimes and their institutional foundations. By allowing states to coordinate to mutually beneficial outcomes in one domain, regimes and institutions afford them the opportunity to signal intentions with respect to other domains and thereby coordinate actions in those domains.

Of course, realists cannot wholly discount the relevance of institutions. Alliances are a part of their argument and institutions can be as necessary to the maintenance of a limited collective security arrangement designed to meet a common military threat as they are to the maintenance of an all-encompassing collective security arrangement. The realists argue though, that certain types of alliances and the institutions that service them arise "naturally" out of the competition among states and the need to ensure one's sovereignty in anarchic systems. The alliances that fail to survive are those that do not establish these institutions. The realist view, then, has a Darwinian flavor that can be supported only by further analysis of the processes whereby states coordinate to achieve different equilibria in the context of a model that allows cooperation as well as competition.

The purpose of this essay, though, is not to take a position in the realist-neoliberal debate, if only because we know too little about the structure of international affairs and the ways in which people and states coordinate in complex strategic environments. This essay, then, is less a critique of realism and neoliberalism than it is an acknowledgment of the fact that once the centrality of coordination and equilibrium selection is appreciated, many if not most of the insights and conclusions from both schools of thought can be made part of a unified whole and central to the construction of any general paradigm. We also want to emphasize, though, that the phenomena that concern us are complex and that existing modes of inquiry—polemical argument, formulation of ad hoc definitions, gathering of case studies to buttress one side or the other, and generalization based on some specific two-person game—appear to have

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reached the point of diminishing marginal returns. Thus, choosing between these two competing schools of thought is at present largely a function of the emphasis one chooses to place on different parameters and of taste—hence, this essay's title.

It is true that any model of international politics must begin with an assumption about goals as an initial operating hypothesis. And despite the occasional national leader bent on world or regional domination, there is little to dissuade us from assuming that absolute gain is the primary goal that, depending on circumstances, can be transformed into a derivative concern with relative gain. But we also cannot ignore that the circumstances dictating the compatibility or incompatibility of specific goals are themselves endogenous and depend on what states believe about the beliefs and strategies of other states.

Recall our discussion of the hegemon's role, and notice that this discussion can be conducted without reference to goals. Although what we say is predicated on the supposition that each state's fundamental goal is welfare maximization, predicting whether cooperation or conflict will emerge after the decline of a hegemon does not require a reassessment of goals. Instead, prediction requires an assessment of the viability of alternative coordinating mechanisms. If a hegemon's decline is accompanied by state actions that are consistent with relative resource maximization—with a less cooperative and more conflictual environment—the explanation for these actions is not that goals have changed, since that merely redescribes events. Rather, the observation that states can no longer coordinate to the same outcomes as before requires an explanation that refers to beliefs, feasible strategies, the relation between strategies and outcomes, and the properties of different equilibria.

It may be true, as Krasner argues,[34] that equilibrium selection in a posthegemonic system depends on things that we think of as components of state power. To suppose that the institutions that emerge to facilitate cooperation or conflict do not represent the capabilities of states is unwarranted because it ignores the fact that "something" must structure international relations. Regardless of the level at which we conceptualize matters, then, coordination remains an essential part of equilibrium selection and the extent to which states focus on relative gain remains dependent on whether states coordinate to a wholly cooperative or to a competitive equilibrium. It follows that explanations of conflict and cooperation in systems without a hegemon require an assessment of coor-

[34] Krasner (fn. 3).

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dination and of the mechanisms required to coordinate to one type of equilibrium rather than another.

Are international affairs so risky that states cannot rely on collective security to ensure their sovereignty, or are the gains from cooperation sufficiently great that wholly competitive policies are antiquated? Has global territorial competition been replaced by competition for economic dominance? To what extent is the ability to coordinate sensitive to domestic politics? Is economic competition conducted by extraterritorial entities more benign than other forms? Have institutional inventions and the technologies that service them made coordination appreciably less difficult? Is the concept of the nation-state itself becoming less relevant with the rise of new international actors and forms of international organization to shape a world economy?

Answers to such questions require a coherent theoretical structure, and although we do not have the temerity to attempt a description of a general theory, we can discern what such a theory would require. First, rather than deal with state goals as a primary explanatory variable, it should focus on the properties of different equilibria, including their durability (stability) in the event of accidental deviations and the likelihood that they can prevail under different assumptions about system dynamics. Second, although we may choose to allow power and the pursuit of relative gain to influence equilibrium selection at one level of analysis, our theory should render such goals the consequence of the selection of an equilibrium in some higher or more general level coordination problem. Finally, that theory should clarify the role of institutions in the evolution of beliefs, in coordination, and in the enhancement of the attractiveness of equilibria. We should realize, though, that owing to the complexity and inclusiveness of the phenomena under consideration, the likelihood of producing some all-encompassing, mathematically rigorous theory is low. Instead, using basic tools drawn from game theory and other fields, we must begin to develop first principles that focus on the ways people coordinate strategies so as to achieve and maintain different equilibria and to render cooperative equilibria more impervious to error and misjudgment.

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Review Articles

THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Problems and Prospect

By BIN YU*

Doak Barnett. *The Making of Foreign Policy in China*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 160 pp.
Lowell Dittmer. *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945–1990*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992, 373 pp.
Harry Harding. *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991, 458 pp.
David Shambaugh. *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, 326 pp.
Chih-Yu Shih. *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, 231 pp.
Allen S. Whiting. *China Eyes Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, 228 pp.

I. Introduction

THE study of contemporary Chinese foreign policy has developed significantly in the past decade. In terms of both quantity and quality, as exemplified by the six books under review here, the field has advanced to a new generation of scholarship. This essay offers a review of the state of the field.[1] It examines the current state of the study of Chinese

* The author acknowledges Allen Whiting, Gabriel Almond, Harry Harding, David Holloway, Nina Halpern, David Shambaugh, and Maureen Fry for their helpful comments on this article.

[1] For other reviews of the study of Chinese foreign policy, see Harry Harding, "The Evolution of American Scholarship on Contemporary China," in David L. Shambaugh, ed., *The American Study of Contemporary China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Michael H. Hunt, " 'Normalizing' the Field" (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on "CCP External Relations," Washington, D.C., June 1992); David L. Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialism: China Perceives America, 1972–1990,* 16–35; Samuel S. Kim, "New Directions and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Harry Harding, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* 32 (March–April 1983); Rong Zhi, "Two Views of Chinese Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 34 (January 1982); Michael Yahuda, "Perspectives on China's Foreign Policy," *China Quarterly*, no. 95 (September 1983); Michael Ng-Quinn, The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (June 1983); Jonathan D. Pollack, "Inter-

World Politics 46 (January 1994), 235–61

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foreign policy by revisiting some of the major approaches of earlier generations of scholarship.[2] The goal is to gain a broader, more historical, and more theoretical perspective and therefore a better sense of the direction in which the field is heading, what the main empirical and theoretical problems are, and how the recent scholarship helps us understand Chinese foreign policy in the present and beyond.

II. The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Retrospect

Prior to the emergence of the institutional and perceptual schools beginning in the 1980s, the study of Chinese foreign policy following the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 fell into some fairly distinctive genres. Until the late 1960s the discipline was divided among three schools: the *traditional/historical*, the *Maoist/communist ideology*, and the *realist/rational actor*. During the late 1960s and the 1970s the *strategic triangle* and *factional politics* schools came to dominate, in response to developments in China's domestic and foreign policies.

The traditionalists, who were mostly historians, tried to understand the foreign policy behavior of the new country based on the legacy of its past.[3] Such proponents of the traditional approach as Fairbank argued that to "deal with a major power [like China] without regard for its history, and especially the tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying blind."[4] According to this school of thought, the basic explanatory variable of the PRC's foreign behavior was the continuity of traditional Sinocentrism and China's experience with and conceptualization of the outside world, especially the West. Accordingly, China's Confucian concept

preting China's Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* 29 (July–August 1980); Friedrich W. Wu, "Explanatory Approaches to Chinese Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Western Literature," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 13 (Spring 1980).

[2] Determining which scholarship to review is a somewhat subjective exercise. The criterion here is to examine studies at the more general political level, such as China's relations with some major international actors and over some key issues. Not considered, therefore, are studies of China's relations with "secondary" actors and of issues other than political/strategic ones.

[3] See Mark Mancall, "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 349 (September 1963); C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Francois Geoffroy-Dechaume, *China Looks at the World* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Norton Ginsberg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order," in Tang Tsou, ed., *China in Crisis*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); idem, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* 47 (April 1969); Albert Feuerwerker, "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 402 (July 1972); J. Cranmer-Byng, "The Chinese View of Their Place in the World: An Historical Perspective," *China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January–March 1973).

[4] Fairbank (fn. 3, 1969), 449.

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of a "middle kingdom" understands the world in hierarchical terms, as having three distinctive layers: China sat on the top; in the middle were its neighbors, who were mostly influenced by Confucianism, as "periphery states" in a China-centered tributary system; and at the bottom was the West—the "barbarians."

This general approach was accompanied by a method of inquiry that tended to be equally grandiose and even ambitious in its selection of topics, breadth of inquiry, and time span. China was treated like a colossal and frequently exhausted creature, lurching slowly toward modernization and reacting to the outside world either sluggishly or violently. This view stressed continuity; that is, the communist system was thought to be not fundamentally different from its predecessors. This approach still has some influence on the current scholarship.[5] Chih-Yu Shih's *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View*, for example, argues that despite the rapidly changing environment, traditional belief systems such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism remain the primary sources of Chinese foreign policy.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the traditional approach was called into question by the Maoist/communist ideology school. Some scholars saw the origins of the PRC's foreign policy in Marxism-Leninism; others, meanwhile, saw the Maoist, or Sinified, version of Marxism-Leninism as the major operating principle of the PRC's foreign policy.[6] The Maoist approach identified those unique foreign policy tactics that differ both from China's traditional past and from orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideologies. Some of the features of this brand of communism,

[5] For more contemporary works, see Chih-Yu Shih, *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992); idem, *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View*; Liao Kuang-sheng, *Anti-Foreignism and Modernization in China, 1860–1980*, 2d ed. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1986); Michael H. Hunt, "Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective," in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 1–42; Mark Mancall, *China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1984); Morris Rossabi, *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[6] See Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Communism and China: Ideology in Flux* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); idem, "China and the West in the 'Thought of Mao Tse-tung,' " in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis*, vol. 1, book 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972); John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922–1972* (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1974); idem, "The Statesman," in Dick Wilson, ed., *Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Michel Oksenberg, "Mao's Policy Commitments, 1921–1976," *Problems of Communism* 25 (November–December 1976); Lucian Pye, "Mao Tse-Tung's Leadership Style," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Summer 1976); Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Greg O'Leary, *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

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including "people's war" and "united front," developed during the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) revolutionary period and strongly influenced the PRC's foreign policy.[7] All of these studies emphasize Mao's personal role and thinking in the making of China's foreign policy. Despite the differences between the traditional and Maoist schools, both tended to argue that the key factor in China's foreign behavior was China itself, either in a traditional format or in a communist one. In other words, China was unique and had to be understood on its own terms.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the China-unique thinking was posed by the emerging systemic, or realist, approach.[8] Instead of viewing China through its own imperial lens or Sinified version of Marxism-Leninism, some scholars applied the prevailing Western realist notions of power, national interests, and international constraints to the study of China's foreign policy, especially to its crisis behavior. The realists hold that Chinese foreign policy makers, like their counterparts in the West, must take into account the far greater military and economic power of their superpower adversaries or allies. This, they say, is evidenced by the major shifts in China's foreign policy, such as its honeymoon with Moscow and the later rapprochement with Washington—shifts that reflected, at least in part, strategic imperatives imposed by fundamental changes in China's external environment.

A typical study of this realist school is Allen Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*.[9] At the height of the cold war, conventional wisdom tended to explain China's entry into the Korean War as the result of an aggressive communist ideology, coupled with a traditional tendency to pacify its periphery. Whiting analyzed key publications and official statements and concluded otherwise—that China's decision to enter the war was a function of national security concerns that had been raised by American rhetoric and actions, especially those of General Douglas MacArthur from Tokyo. This image of

[7] Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin, "Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," *American Political Science Review* 69 (March 1965); Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Lyman Van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967); David Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949–67* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

[8] For typical realist works, see E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1966); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[9] Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960).

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an aggressive United States found some corroboration in events of the summer and fall of 1950. Washington's refusal at that time to heed explicit Chinese warnings against crossing the 38th parallel eventually led to China's fateful decision to intervene before it was too late. In both empirical and theoretical terms, Whiting's realist approach was a path breaker for understanding the PRC's foreign and crisis behavior; indeed, much of his argument is still relevant today. It is not surprising that this approach eventually attracted more scholarly attention.[10]

Whiting further refined and developed his realist approach in a 1972 article[11] that eventually grew into his 1975 book, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*.[12] He argued on the basis of empirical evidence and logical inference that China's use of force was primarily reactive, defensive, and for deterrence purposes only. China's use of force was also cautious and deliberate in execution. Military action was taken from a broader political perspective, rather than for narrower military ends—to signal a perceived enemy and deter it from jeopardizing vital Chinese interests. This crisis behavior of the PRC remained consistent across all the cases examined: the Korean War (1950–53), border conflict with India (1962), China's deployment in Laos (1964) and Vietnam (1965) when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the border, and two crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954–55 and 1958). Both studies were behavior-oriented and made use of the rational-actor model. By contrast, the internal dynamic of policy formulation—the interaction of factions, organizational procedures, and bureaucratic politics—was given only secondary consideration: neither communist ideology nor imperial ambitions were said to be significant factors in China's decision to use force. Whiting argued further that China's crisis behavior was just like that of any other country. It therefore should not be restricted to "esoteric analysis of Sinologues"[13] but instead should be studied by generalists for the purpose of analytical comparison. By the time these studies were published in the

[10] See also Donald Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle* (New York: Pegasus, 1967); idem, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," in Tsou (fn. 3); I. C. Ojha, *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition* (Boston: Beacon, 1969); Van Ness (fn. 7); Thomas W. Robinson, "The View from Peking: China's Policies towards the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan," *Pacific Affairs* 45 (Fall 1972); Allen S. Whiting, "New Light on Mao: Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations," *China Quarterly*, no. 62 (June 1975), 263–70; Jonathan Pollack, "Perception and Action in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Quemoy Decision" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1976); Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); Melvin Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

[11] Allen S. Whiting, "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 402 (July 1972).

[12] Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

[13] Ibid., xiv–xx.

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1970s, what had previously been Whiting's somewhat "minority view" regarding China's crisis behavior and foreign policy had become the mainstream in both academia and the intelligence community.[14] The realist emphasis on security, national interests, and power factors was particularly useful for scholars probing the interrelationship between China's security interests and her technical capacity, including configuration, deployment, and performance of the military.[15]

The earlier scholarly works on China's foreign policy covered a wide range of situations over a long period of time. This vast and diverse literature of the earlier period has a common feature: all the works tend to treat China as a unitary actor, either influenced by its own tradition and communist ideology or by some rational calculation, as if China were a single individual and able to assess the environment, make decisions, and react according to the outside stimuli. Indeed, at the time many of these studies were written, outsiders perceived China as monolithic in both elite thinking and policy behavior. Chinese foreign policy behavior was viewed as "rational" in light of the PRC's dominant ideology, such as Mao's Sinified Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, because of the relatively small number of leadership purges within the PRC, earlier scholars of Chinese foreign policy, like their colleagues who studied Chinese domestic politics,[16] concluded that there was much more unity and consensus among China's elites than actually existed. This was coupled with the prevailing realist thinking in Western studies of international relations, which contributed to making unitary-actor/rational-choice approaches attractive and feasible for the study of Chinese foreign policy.

These studies, whether of the China-unique school or the realist "gross variable" approach,[17] however, interpreted China's foreign policy orientations in only the broadest strokes. They did not concern themselves with the timing and content of particular initiatives and major decisions in China's foreign policy; nor did they look at the management

[14] Ibid., ix.

[15] See Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army: From the Long March to the Hydrogen Bomb*, 2d ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968); Arthur Huck, *The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to the Problems of War and Strategy* (London: Chatto and Windus for the Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971); Whiting (fn. 11); Gerald H. Corr, *The Chinese Red Army: Campaigns and Politics since 1949* (New York: Schocken Books, 1974); John Wilson Lewis, "China's Military Doctrines and Force Posture," in Thomas Fingar, ed., *China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

[16] Harry Harding, "The Study of Chinese Politics: Toward a Third Generation of Scholarship," *World Politics* 36 (January 1984), 289.

[17] For a critique of realist theory, see Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983).

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of certain sensitive issues and relationships that were influenced by some more dynamic domestic variables. This eventually led the study of Chinese foreign policy to the *factional* and *triangular* approaches.

In the mid-1960s China entered its most turbulent phase, both internally and externally. The Sino-Soviet dispute was emerging as one of the most dangerous interstate relationships of the postwar era. At the same time Mao resorted to campaigns of mass mobilization at home in order to confront his political opponents and restore his brand of socialism. These developments also shaped the study of Chinese foreign policy into two very different subfields. Some scholars focused on the formation of the so-called strategic triangle composed of the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. Others looked to China's domestic scene for clues to understanding China's external behavior.

The triangular approach was largely a descendant of the earlier realist/unitary-actor school. It treated the state as a unitary actor and focused on various aspects of state behavior in relation to other players of the triangle. With the widening of the Sino-Soviet rift in the late 1960s and its increasing impact on the world, the triangular perspective finally became fertile ground for scholars of Chinese foreign policy during the 1970s.

Scholars have debated both the terminology and the definition of triangular politics, as well as its various forms and theoretical assumptions. One debate focused on the huge disparity between the theoretical assumption of a three-power game and the reality that China was far weaker than the two superpower players in every respect. China's role in this largely bipolar world was complex and even paradoxical. Many scholars were undecided as to whether the PRC should be considered a global power at all. It seemed at most to be a regional power, nor could it project its force very far beyond its borders. The foremost critic of the triangular politics model was Kenneth Waltz of the realist school; he went so far as to say, "As a future superpower, the People's Republic of China is dimly discernible on a horizon too distant to make speculation worthwhile."[18] And others commented that "if China matters at all on the international scene it is largely because the two super powers continue to act as if it does matter."[19] This raised fundamental doubts, at least for some, about whether the strategic triangle was an appropriate concept for analyzing PRC-U.S.-USSR relations.

Part of the ambiguity and confusion surrounding this concept is ex-

[18] Waltz (fn. 8), 180.

[19] Lawrence Freedman, "The Triangle in Western Europe," in Gerald Segal, ed., *The China Factor* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 105.

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plained by the failure of scholars to see that the notion of triangular politics was basically a complex and dynamic pattern of political/strategic *interaction* among the three players. This differed essentially from the notion of tripolarity, which is both a more static concept based largely on the distribution of power among relevant actors and a basically structural feature of the world system or subsystem.[20]

Despite these problems, efforts to understand the workings of the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle multiplied during the 1970s and early 1980s. These studies offered fruitful insight into state behavior in the particular circumstances of the Washington-Beijing-Moscow relationship of the preceding thirty years. Their impact on the China field was enormous.[21]

Triangular theories did not constitute the exclusive approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy during this period. Even at the height of the "strategic triangle" of the 1970s, the unitary-actor model for explaining Chinese foreign policy began to break down. A competing group of scholars of Chinese domestic politics came into its own—the beneficiary of a flood of new information on China's domestic politics obtained from such sources as Red Guard revelations.[22] This school identified factionalism among top elites (that is, relatively stable groups united by some particular interest or ideology) as the main explanatory variable. It assumed that competing policy groups advocating different domestic policies presumably differed in their foreign policy preferences as well. Some of the best-known factional interpretations arrayed Maoists against Moscow-oriented internationalists.[23] This emphasis on factionalism in

[20] Nogee has an excellent discussion on the concept of polarity, and he sees the inherent difficulty of measuring polarity and defining a system's structure. See Joseph L. Nogee, "Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept," *Orbis* 18 (Winter 1975).

[21] See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), esp. 837; Ilpyong Kim, ed., *The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States and the Soviet Union* (New York: Paragon House, 1987); Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982); Gerald Segal, *The Great Power Triangle* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1982); Segal (fn. 19); Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, eds., *China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Strobe Talbott, "The Strategic Dimension of the Sino-American Relationship: Enemy of Our Enemy, or True Friend?" in Richard R. Solomon, ed., *The China Factor* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics* 33 (July 1981); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1978); Steven I. Levine, "China and the Superpowers," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Winter 1975–76).

For some contemporary works, see Min Chen, *The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts: Lessons from the Indochina Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Harvey W. Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity: Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, 1949–1988* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

[22] A typical example of this argument is made by Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January–March 1973).

[23] See Hunt (fn. 1), 12.

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policy-making helped to undermine both the totalitarian model for interpreting domestic politics and the unitary-actor approach in foreign policy. Since the 1970s, then, studies of China's foreign policy have consistently emphasized elite politics. The earlier studies of this type had analyzed the internal debates among top Chinese elites and policy institutions. They looked at China's policies toward the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s and at China's more nuanced Soviet policies in the early and mid-1970s.[24] More recent studies have explored the interactions between domestic political-economic factors and foreign policy orientations.[25]

The factionalist school, however, has run into some criticism recently, notably from diplomatic historians. According to Michael Hunt, new archival material from both sides of the Pacific indicates that the factional model offers "little to support even a circumstantial argument for the existence of factions." And at worst, "the model tells us as much about them [those who used the factional model] as it reveals about China."[26]

[24] Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate,' 1965–1966," in Tsou (fn. 3); Allen S. Whiting, *Chinese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1970s* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, 1979); Melvin Gurtov and Harry Harding, Jr., *The Purge of Luo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Report R-548-PR, 1971); Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism* 23 (March–April 1974); Zagoria (fn. 10); Michael Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965–66," *China Quarterly*, no. 49 (January 1972); Thomas Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Report R-1902-NA, 1977); Steve Chan, "Rationality, Bureaucratic Politics and Belief System: Explaining the Chinese Policy Debate, 1964–66," *Journal of Peace Research* 16 (1979); John Garver, "Chinese Foreign Policy in 1970: The Tilt toward the Soviet Union," *China Quarterly*, no. 82 (June 1980); idem, *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, "The Foreign Policy Debate in Peking as Seen through Allegorical Articles, 1973–76," *China Quarterly*, no. 71 (September 1977); Jonathan D. Pollack, *The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Chinese Security Debate* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, R-2907-AE, October 1982); Peter Van Ness, "Three Lines in Chinese Foreign Relations, 1950–1983: The Development Imperative," in Dorothy Solinger, ed., *Three Visions of Chinese Socialism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

[25] See Harry Harding, "The Domestic Policies of China's Global Posture, 1973–78," in Fingar (fn. 15); Thomas Fingar, "Domestic Policy and the Quest for Independence," in Fingar (fn. 15); Carol Lee Hamrin, "China Reassesses the Superpowers," *Pacific Affairs* 56 (Summer 1983); idem, "Domestic Components and China's Evolving Three Worlds Theory," in Lillian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden, eds., *China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger* (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986); Susan Shirk, "The Domestic Political Dimensions of China's Foreign Economic Relations," in Samuel Kim, ed., *China and the World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Solinger (fn. 24); Kenneth Lieberthal, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy," in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Robert Ross, "From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China's U.S. Policy," *China Quarterly*, no. 118 (June 1989); David Bachman, "Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy," in Kim (fn. 1); Zhao Quansheng, "Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism," in Allen S. Whiting, ed., *China's Foreign Relations, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 519 (January 1992).

[26] For a detailed critique of the factional model, see Hunt (fn. 1), 12–13.

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III. The Current Generation

These earlier approaches are the point of departure for the more recent scholarship, which focuses on China's foreign policy–making structures and the mind-set of those who staff these institutions. Scholars have grown dissatisfied with the earlier interpretations; they view them either as too simplistic or deterministic (traditional/Maoist/realist approaches) or as suffering too much from the "*Zhongnanhai* [factionalist] syndrome." The interest lies in examining either the more nuanced micro policy-making mechanisms, mostly below the top-level decision makers, or the pre-policy-making processes such as the perceptions and writings of foreign policy specialists. This effort is also facilitated by the growth of scholarly studies of international relations in China during the past fifteen years, by the gradual opening of China's policy-making institutions and process, and by the greater access by outsiders to policy-making institutions and to some of their key personnel. With the abundant data, students of Chinese foreign policy tend to do more discriminating studies of the subject.[27]

Institutional Approach

Doak Barnett's 1985 study, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China*, represents a major advance in the study of China's foreign policy–making institutions. Based on his interviews with a wide range of Chinese officials and scholars, Barnett has painted a comprehensive picture of China's foreign policy institutions and processes. Not only does he find a major shift of decision-making power from the CCP's Politburo to its Secretariat and the State Council, but his study is also the first to try to untangle the web of secondary-level institutions involved in foreign policy making. These include various specialized party and government organizations, the military and intelligence establishment, major press organizations, and research institutions and universities. Benefiting from the new openness on the part of both leaders and bureaucrats/specialists in the PRC, Barnett has produced the most detailed study of this kind available. In addition to Barnett's book there are a few other works that also probe China's institutions of international studies and foreign policy making.[28]

[27] See Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems," in *China Quarterly*, no. 120 (December 1989).

[28] See David L. Shambaugh, China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," *China Quarterly*, no. 110 (June 1987); David L. Shambaugh and Wang Jisi, "Research on International Studies in the People's Republic of China," *PS* 17 (Fall 1984); Li Fan, "The Question of Interests in the Chinese Policy Making Process," *China Quarterly*, no. 109 (March 1987);

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This and other efforts to penetrate the structure and functioning of Chinese foreign policy making came so late in comparison with work on domestic politics largely because Chinese foreign policy had been more centralized and more covert.[29] Thus, Barnett produced his path-breaking study of China's domestic political structure almost twenty years before his work on foreign policy.[30] Another useful comparison is Lieberthal and Oksenberg's 1988 study of China's domestic policy-making structure.[31] This is by far the best study of its kind, surpassing Barnett's foreign policy counterpart in both scope and depth.

The study of Chinese military institutions and strategies, a subfield in the study of Chinese foreign policy making, has also thrived since the early 1980s. It has contributed significantly to the understanding of the structure, process, and behavior of China's national security policy making in both historical and contemporary contexts.[32]

Douglas Murray, *International Relations Research and Training in the People's Republic of China* (Stanford, Calif.: Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy, 1982).

[29] The notion that foreign policy should be highly controlled came from Zhou Enlai's watchword: "There are no trivial things in foreign affairs, and everything has to be reported to the higher level [Waishi wuxiaoshi, shishi yaoqingshi]." See also Wang Jianwei and Lin Zhimin, "Chinese Perceptions in the Post–Cold War Era," *Asian Survey* 32 (October 1992), 904.

[30] A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

[31] Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[32] For books about the Chinese military, see Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Army after Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Benjamin C. Ostrov, *Conquering Resources: The Growth and Decline of the PLA's Science and Technology Commission for National Defense* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991); Mark A. Ryan, *Chinese Attitudes towards Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989); Rosita Dellios, *Modern Chinese Defense Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Chong-Ping Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988); Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, *China and the Arms Trade* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Paul H. B. Godwin, ed., *The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983); June T. Dreyer, *China's Military Power in the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: China Council of the Asia Society, 1982); Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Harvey Nelson, *The Chinese Military System* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

For some major articles, see John W. Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," *China Quarterly*, no. 132 (December 1992); Eric Hyer, "China's Arms Merchants: Profits in Command," *China Quarterly*, no. 132 (December 1992); Bin Yu, "Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security," *Asian Survey* 3 (March 1993); John Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," *International Security* 17 (Fall 1992); Richard J. Latham and Kenneth W. Allen, "Defense Reform in China: The PLA Air Force," *Problems of Communism* 40 (May–June 1991); John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," *International Security* 15 (Spring 1991); Paul H. B. Godwin, "Soldiers and Statesmen in Conflict: Chinese Defense and Foreign Policies in the 1980s," in Kim (fn. 1); John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, "Strategic Weapons and Chinese Power: The Formative Years," *China Quarterly*, no. 112 (December 1987); Paul

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The institutional approach is not without problems, however. It frequently fails to consider the actual impact of institutions on specific policies. In a political system like China's, which is still heavily shaped by idiosyncratic elements of certain top leaders, institutional analysis offers only partial explanations.

Perceptual Approach

The current phase of scholarship also considers the images or perceptions[33] held by Chinese foreign policy makers, specialists, and scholars at different levels.[34] This recent focus[35] is largely the function of three developments. First, China has seen considerable expansion in research and education in international relations in the post-Mao period. Second, the opening of China to the outside world has made available to Western scholars a vast array of information on the elaborate foreign policy–making structure. Finally, the cognitive/decision-making approach in the mainstream of international relations and foreign policy studies[36] is also being integrated into the "atheoretical"[37] field of studying Chinese foreign policy.

This cognitive/image orientation to the study of Chinese foreign policy is best exemplified by three scholarly works: Gilbert Rozman's *The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985*, Allen Whiting's *China*

H. B. Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1979–1987," *China Quarterly*, no. 112 (December 1987).

[33] The current interest in how Chinese scholars view the world is also a reaction to the traditional and Marxist ideology approaches of the earlier generations of scholars. While all argue that images matter, the traditional approach argues that those images are based on Chinese traditional and imperial thinking; the Marxist/ideology school holds that the relevant images come from ideology; the current scholarly focus on images is more complex and certainly incorporates those perceptions that come from day-to-day political reporting and analysis.

[34] Some of the major works are Shambaugh (fn. 1); idem, "China's America Watchers," *Problems of Communism* 37 (May–August 1988); idem, "Anti-Americanism in China," *Annals, AAPSS* 497 (May 1988); Gilbert Rozman, *The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); idem, "China's Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship," *World Politics* 37 (July 1985); Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*; Michael H. Hunt et al., "Mutual Images in U.S.-China Relations," *Wilson Paper*, no. 32 (June 1988); Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Estimates of the U.S.-Soviet Balance of Power," *Wilson Paper*, no. 33 (July 1988); Harish Kapur, ed., *As China Sees the World: Perceptions of Chinese Scholars* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987); Michael Yahuda, ed., *New Directions in the Social Sciences and Humanities in China* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); Yaacov Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959–1962* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

[35] With few exceptions, such as the pioneering work by Ernst Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956).

[36] Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956); and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[37] See Kim (fn. 1), 1.

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Eyes Japan, and David Shambaugh's *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990*. These studies focus on some principal concerns for contemporary Chinese foreign policy—the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. Taken together, the works break new ground that could open the way to an understanding of the deeper structure of Chinese thinking and its impact on China's foreign behavior.

The three studies are quite different, however, in both scope and findings. Rozman and Shambaugh examine the mind-set of those in China who focus on the Soviet Union and the United States. Whiting, however, also probes a broader sociohistorical context, in particular, the popular images of Japan, dating back to the turn of the century but especially to World War II. All three authors emphasize the recent past, when China began to pursue a pragmatic and "independent" foreign policy, but their findings reveal startling differences in China's perceptions of these three countries. Rozman discovers that the Chinese have been developing more positive perceptions of the Soviet Union since the late 1970s, which paved the way for the eventual relaxation in relations with Moscow that began in the early 1980s. Whiting finds that an underlying negative image of Japan remains basically unchanged across all levels of the society and policy-making elite due either to historical animosity or to current ignorance of Japan. This attitude jeopardizes China's interests because better relations with Japan would serve China's modernization needs; it also creates difficulties for the Chinese government at home, ranging from spontaneous student-led anti-Japanese demonstrations (since 1985) to reshuffling of top-level elites (for example, the removal of Hu Yaobang, the party's general secretary, in 1987 for his softness toward students).[38]

Shambaugh's work, the most recent of the three, is very thorough in documenting the perceptions of China's America watchers over an extended period of time. The work also offers systematic inquiry into both the structure of and interrelationship between various agencies of China's foreign policy–making community (based on his earlier work)[39] and the perceptions of the U.S. by those who staff these institutions. Thus, Shambaugh bridges both institutional and cognitive subschools of the field. In terms of scope and accuracy, this section of his study surpasses Barnett's 1985 study and has no parallel in the books by Rozman and Whiting. In that sense, his depiction of China's community of America watchers can also be extended to China's foreign policy and international study com-

[38] Whiting noticed that Hu's Japan policy was not the only reason that he was removed. But the Japan factor did contribute to the outcome. See Whiting (fn. 34), 150–53, 184.

[39] See Shambaugh (fn. 28).

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munities as a whole and therefore is very useful for students of Chinese foreign and national security policies.

Shambaugh's findings, however, are somewhat unexpected and controversial. Having surveyed and interviewed some 140 of China's leading America watchers over a period of seven years, he concludes that "with a few exceptions, the vast majority of America Watchers in China do not understand the United States very well," despite the fact that there has been a learning curve among the PRC's Americanists.[40] He implies that the supposedly best-informed Chinese specialists on the U.S. are either ignorant or critical of America, or both. This significant "perceptual gap" on the Chinese side will continue to contribute to the fluctuating nature of Sino-U.S. relations.[41]

That conclusion is quite different from the findings of Rozman and Whiting in their respective studies of China's images of the Soviet Union and Japan. Both authors detect some general trends among decison makers, scholars, and the general public that roughly parallel China's policies toward the Soviet Union and Japan. Rozman holds that China's negative perceptions of the Soviet Union gradually declined after more than twenty years of hostility between the two countries; this generated momentum to improve relations with Moscow during the early 1980s. According to Whiting, most Chinese still have strong negative feelings about Japan dating back to the Japanese invasion of China during World War II, but these are counterbalanced by China's admiration for contemporary Japanese economic efficiency and high-quality consumer products. These mixed feelings tend to give rise to a poorly orchestrated policy toward Tokyo, which frequently works against China's interests. Shambaugh's finding does not parallel a general improvement in Sino-U.S. relations in the 1980s and therefore comes as quite a surprise and is even "disturbing" to some.[42] The study of Chinese foreign policy makers'/specialists' images, especially Shambaugh's work, therefore, warrants some further inquiry here and can be a useful point of departure for future scholarship.

Shambaugh's argument that China's America watchers are ignorant and critical of the United States may be important from a scholarly point of view, but it does not necessarily reflect the deeper layers of their thinking about the U.S., especially in a political environment where orthodox ideology still dominates. In this sense, the publications cited by Sham-

[40] See Shambaugh (fn. 1), 41.
[41] Shambaugh (fn. 1), 41, 283.
[42] See book review article by Lucian W. Pye, *China Quarterly*, no. 129 (March 1992), 229–31.

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baugh, ranging from Chen Baoshen's 950-page study of American economy to the travelogues by Chinese journalists, can hardly be an accurate reflection of their true views of the U.S. Much of the perceptions described by Shambaugh falls largely outside the meaningful process of China's America policy making and at best postrationalizes certain existing policies. Indeed, these expressed opinions are frequently significantly different from their writings for internal circulation at various classified levels. The latter tend to be more factual and less ideologically or politically oriented.[43] It is not argued here that one has to have access to all the *neibu* (internal) materials in order to reach any significant conclusions; that would be impossible. Nevertheless, one can take care not to give too much weight to these published scholarly works.[44] Furthermore, those expressed "images" or debates on imperialism, state-monopoly capitalism, and hegemony do not constitute the sole ideological basis for the America watchers' images of the U.S.[45] There is no question that many America watchers in China have been influenced by their Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thinking about capitalism; and some of them, like historian Huang Shaoxiang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), might even truly believe the Marxist version of capitalism. But one must also take account of the significant and cumulative exposure of many America watchers to the United States and the West since the late 1970s and the impact of this experience on their perceptions.

Moreover, how does one gauge the extent to which the perceptions of China's America watchers' ignorance and criticism of the U.S. are the sources of the fluctuation in Sino-U.S. relations? Some would argue at a more general level that the cyclical pattern of the bilateral relations in the past twenty years, especially since the late 1980s, is frequently the result of some contextual factors beyond the scope and capability of China's America watchers. These factors include historical legacies such as the Taiwan issue or decisions made by an earlier generation of leaders such as Mao and Zhou. Other factors include domestic developments such as the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. And still others are the recent radical changes in the former communist countries in Europe.[46] Considering the nature and impact of these events on China's America

[43] This is the impression I gained when working in the CIS. See also Wang and Lin (fn. 29), 904.

[44] For similar argument, see Zhao (fn. 25), 170–71.

[45] See Shambaugh (fn. 1), 42–84. Ideology should be defined as a more complex belief system. See Alexander L. George, "Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 1 (1987).

[46] See Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), 9–16.

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policy-making, some credit is due to China's foreign policy community for its efforts to stabilize relations with the U.S. In fact, many of China's leading America watchers have been very concerned about the stalemate and deterioration in U.S.-China relations since 1989. Their preference for a workable bilateral relation might well be based on their professional interests, not having to be "pro-American" or to understand the U.S. perfectly. But for understandable political reasons, these opinions or perceptions sometimes cannot be openly and easily expressed.

A final question here concerns Shambaugh's definition of the nature of fluctuating Sino-American relations. This is not to deny that there is a cyclical pattern in the bilateral relations between China and the U.S. But since the late 1970s there has been another and parallel trend of mutual adaptation, learning, compromise, and adjustment, despite the cycles of progress and stalemate.[47] This was especially evident during the second half of the 1980s, when a broadening and deepening of the relationship occurred on both the governmental and the nongovernmental levels. Even if the bilateral relationship did not function in perfect harmony up to 1989, a considerable degree of institutional autonomy had been achieved in such subareas as military security, economics, science and technology, and cultural relations. This actually enhances the stability of the bilateral relations as a whole, so that friction in any one area will not jeopardize the entire relationship.[48] These "webs" of interaction and institutional interest between Beijing and Washington have to a large extent performed "crisis management" functions and sustained the bilateral relationship in the post-Tiananmen period. A more accurate depiction of Sino-U.S. relations, therefore, should reflect a broadening and deepening relationship between the two countries, which has fostered both competitive and complementary interests.[49] If that is the case, one has to explain a gap between what Shambaugh describes as the overwhelmingly critical attitude and general ignorance of the U.S. by China's community of America watchers on the one hand and the PRC's willingness and effort to adapt to the new situation on the other. China's post-Tiananmen U.S. policies seem to be measured, reactive, and restrained, despite enormous internal and external changes and the resulting pressures on its foreign policy community to reconsider its U.S. policy.

[47] See Robert S. Ross, "China Learns to Compromise: Change in U.S.-China Relations, 1982–1984," *China Quarterly*, no. 128 (December 1991).

[48] See Harding (fn. 46), 207–9, 330; Steven I. Levine, "Sino-American Relations: Renormalization and Beyond," in Kim (fn. 1), 94–95.

[49] See Harding (fn. 46), 18–19, 359.

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Despite the questions one might have after reading Shambaugh's work, his finding does, at a more general level, parallel the mainstream of decision-making/cognitive studies of international relations. It is so obvious as to be almost a cliché to say that policy, especially foreign policy, is made on the basis of both perceptions and misperceptions and that the latter may be more important.[50] The making of China's U.S. policy is no exception. On the one hand, even according to the best scenario in which China in the future develops some political and economic systems acceptable to the U.S., the different culture/values, historical experiences, levels of development and geopolitical locations will make differences of perspective on the same issues inevitable. The U.S.-Japan relationship is a case in point. On the other hand, one has to take into account the history of America's China policy and perceptions of China. It is not uncommon to find that the U.S. liberalist tradition tends to give rise to either isolationism or interventionism in its foreign behavior, with both extremes rooted deeply in America-centrism.[51] In America's China policy, this tendency is manifested in what one scholar calls the "quixotic search for a special relationship with China," and the tendency toward "simplistic, exaggerated, and emotional images . . . as ally or adversary, as willing student or as ideological antagonist." These "cycles of euphoria and disillusionment" have been costly in the past.[52] This tendency is clearly reflected in some recent scholarly works about Americans' perceptions of China.[53]

The current generation of scholars has produced systematic analyses of China's foreign policy-making institutions and individuals—certainly necessary stepping-stones for future scholarship. More interesting for future studies of Chinese foreign policy, however, is to identify the politically significant perceptions/misperceptions of China's foreign policy community and then determine how they actually influence policymakers. To address these important questions, the institutional and perceptual schools need to improve both their empirical and theoretical understanding of Chinese foreign policy making.

[50] Jervis (fn. 36).

[51] For domestic determinants of U.S. foreign policy, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1955), esp. chaps. 1, 11.

[52] Harding (fn. 46), 361.

[53] See Jonathan Goldstein, Jerry Israel, and Hilary Conroy, eds., *American Views China: American Images of China Then and Now* (Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University Press, 1991). It is quite a surprise to see that the articles on the post-1949 period in this edited volume focus only on Americans' "worst" or "best" perceptions of China.

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IV. The Empirical Reality: The Limited Role of Specialists and Scholars in China's Foreign Policy Making

Many scholars are now eager to embrace the newly available information on China's foreign policy-making institutions and the mind-set of foreign policy makers. Implicit in these current efforts is the assumption that the Chinese foreign policy establishment is characterized by greater professionalism and rationality and that foreign policy making is less ideologically driven than it used to be. One must approach these assumptions carefully, however, because the institutional and perceptual changes may be only superficial and ever deceptive—despite China's open-door policy, despite the gradual opening of the decision-making process in other areas such as economics and education during the reform decade, and despite the effort made by Chinese foreign policy specialists/scholars to have more input in the process. In foreign policy making the relationship between top-level elites, foreign policy bureaucrats, and those outside the policy-making community still operates on a somewhat ad hoc basis. China's foreign policy making remains largely the domain of top elites and policy bureaucrats; specialists/scholars, with their writings and debates, play only a limited role in the deliberations.

Foreign policy–making bodies, especially the Foreign Ministry, have until recently tried hard to censor and regulate internal policy debates, research, and publications. Although the process of foreign policy deliberation has opened up considerably in terms of the actors involved and the complexity of the issues under consideration, the role of the Foreign Ministry remains indisputable. Besides, foreign policy–making bodies usually have their own research institutes, which makes them independent of and able to disregard other specialist/scholarly inputs. Policy–making bodies also tend to distrust scholarly writing on foreign policy.[54]

The relatively insignificant influence of the specialist/scholar community is also the result of its own general underdevelopment. Recent specialist/scholar studies of international relations in the post-Mao decade in China have certainly made progress in restoring their own autonomy, especially in the area of American studies.[55] However, their influence on official policy is limited. This state of affairs, although better than it was in the Maoist period, is still not that conducive to the development of the social sciences, the result of the constraints of political ideology and the

[54] This is my impression from working and dealing with many Foreign Ministry staff on various occasions. For understandable reasons, they must remain anonymous.

[55] For a recent, detailed assessment of the subject, see Harry Harding, "Supporting International Studies in China" (Unpublished paper, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., May 22, 1992).

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fluctuation of the political climate in China. During much of the 1980s some social science research institutions slowly took shape, but the field has yet to recover fully from the serious dislocation and intellectual stagnation resulting either from the Cultural Revolution or from the general impotence of the social sciences in China.[56] At the same time, the study of political science, international relations, and foreign policy in Chinese universities and CASS institutes has been in decline even compared with the early 1980s, due to repeated ideological repercussions, political restrictions, financial difficulties, and the outflow of younger scholars/students overseas.[57] With the large numbers remaining abroad, some leading institutions such as Fudan and Renmin universities have had to cancel some courses in their international relations and political sciences programs.[58]

In terms of personnel, the majority of the research staff in the various academic institutions, including CASS, are either "too old" (physically as well as intellectually) or "too young" (fresh from school or recently shifted to the field). In between are the middle-aged scholars. The latter individuals come from diverse backgrounds; and since the late 1970s, when China started to rebuild its social science research institutes, many have come from governmental institutions. Unfortunately, they often lack necessary training for their new academic work. In fact, many were "unwanted" by their former work units because of incompetence or because of factional divisions resulting from the Cultural Revolution. Thus, at least at the beginning, the new academic area was a "dumping ground" for "outcasts" from other institutions. Also, whereas senior and younger scholars have more in common with each other due to their more systematic education and more extensive experience with the outside world, the middle group tends to be more conservative and even ignorant in both its scholarly and its normative perceptions of the outside world. Unfortunately, as many senior scholars are gradually phased out, it is this middle-aged generation of scholars that has come to occupy important academic and administrative positions in many research insti-

[56] The reason for this backwardness is multifaceted: political, ideological, institutional, and so on. At a deeper, cultural level, however, Chinese scholars tend to see the ultimate goal of scholarship not as creating knowledge for its own sake but rather as contributing to the wisdom and effectiveness of national policy-making. See Harding (fn. 55), 26.

[57] See Report of CSPSIS Teaching Project (1991–92), in *Political Science and International Studies* (The Chinese Scholars of Political Science and International Studies, April 1992), 6–12.

[58] Remark made by Song Xinning, deputy chair, Department of International Politics, Renmin University, at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Chinese Scholars of Political Science and International Studies, Oneonta, N.Y., August 1, 1992.

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tutions. These generational nuances are not given adequate attention by the perceptual school.[59]

Furthermore, the foreign policy-making bureaucracy controls the flow of information to specialists/scholars, which makes it difficult for the latter to pursue policy-relevant issues. Therefore, in some of the most sensitive areas, such as relations with those China is either on "best" or "worst" terms with, people either study "apolitical" issues or stay away from the subject altogether. As a result, the influence of specialists/scholars upon foreign policy making is insignificant; the few exceptions are those well-established scholars with strong personal ties to certain policymakers and institutions. Efforts by some Chinese scholars to enhance specialist/scholarly input into foreign policy making in the past ten years have been disappointing.[60]

Some may argue that the effort to have more input from specialists/scholars in the study of international relations and China's foreign policy making has not been totally in vain. One could point to the establishment of some quasi-official think tanks during the first half of the 1980s,[61] such as the State Council's Center of International Relations (CIS) (Guoji wenti yanjiu zhongxin) and the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS) (Beijing zhanlue xuehui). The impact of these new institutions on China's foreign policy is questionable, however. While the CIS is basically the result of efforts by one individual, Huan Xiang, a prominent scholar/official, the BIISS is simply an extension of the PLA's general staff. Even when the CIS tries hard to integrate some more academic and long-term research projects into China's foreign policy, the efforts are often constrained by institutional obstacles such as "departmentalism." Moreover, even if those institutions have some official background or high bureaucratic status, they have hardly been integrated into the existing policy-making process regulated by the Foreign Ministry.[62] The CIS did produce some quality research on China's foreign policy orientation early on, but in part because of this initial accomplishment, its relationship with the Foreign Ministry and other institutions reportedly remains strained. Several studies done in the United States have equated the CIS with the U.S. National Security Council.[63] This is a gross exaggeration;

[59] Whiting and Shambaugh do touch on the issue but only in general terms. See Whiting (fn. 34), 188; Shambaugh (fn. 1, 1991), 284–85.

[60] According to interviews with several leading foreign policy specialists, who prefer to remain anonymous.

[61] See Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 71–73, 101.

[62] CIS is officially a ministerial-level institution.

[63] See Shambaugh (fn. 1, 1991), 12.

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in fact, in terms of its institutional strength and access to top leaders, the CIS has been the weakest and most underdeveloped think tank of all the research centers in the State Council.[64] Its occasional outreach to the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) for input[65] is more a sign of its limited function in Beijing than any meaningful effort at "coordination."[66]

The role of specialists/scholars in China's foreign policy making is also determined by certain top leaders. Since the departure of Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1987 to become the Party's general secretary following the dismissal of Hu Yaobang, the new premier, Li Peng, has hardly consulted with the CIS on foreign policy. Although the CIS survived several "streamlining" efforts under Li Peng, its role in China's foreign policy making has declined considerably. When Huan Xiang died in early 1989, the role of the CIS in foreign policy making shrank even more.[67] Since becoming the new party secretary in 1989, Jiang Zemin has tended to seek opinions from the SIIS in Shanghai, especially on Sino-U.S. relations.[68] This reflects his earlier liaison with the SIIS, when he had been Shanghai's party secretary, but it may also be the result of his limited influence in Beijing's foreign policy establishment.[69] In the long run, the younger generation of Chinese leaders like Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, with their background as technocrats and lack of foreign policy experience, will probably rely more upon the advice of specialists. But the study of post-Mao foreign policy making should not simply assume, as the typical bureaucratic model of international relations theories in the West would suggest, that the creation of certain institutions will automatically or inevitably lead to a different, presumably more coordinated and sophisticated, foreign policy–making process. Indeed, that there are structural similarities in different countries does not guarantee that these political institutions will function the same way, as the mainstream theories of comparative politics usually argue.[70]

[64] Some of the other think tanks are the Center for Rural Development, the Center for Technological, Economic and Social Development, and the Center for Economic Laws.

[65] Shambaugh (fn. 1, 1991), 13, 287.

[66] The role of the CIS in foreign policy making cannot be detailed here for political reasons. The author apologizes for the inconvenience.

[67] The current director of the CIS is Li Luyie, China's former ambassador to the U.N. As a veteran diplomat, Li presumably has good working relations with the Foreign Ministry. But it is not clear that he is Huan Xiang's intellectual and political match.

[68] See Harding (fn. 46), 262.

[69] In the early 1980s the SIIS was supposed to be more regional-oriented, trying to meet the special needs of Shanghai within the context of China's overall opening to the outside world.

[70] For a typical "structural-functionalist" argument, see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 5th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 13.

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The current generation of scholars has certainly made a lot of headway in probing into the more nuanced aspects of the Chinese foreign policy–making process. More generally, the field has moved from the macro to the micro, from the formal to the informal. It is imperative to avoid the obvious pitfalls of this process—learning more about the individual trees but losing sight of the forest: foreign policy making in China is still largely controlled by top leaders. Even though the relevant bureaucrats and some specialists are involved, underneath this seemingly greater professionalism, foreign policy making has yet to become an autonomous and professionalized community relatively free from domestic constraints.

This state of affairs suggests that one cannot simply substitute the perceptual approach, which focuses on the more nuanced perceptions of the specialist/scholarly community, for "old methods" such as examining published and authoritative sources. Unlike the situation in the last years of the Soviet Union and in Russia today, when one can no longer assume that any published statement has official backing, official foreign policy rhetoric in China is still largely regulated by the foreign policy–making elite and bureaucrats, who use it to represent the perceptions of the Chinese foreign policy makers but also as a bargaining tactic. Many editorials and opinion articles are even drafted by foreign policy bureaucrats rather than by journalists. The realist approach of analyzing official rhetoric continues to be indispensable to the study of China's foreign policy, at least as a "first cut."

V. The Future: Beyond Empiricism and Generalism and toward More Theoretical Validity

What does the future hold for the study of Chinese foreign policy? There has been little agreement in the field on either the goals/concepts or the range/scope of study; nor is this paper in a position to offer a framework for the study of Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, such a general framework would not even be desirable. Broadly speaking, however, future studies should beware of *two* extreme trends: empiricism and generalism. Whereas the former tends to be preoccupied with political trivia, the latter searches only for general theories. Both can be traced to the legacy of behavioralism.

Behavioralism in the social sciences[71] tends to emphasize contextual factors within which political structures and forms develop and political

[71] David Easton pioneered the field in the 1950s with his "input-output" system theory. See Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965).

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roles flourish. It rests on careful definition of empirical problems and the formulation and testing of hypotheses. To this end, the behavioralist approach introduces new techniques—surveys, interviews, the compilation of aggregate data—that can identify correlations between various socioeconomic and psychological factors and the foreign policy behavior of the state. While it opens alternative grounds and subfields for significantly more detailed and more "scientific" investigation on the actual workings of political process, its focus on the "input" and "output" sides of the polity[72] tends to lead to the indiscriminate study of everything, to the neglect of the politically significant phenomena.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the behavioral trend has become more influential in the study of Chinese foreign policy.[73] This late embrace of behavioralism rests on the assumption that China's foreign policy has become a multifaceted enterprise, especially since China opened its doors to the West in 1978. At the same time, China's foreign behavior has moved in many new and different directions, making it difficult, if not impossible, to grasp the totality of Chinese foreign behavior. Indeed, it may be that contemporary China has never been a unified whole and that only its parts can be grasped. If that is so, priority should be given to the study of the discrete measurable units of the system, a system that can be conceptualized, operationalized, and comprehended only by breaking it down into observable and measurable units.[74] The behavioralist trend is reflected to some degree in the efforts of the institutional and perceptual schools to detail everything either around or below, but not the actual process of, foreign policy making.

Contrary to empiricism is another trend of searching for a general and all-encompassing theory of Chinese foreign policy behavior. In *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View*, Chih-Yu Shih examines Chinese diplomatic history from a cross-level and "psychocultural-cybernetic" perspective. The author focuses on the cultural-historical context of Chinese leaders such as Li Hongzhang, Yuan Shikai, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong, in order to establish linkages between the motivation, making, implementation, and outcome of policy. The key factor in China's diplomacy is "to maintain the integrity of the national face in front of the world, the internal citizenry, and statesmen themselves."[75] This "face-saving diplomacy" is said to be the common denominator for all prominent Chinese foreign policy makers—from the last emperors to

[72] See Kim (fn. 1), 6–11.
[73] Kim (fnn. 1, 24).
[74] See Kim (fn. 1), 6–10.
[75] Shih (fn. 5, 1990), 190.

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the nationalist generalissimo, and finally to the communists. All of them are the product of the mix of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and the values reflected in Chinese folk novels.

Shih's pioneering book is based on the author's impressive knowledge of China's cultural heritage. It surveys the mind-set of some important foreign policy makers, viewed from the perspective of the Chinese cultural context. However, its use of the contemporary Western theoretical paradigm of cybernetics does not seem to advance our understanding of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. During the past two decades some "scientific" approaches like behavioralism have been criticized by many as being ethnocentric, conservative, and static, as well as for failing to account for the more dynamic and diverse political reality. The author seems to be either unaware of or uninterested in some of the long-standing problems in the mechanical application of "scientific" approaches to the study of the political and social world.[76] Accordingly, Shih's work seems to suffer from many of the same problems that plagued the earlier behavioralist "inputism." One of the problems, deterministic reductionism, reduces political phenomena either to a number of nonpolitical determinants (such as psychocultural cybernetics at the national level and on the individual leader's level),[77] or to one factor (face-saving). In either case, the Chinese political structure and especially the interacting dynamics of China's political process play no independent problem-solving or attitude-forming role. By focusing on the broadest possible cultural and religious "concepts" such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism and their impact on some selective foreign policy makers, such a "scientific" approach tends to lead either to hypertheorizing or to an exercise (often brilliant) in intellectual virtuosity. However, it lacks the essential ingredient—empirical relevance. Indeed, the author ignores or is unaware of most of the recent literature in the PRC on Chinese diplomatic history. Hence, this work is not very informative.

These two trends in the study of Chinese foreign policy—empiricism and generalism—are by no means isolated phenomena. They reflect some long-standing problems of behavioralism, which has tried to search for regularities and general theories in the study of political science and the social sciences. In this respect, some of the familiar critiques of these problems are still relevant. During the height of the behavioral revolution of the 1970s, Almond and Genco warned social scientists of the pitfalls of searching for "general laws," "regularities," and "uniformalities"

[76] For a detailed discussion, see Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), 60–61, 142, 153, 155.

[77] Shih (fn. 5, 1990), 33.

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of the type one expects in the hard sciences. The indiscriminate adoption of the models, procedures, and methodologies of the natural sciences, they contend, has only limited utility for the study of human and political reality. Such a preoccupation with scientific methods overlooks the basic fact that political reality is fundamentally different from the natural world. It consists of ideas—human decisions, goals, purposes—in constant interaction with other ideas, human behavior, and the physical world. "At the center of this complex system are *choices and decisions* [emphasis in original]." The dynamics of the political reality can be best portrayed as "clouds," which are unpredictable, against the more mechanical and reactive natural world, the "clock," which is very predictable. In their search for regularity in human behavior, neo-positivists failed to realize that there is only "soft regularity," or very often "accidental conjunctions," in the political world. Almond and Genco do not oppose the application of scientific models and methodologies in the study of politics; they do warn against overlooking other irregular, accidental, and residual phenomena in the political world that are perhaps more important for understanding the richness and diversity of human reality.[78]

The mainstream of political science has come a long way from that. Where the empiricism and generalism have gone wrong is in pursuing extremes. Between the two poles lies fertile ground for scholarly inquiry. As a result, many tend to take a middle-range approach, trying to achieve both theoretical rigor and empirical relevance. The problem with the study of Chinese politics and foreign policy seems to be that the field has always been a few steps behind the mainstream of the social sciences, for better or for worse. So are the recent tendencies to become more "scientific." In order to join the mainstream of the social sciences, as some proposed,[79] the study of Chinese foreign policy should adopt some of the more scientific approaches but also be aware of their problems. Specifically, future studies of Chinese foreign policy need to be placed in a broader context. They should address more politically relevant questions such as the interplay between policy-making institutions and individuals, on the one hand, and the broader societal and systemic factors, on the other. They should also consider how and when international and domestic factors will affect and be affected by the changing perceptions of decision makers and specialists. Some of the recent studies of Chinese foreign policy—notably the two comprehensive overviews of

[78] Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics* 29 (July 1977), 522.

[79] See Kim (fn. 1), 3.

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China's relations with America and Russia—have begun to move in this direction.

One of these is Harry Harding's recent study, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972*, among the first comprehensive reflections on the U.S.-China relationship over the past two decades. Based on his experience in the study of Chinese foreign policy, Harding offers a multilevel, interactive approach to the understanding of a delicate and crucial relationship between two vastly different political systems in an ever-changing environment. U.S.-China relations are explored at four basic analytical levels: international, regional, domestic, and mutual perceptual. One of the findings of the book is that across all the four levels, leaders of both countries found a less and less supportive context for normal and stable bilateral relations. The euphoria of the early 1970s has given way to the deadlock of today, a result of mutual disillusionment and changing environmental contexts. Harding's study is descriptive and chronological, and not particularly concerned with hypothesis testing and theory building. It is, however, more analytical and insightful than many other studies of U.S.-China relations, and hence more useful for students of Chinese foreign policy.

In his *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945–1990*, Lowell Dittmer attempts to capture the Sino-Soviet relationship in its entirety, but in a highly compressed manner. Although the title of this study seems to be somewhat dated because the Soviet Union no longer exists, this work is the most, and perhaps the last, comprehensive analysis of this important bilateral relationship since the end of World War II. Unlike Harding's prescriptive and chronological approach, Dittmer is more concerned with hypothesis testing and theory building. While systematically surveying and cross-examining the half century of Sino-Soviet relations, the author tries to test, confirm, and in some cases challenge some broader theoretical generalizations. For example, he goes beyond the theory of convergence[80] to analyze the two similar systems that had an "intense, fitful, and deeply ambivalent" relationship.[81] Even with this high level of theorization, Dittmer's study by itself is empirically illuminating and original. Although part 3 on the strategic triangle is basically an updated version of the author's similar effort some twelve years ago,[82] it is nonetheless an indispensable part of

[80] The theory of convergence applies mainly to the analysis of interactions between different political and economic systems. See Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945–1990* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), 15.

[81] Ibid., 3.

[82] See Dittmer (fn. 21).

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Sino-Soviet relations, which from the very beginning assumed a larger international dimension. Moreover, this part is the most rigorous in terms of theory building, the pinnacle of Dittmer's logical progression from lower levels of leadership idiosyncracies, to mutual perception, to domestic dynamics, to bilateral interaction and systemic implications.

Despite some notable differences in approach, the studies by Harding and Dittmer have some characteristics in common. One is the scope and depth of the research, which is reminiscent of the grandiose approaches of the earlier "traditionalists"[83] in the study of Chinese foreign policy, but is also at a much higher level of sophistication and synthesis of the empirical and theoretical domains. This is quite different from the "tight focus" of the institutional and perceptual approaches. Another common feature in the work of Harding and Dittmer is their focus on politically relevant issues and problems. They do deal with the perceptions or images that interest so many other contemporary scholars, but they have done it within a politically and empirically relevant context. Within this framework, they travel freely across time and at various levels to look at mutual perceptions of leadership, society, specialists/scholars, media, and so forth. At the same time, they do not lose sight of the bigger picture. Finally, both studies develop a balanced combination of history, analysis, theory, and prescription/prediction.[84] These qualities set these two recent writings on Chinese foreign policy apart from some of the other contemporary scholarship; they parallel the same trends seen in the study of comparative politics since the 1980s, including the neo-institutionalist and statist approaches.[85] Their call for "bringing the state back in" urges us not to forget a basic but frequently ignored fact that there is a *state*, a politically relevant and more influential entity that transcends and is relatively independent of society. It is toward this orientation of medium-level approach and focus on things political, with its combination of analytical vigor and empirical validity, that future scholarship on Chinese foreign policy should develop.

[83] See Section II of this review.

[84] The concluding part of Dittmer's book, however, is overtaken by the rapid developments, especially in Russia.

[85] See Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in *Items* 36 (June 1982), 1–8.

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AUTHORITARIANISM AND ITS ADVERSARIES IN THE ARAB WORLD

By JILL CRYSTAL*

Kevin Dwyer. *Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, 245 pp.

Raymond A. Hinnebusch. *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, 350 pp.

Samir al-Khalil. *The Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, 310 pp.

Fred H. Lawson. *Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989, 142 pp.

Ann Elizabeth Mayer. *Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991, 243 pp.

Khaldoun al-Naqeeb. *Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective*. London: Routledge, 1990, 206 pp.

Introduction

MOST Americans know little more about the Middle East than that it is largely Islamic and vaguely nondemocratic. Indeed, most popular and unfortunately even some scholarly thinking on the region links these two pieces of received wisdom, tracing political forms to cultural templates. Scholars of other regions of the world may therefore be surprised to learn that those who study the Arab world do not approach the issue of authoritarianism in that way. Rather, the latter eschew explanations based on religious doctrine or family structure and instead ground their work in political economy, the historical evolution of the state, and patterns of state-society interactions.

Recent scholarship on domestic politics in the Arab world has focused primarily on democratization, reflecting the broader emerging international literature and its emphasis on transitions away from authoritarian rule. The tendency is to collapse into the term authoritarianism all regimes that are not, or are not yet, democratic.[1] Democratization is, of

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[1] Democratization has shaped recent scholarship on the Middle East, although this work

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course, an important topic, indeed one that can be enriched by a study of authoritarianism. But authoritarianism also merits study in its own right. More than just the absence of democracy, it is very much its own presence: of police, jails, fear. It is this presence that the authors reviewed here seek to explain on the basis of their particular case studies. And in so doing, each must confront a core set of popular misconceptions: that all of Middle Eastern politics is authoritarian and violent and that these features spring from deep within society—from Islam (where everything Arab originates) or from the same dark source from which Islam itself sprang. These books make the convincing case that the impulse toward authoritarianism lies not in something primordial in Arab culture but instead in a more complex dynamic involving economic growth and stagnation, social-structural transformation, state formation and institutional inertia, and ideological transformation.

Four central themes recur in these books—two explicitly, two more implicitly. The first is the relationship between economic change and patterns of state control. The early modernization literature suggested an almost inevitably inverse relationship between economic development and repression, misreading state violence as a traditional form of authority that would give way to democracy in response to economic development. For the most part, however, these writers ground at least their historical analysis in dependency theory. They typically link the appearance of authoritarianism to ties to the world economy forged under colonialism; and they suggest further that economic changes more commonly associated with the emergence of democratic trends may, in states with a colonial history, actually prompt the emergence of authoritarian regimes.

The second theme is the relationship between social-structural diversity and level of state control. Outside observers (and not just of the Middle East) often attribute state violence either to the weakness of civil society or to the unchecked strength of primordial (ethnic, sectarian) identities (a reversion to some natural state). The authors here draw attention to the many and complex forms of social stratification in the region, to the importance of classes and class coalitions in determining a

is more recent and less widely known than scholarship on other regions. For an overview of work under way, see Louis Cantori, "Democratization in the Middle East: Report, American Political Science Association," *American-Arab Affairs* 36 (Spring 1991), which summarizes papers from the 1990 San Francisco APSA meeting; Michael Hudson, "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World," *Middle East Journal* 45 (Summer 1991); Muhammad Muslih and Augustus Richard Norton, "The Need for Arab Democracy," *Foreign Policy* 83 (Summer 1991); the special issue of *Middle East Report* 174 (January 1992) on democracy in the Arab world; and Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba, and Joel Migdal, eds., *Rules and Rights in the Middle East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, forthcoming).

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state's predisposition to violence, and to the interactive and often synergistic (rather than antagonistic) relationship between class and communal identification. To understand authoritarian outcomes, all look to social actors, to the importance of organized social groups, to the role of state efforts to contain them in shaping political outcomes, and to the repressive institutions that sometimes arise from this process.

These books raise a third theme, although they do not explore it fully: the importance of institutions of repression in sustaining state violence. Only al-Khalil focuses directly on security institutions; the others suggest indirectly, however, that repressive institutions, once established, can be remarkably resilient and play an independent role in sustaining authoritarianism.

Finally, all of these books indirectly raise the theme of the role of ideological appeals in sustaining authoritarianism. Taking the books together, one sees that leaders' appeals to tradition or to Arab nationalism to justify state violence may not be the expressions of long-standing cultural norms that they at first appear to be. Rather, they are better seen as deliberate and careful attempts by rulers to deal with a crisis of legitimacy either by invoking a carefully crafted, selective, and often inaccurate past or by offering promises, perhaps willfully false, of future material gain—an appeal to developmentalism—in order to fragment the opposition. Although the regimes' justifications appear in local dress, unveiled they bear a strong family resemblance to appeals to tradition and progress made by rulers throughout the Third World. The ideological assertions of the rulers, thus recast, allow us to reexamine Arab culture in a more nuanced way—not as an unchanging force that impinges inexorably on politics, but rather as the basic material that both regime and opposition manipulate. This less static view of ideology and culture opens the way for a consideration of the alternatives to authoritarianism that might be built from this same cultural base.

Taken together, these books allow us, first, to identify a wider range of factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of a state's resorting to violence: economic (the level and strategy of development), social-structural (the nature of communal and class divisions), institutional (the historical mix of repressive and representative institutions), and ideological (orientation of regime and opposition). Second, they allow us to unpack the phenomenon of authoritarianism itself. To that end, we can organize these authors' ideas around three different sets of forces: those that precipitate authoritarianism, those that sustain it, and those that resist it. This approach fosters a clearer understanding of the conditions

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under which authoritarianism flourishes and, perhaps, those in which it may one day wither.

Each book addresses these issues differently. Khaldoun al-Naqeeb offers a historical economic analysis of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states. Hinnebusch and Lawson take a more social-structural approach to explaining authoritarianism in Syria and Bahrain. Al-Khalil traces Iraqi authoritarianism to Baathist ideology. Dwyer and Mayer are concerned more with alternatives to authoritarianism; both lay out, but assess very differently, the democratic and antidemocratic elements and prospects of existing opposition forces. Taken together, these works contribute to an explanation of authoritarianism in the Arab world that is applicable to the broader dynamics of authoritarianism anywhere.

The Origins of Authoritarianism

Points of Departure

These writers join, although they do not invoke, a larger, older tradition that takes the presence of state violence as its point of departure. Although recent writing on authoritarianism seems primarily concerned with its breakdown, this was not always the case.[2] Writers like Perlmutter, Linz, and Huntington have focused directly on authoritarianism, as did earlier writers like Hannah Arendt or Carl Friedrich.[3] Now that the topic can be pried from the grip of cold war–era debates that characterized many earlier efforts, it is time for scholars to revisit the question.

Historically, scholars have approached the topic of authoritarianism in

[2] E.g., Lucian Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," *American Political Science Review* 84 (March 1990), concerned primarily with postauthoritarian systems; or Guillermo O'Donnell et al., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[3] Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3, *Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975); idem, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1970). There is also the voluminous literature on bureaucratic-authoritarianism, e.g., David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968); Carl Friedrich, *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); and Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955). In the 1980s only a handful of new writers revisited the topic, e.g., Michael Stohl and George Lopez, eds., *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Stohl and Lopez, eds., *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984).

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the Arab world primarily through the study of the military in politics.[4] This literature has fewer analogues in more recent writings on the Arab world. Although the *mukhabarat*, or intelligence state, is frequently mentioned in passing and its misuse as a caricature of Arab politics is frequently, and appropriately, decried, actual state violence has received less systematic attention in recent scholarship.

This neglect, not wholly peculiar to the Arab world, has several causes. One is the very success of the regimes under scrutiny. The vast majority seem well entrenched, with the same coalition, often the same ruler (Assad, Hussein, Qaddafi), in charge for decades. Furthermore, no postauthoritarian democratically elected regimes have cleaned house by opening these windows.[5] Another is that the internal dynamics of working repressive institutions are difficult to study. Data on indicators of state violence are notoriously poor,[6] as governments do not release them. (Human rights groups have only recently begun to collect any documentation on the area.) For obvious reasons, few scholars willingly risk participant-observation: those who try to collect data too often become data, as did al-Naqeeb, who was imprisoned for publishing this book.[7] In much of the Third World research on authoritarianism is a personal as well as professional undertaking. While this engagement with the material brings a unique richness, one unfortunate consequence is to reinforce parochialism, as writers focus on the immediate, pressing problems of their particular region to the exclusion of others. Thus, although scholars everywhere struggle with the same issue of authoritarianism, their work is rarely read by those of other regions—to the detriment of scholarship.

These books do not grow out of a school of literature on repression; indeed, they are largely inattentive to the early scholarship on the topic in the region. Rather, they come to many of the same concerns from very different directions. Consequently, they lack a coherent shared definition

[4] E.g., J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Eliezer Be'eri, *Arab Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970); George Haddad, *Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States* (New York: Robert Speller, 1971, 1973); Sydney Fisher, *The Military in the Middle East* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1963). Clement Moore's treatment of Tunisia in Huntington and Moore (fn. 3) takes on authoritarianism directly, as does Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), who devotes a chapter each to "neo-Islamic totalitarianism" and "communist totalitarianism."

[5] The few exceptions suggest what rich material might be available if they did, e.g., Hanna Batatu's use of the pre-1958 Iraqi police files in *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); or the unpublished records of state security forces in Kurdish Iraq presently in the hands of Middle East Watch.

[6] See Robert Goldstein, "The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses," *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (November 1986).

[7] Or Kanan Makiya, who originally published *Republic of Fear* pseudonymously.

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of authoritarianism (for example, nondemocratic regimes) of the sort that Linz and others employ.[8] They do, however, have a number of features in common. Their authors are interested in regimes that rule through a sustained pattern of force and fear: by the infliction of bodily harm and through the immobilizing threat of violence. This shared concern with force and fear has the advantage of directing one's attention to attributes regimes possess (violence) rather than lack (political pluralism), and it leaves open the question of the role of ideology or state institutions in sustaining that violence and fear.

Political violence, then, is central to the longevity of these regimes. On this the authors agree. It is the explanation for this violence and fear that varies.

Economics

Of these authors, al-Naqeeb, writing from a dependency perspective, most clearly explains authoritarian outcomes in terms of economic causes. Like many other writers from the region,[9] he grounds his explanation for authoritarianism, especially for the preoil period, in the economic and, to him, consequent political processes accompanying colonialism. State violence is a function of state position in the world economy; authoritarianism is the culmination of a centuries-long economic transformation. Although oil states (the focus of this book) have their own peculiarities, al-Naqeeb believes some form of authoritarianism is the inevitable outcome of what he terms the bureaucratized dependent capitalism that is spawned by integration into the world economy.

Al-Naqeeb argues that each historical period of economic activity generates a particular political form. Unlike many authors whose histories of the area begin with oil (a point of great concern to Gulf writers who frequently feel they must explain that the area even had a preoil past),[10] al-Naqeeb's analysis links pre- and postoil politics. Three periods are important to him. The first, lasting until the seventeenth century, was a flourishing economy based on speculative trade that linked coastal cities to interior tribes and to larger trade networks outside the Gulf. This trade carried Islam abroad, creating a unified culture. With the Ottoman

[8] Linz deals with the definitional problem by focusing on what authoritarian regimes are not, defining these political systems as "nondemocratic," in Linz (fn. 3, 1975), 177. He thus examines the degree to which political pluralism and political activism are absent (pp. 179–80).

[9] Notably Samir Amin, e.g., *The Arab Nation* (London: Zed Press, 1978).

[10] E.g., Muhammad al-Rumaihi, *Beyond Oil: Unity and Development in the Gulf* (London: Al Saqi, 1983).

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state a weak central political power, trade was able to thrive unstifled. Locally, desert and settled urban tribal leaders ruled in alliance, balanced against urban merchants. That this period was better fundamentally than the second period, that of British domination, is clear from the moral authority vested in the natural state, the term he uses to describe it. This economy was destroyed in the imperial era when Britain, in the guise of eliminating piracy and the slave and arms trade, replaced regional trade networks with a pearl-based European trade that Britain could control. The political counterpart of this new economy was the fragmentation of the region into small units dominated by increasingly dynastic, familial leaders kept in place by treaties, by force, and by a new political instrument—borders—that linked sovereignty to places, not people. The coastal cities lost power to the tribal hinterlands, where colonial penetration was weaker. Resistance to the new system flowed first from this hinterland (the Wahhabi movement) and later from the cities as Arab nationalism, which Britain manipulated by creating borders, limiting the free movement of dissidents, historically an important check on ruling authority.

The third period, giving rise to contemporary authoritarianism, began with oil. Oil revenues concentrated power in the state. Initially this state was benignly bureaucratic, but as it expanded, absorbing independent social institutions, it created opposition among remnants of the old labor force, bedouins, and pearl divers who had become educated middle-class bureaucrats in "air-conditioned ghettos." At first the state tried to depoliticize these groups by buying them off. When these efforts failed, rulers increasingly resorted to terror, perhaps because owing to oil revenues, they had never been forced to develop other, more nuanced ways of dealing with opposition. Although oil revenues can postpone the day of reckoning, al-Naqeeb believes that the limits inherent in dependent state capitalism and the necessarily stifling and wasteful bureaucratic control that dependency creates ultimately absorb even these massive oil revenues and inhibit growth. The exhaustion of oil revenues ushers in a new phase of limited growth, which in turn generates new political pressures. The regimes contain this new pressure with more violence, for in essence they are now fighting history itself. Terror then leaves them more dependent on the West—the source of their instruments of terror.

Where earlier writers like Rostow saw a linear relationship between economic growth and democratization (and even later refinements on the argument, notably Huntington's, saw the relationship as at least curvilinear), al-Naqeeb suggests the reverse.[11] If wealth led in any simple

[11] Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cam-

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way to a decline in state violence, we would see this in the Gulf. Instead, we see more violence.

To al-Naqeeb, Gulf authoritarianism belongs to a family of authoritarian outcomes produced by colonialism; however, the particular state violence that emerges in the Gulf is also particularly characteristic of oil economies. With this last observation he links the older dependency-based writing to the new and growing body of literature on the *rentier* state, a literature which argues that oil, by freeing rulers from their dependence on domestic revenue sources, frees them from the demands for democratic participation that accompany the provision of taxes.[12] The result is a movement away from democracy: no taxation, hence no representation.

Al-Naqeeb and the *rentier* literature explain why the democratic impulse seems weak in oil states (arguably in all oil states, not just Arab ones). They do not explain why the impulse toward the violence and terror of authoritarianism would be any stronger. After all, oil states do not need to drive out opposition; they can *buy* it out, through social services, employment programs, and targeted handouts. Al-Naqeeb's argument concludes with a picture of authoritarianism painted in particularly dark, monochromatic hues. But whereas many regimes are undemocratic, they are not equally violent. Whether the state buys or beats one into silence matters to its citizens. The distinction between undemocratic and antidemocratic regimes, between those who silence the population with benign materialism and those who cow it with torture and murder, is deeply important to those living under such regimes. If oil-producing states are so inexorably hostile to political opposition, how can we account for variation, for example, the emergence and successes of the prodemocracy movement in Kuwait in the late 1980s and the more limited political openings in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain?

Social Structure

To answer this question, one must reexamine the social mechanisms that mediate economic change. One type of conventional wisdom on the social-structural determinants of state violence holds that repression is the state's natural (even understandable) response to the persistence of traditional, perhaps violently irrational ascriptive identifications with sect or clan, especially in the absence of such moderating modern identifications as a prodemocratic middle class rooted in the private sector.

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[12] I develop this argument at length in Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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According to this thinking, then, state violence is the result of both an absence (the middle class) and a presence (ascriptive ties) in civil society.

Is there something about the prevailing social structures in the Arab world that somehow facilitates authoritarianism? On this, al-Naqeeb follows some of the conventional thinking. He believes that virtually no independent social groups exist in the Gulf anymore, having all been absorbed by the expanding authoritarian state. Al-Khalil paints an even darker picture of Iraq, where "party, state, and even civil society [merged] into a single, great, formless mass" (p. 41); in that world ubiquitous police informers undermine the solidarity critical to the preservation of old groups or the formation of new ones.

While it is true that independent groups are often banned and certainly hounded, other writers draw a more nuanced picture of Gulf society. Several scholars have challenged the received wisdom that civil society in the Arab world either generally or in particular states is remarkably weak.[13] Their studies suggest that there is throughout the region a resilient civil society with a thriving associational life independent of effective state control. In Lawson's Bahrain, one finds flourishing sports clubs, cultural clubs, trade unions, chambers of commerce, and mourning houses. Kuwait, too, as other writers attest, has long had its clubs and professional associations, *diwaniyyah*s (the weekly meetings of circles of family and friends), religious study groups, its powerful chamber of commerce.[14] The Iraqi occupation certainly demonstrated the vitality of civil society in Kuwait; mosques and elected food cooperatives easily transformed themselves into underground opposition organizations. Indeed, if these states are as authoritarian as al-Naqeeb and al-Khalil argue, then more groups may well exist—but underground or in hibernation, unknown to both the government and outside observers.

If it is not the general weakness of civil society, then perhaps it is the absence of key groups such as an organized middle class that explains

[13] See Augustus Richard Norton, "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East," *Middle East Journal* 47 (Spring 1993), and the other pieces in this special issue on civil society edited by Norton. In the pipeline are other articles from Norton's civil society project, a rumored forthcoming issue on the topic in *Middle East Report*, and possibly an edited volume on the same by Roger Owen and Tim Mitchell. For some of Owen's preliminary thoughts, see Owen, "State and Society in the Middle East," *Items* 44 (March 1990). See also Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[14] Fuad Khuri and Emile Nakhleh likewise demonstrate the rich associational life in Bahrain. See Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Nakhleh, *Bahrain* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976). On Kuwait, see Crystal (fn. 12); idem, *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992); and Shafeeq Ghabra, "Voluntary Associations in Kuwait: The Foundation of a New System?" *Middle East Journal* 45 (1991).

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authoritarian outcomes. Authors who have looked at this question through the lens of the democratization literature have often suggested that authoritarianism grows from the absence in particular of a middle class, which, either because of its interests or its values, is supposed to be the natural ally of democracy.

The regional evidence on this is ambiguous, however. As in much of the Third World, there is a small middle class with private sector business interest; but its support for democracy is mixed. Alan Richards and John Waterbury in their recent survey of the region note the political ambivalence of the middle class: although its members sometimes pursue political liberalization, they can just as comfortably live with other choices and willingly embrace even authoritarianism "as long as they have a meaningful role in it."[15] Kuwait's merchants have largely eschewed formal politics. Lawson shows that in Bahrain the merchants have sided with the ruling family. In Syria, according to Hinnebusch, they have devoted what oppositional energy they have to Islamist causes. In al-Khalil's Iraq they are silent.

Why is the middle class sometimes comprised of such reluctant democrats? One reason may be that its members want money even more than they want political participation. If they find nondemocratic ways to protect economic interests, they can live with that. In the oil states a trade of wealth for formal power is easier to achieve. The rulers may even aggressively promote it, as in Kuwait (as I have argued elsewhere). In Bahrain as well, Lawson argues, the wealthier traders acquiesced in autocracy both because they were frightened by the labor uprising of the 1950s and because the regime continued to protect their economic interests.

The dynamic is a little different in the poorer states. From Egypt's *infitah* to Iraq's more cautious opening, every Arab state experimented with economic liberalization in the 1980s, whether in response to economic crises generated by external changes in the international economy or to the parallel internal exhaustion of state-planning efforts that followed the Second World War. This liberalization generated everywhere a substantial group of people with shared wealth and private sector interests. As in the wealthier states, this group is not always at the forefront of the prodemocracy movements. Two recent studies of Egypt suggest an explanation. Joel Migdal, looking at Nasser's Egypt, argues that coercion occurs as a by-product of developmental breakdown.[16] Migdal is interested in variations in state capacity and the prevalence of weak

[15] Richards and Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 437.

[16] Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

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Third World states, weak in terms of the state's (in)ability to penetrate society, to extract (financial and other) resources, and to use those resources to implement policy as formulated. To the extent such states can regulate social relationships, they will do so. Migdal argues that the weakness is the result of colonialism, which crippled society but left in place local leaders who could challenge the state for social control in the village, where policies were actually implemented. These provincially based strongmen were more able than distant bureaucrats to meet the daily needs (from jobs to housing) of the rural poor and could not only ignore central authority but also manipulate state bureaucracies to enhance their local power—thereby further undermining state leaders. To accomplish anything, leaders had to turn to these middlemen to deliver the countryside. The power of entrenched local elites forced Nasser to retreat from his initial ambitious development plans into a politics of survival: preemptively reshuffling officials, favoring patronage over merit, and engaging in torture and murder when these efforts failed. Leaders, Migdal argues, resort to repression because they cannot exact compliance through old institutions and cannot create effective new ones. With the old rules unbearable and the new rules unenforceable, they abandon rules. Migdal's explanation does not account for the institution of the political police—Nasser established the repressive apparatus very early in his rule, before the development plans had a chance to fail—but it does tell us something about why that apparatus came to have so vast an authority in later years.

Yahya Sadowski makes a parallel argument about contemporary Egypt, arguing that businessmen, interested primarily in profit, are far more concerned with a regime's effectiveness than with its openness: they want a state weak enough to loot but strong enough to be worth looting.[17] Sadowski wonders why Egyptian leaders, well-intentioned and relatively well-endowed, are so unable to implement policy, especially agricultural policies. His explanation lies not in political will, but rather in the weakness of the Egyptian state (its administrative inertia), in societal strength (the ability of social groups to organize and resist informally), in the nature of the links between the two, and in a set of inappropriately promarket policies forced on Egypt by Western creditors. Because businessmen profit more from lobbying the state than from competing in the market, they divert both entrepreneurial and financial resources from productive investment to rent seeking, that is, building political influence for economic profit. Eventually, they are so successful

[17] Sadowski, *Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991).

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that they sabotage state policies. At that point desperate leaders resort to force, sending police into villages in a futile attempt to enforce rice quotas that its agricultural agents cannot.

Authoritarianism, then, is in part the result of both the kind of (state-led) economic development that occurred in the postwar era and of the resilience of old classes, the adaptability of the new, and their consequent ability to thwart state policy. Authoritarianism is not the result of successful efforts at economic development, but of partially successful (there must be a state development authority worth bleeding) but ultimately unsuccessful efforts. It emerges from economic crises as an unintended by-product of economic breakdown. It is not that authoritarian leaders are better able to handle such crises (indeed, many argue they are not) but rather that they are desperately attempting to regain control over policy implementation. Hence, the absence of a commercial elite does not account for authoritarianism any more than its presence necessarily checks it. Business owners are uninterested in launching a frontal pro-democratic attack on the regime because they fare far better subverting it: why fight for formal representation in a state they are successfully ransacking? But as private sector interests loot the state, they deprive it of funds critical for even the most basic development tasks, enfeebling it so thoroughly that state leaders see no alternative to force in their bid for compliance. The poorer the state and the more resilient and resourceful the commercial interests, the sooner the money runs out. The consequent developmental breakdown prompts economic liberalization, but political liberalization does not necessarily follow. When the public treasury is finally so thoroughly looted that economic development halts, private sector interests might rethink their support for the incumbent regime. At this juncture, they *might* support democracy in order to check immobilizing corruption—but they may find repression equally attractive. As Hinnebusch argues in the Syrian case, once state-led development fails, a limited move toward the market will occur and state elites may approach remnants of the old commercial class. Together they may pursue limited political liberalization, but because other classes will resist the new policy, the state will continue to use force against these new targets. Just as there is no direct connection between economic growth and democratization, there is no easy leap from economic to political liberalization. At this point these debates intersect with debates throughout the Third World on the nature of the relationship between economic and political liberalization.[18]

[18] Three recent books take up the issue of economic liberalization in the region: Henri Barkey, ed., *Economic Crisis and Policy Response: The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle*

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The desperation of rulers in the face of social opposition is not the only social-structural explanation for authoritarianism. In his work on Syria, for example, Hinnebusch looks at the social bases of the regime. He argues that class divisions and conflict played the pivotal role in the rise of Baathist authoritarianism there. He is interested not only in the groups that might or might not support democratic regimes but also, and primarily, in those groups that sustain authoritarian ones.

Hinnebusch, like al-Naqeeb, roots his explanation in colonialism: integration into the world economy, he argues, first created a particularly hierarchical class structure and then prompted an agrarian crisis that deepened class conflict. After infiltrating the military, the Baath came to power as the voice of the rural poor, who had been impoverished by absentee landlords unwilling to concede any social reform; the Baath then linked these grievances to the concerns of newly politicized bureaucrats and commercial elites and, on taking power, consolidated its hold on the state by mobilizing these class forces. The regime rests on a village base; its programs still represent rural interests.

No regime rules through coercion alone. The authoritarianism Hinnebusch seeks to explain is populist, inclusionary, and participatory. The regime, he argues, responds to its core constituency, the rural peasantry, without formal representation. The state, although repressive, targets not the rural poor but the urban middle class, filling its jails with members who have organized into an Islamist movement. Brutal though it is, the Baath rules with a substantial social base, a constituency that supports the regime's economic and social policies and so tolerates, albeit reluctantly, the accompanying violence. If Hinnebusch is right, Syria may be more representative of many Third World regimes rooted in rural classes than observers who limit themselves to the cities would have us believe.

To Hinnebusch, states are captured by social groups, most importantly classes, that then use state resources to further their corporate interests and react, sometimes violently, against groups they cannot eliminate and will not accommodate. Hinnebusch's work demonstrates that today's popular wisdom—that tribe, sect, and family form the hard core of Arab

East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy, eds., *Economic Liberalization in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan, eds., *Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). Steven Heydemann's work on the Syrian case very nicely sustains his conclusion that "economic liberalization can be, and frequently is, pursued without recourse to political liberalization. Syria's experience . . . calls into question the underlying assumption that economic and political reform are necessarily linked." See Heydemann, "Taxation without Representation: Authoritarianism and Economic Liberalization in Syria," in Goldberg, Kasaba, and Migdal (fn.1). See also his piece in Barkey.

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culture—is as silly as the older notion that these traditional identities would collapse under the onslaught of modernization. Hinnebusch argues for the centrality of class even in a mosaic society. The Middle East has politics of interest as well as identity.

Hinnebusch does not, however, see communalism as simply class in disguise, nor does he see the two identities as exclusive. In this he follows the classic work of Hanna Batatu, whose class-driven argument is nonetheless highly sensitive to sect and ethnicity. "Power," Hinnebusch writes, "probably cannot be built without some recourse to the basic associative tissue of the culture. In a mosaic society, resort to such a strategy is certain to translate into the use of communalism to cement an elite core" (p. 10). The overlap of class and communal identities, coupled with the overarching Baathist ideology, which masks the communal (Alawite) origins of its adherents, allowed minorities to appear disproportionately at the head of a class-based movement. On attaining power, the group's identity can surface and its members can then use political power to exclude other communal groups, thus prompting communal revival.

Al-Naqeeb would agree. Even in the oil-producing states, where foreign labor inhibits the formation of a working class among nationals (united primarily by economic *in*activity), al-Naqeeb observes that some classes, notably merchants, retain their identity. While asserting that the underlying antagonism to imperialism was economic nationalism, he points out that it consistently took sectarian form (Ibadi, Zaidi, Wahhabi). Gulf rulers have always used communalism to inhibit class identification. Preoil patron-client ties between merchants and crews undercut class conflict and strengthened the leading families. The British tried to break Arab economic nationalism by encouraging new national identities. Today's authoritarian state rules by swallowing, but not digesting, communal groups (tribe, sect, family), leaving them intact but powerless. By incorporating social groups directly into the state, they strengthen their communal identifications. It is not the inherent strength of communal identities so much as their malleability and their intertwined relationship with class and other identities that makes them so resilient.

To Lawson, Bahrain's autocracy is also based on an antidemocratic coalition cobbled from diverse social elements. Like al-Naqeeb, Lawson grants a key role to integration into the world economy. Oil generated new classes, notably a well-organized and articulate working class, whose activism frightened the old merchant class into joining the ruling alliance. But Lawson extends al-Naqeeb's analysis by weighing the bureaucratic as well as economic transformations catalyzed by colonialism. Britain's preference for indirect rule led it to consolidate the power of

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the Al Khalifah ruling family. British administrative reforms generated a new group of bureaucrats, which the family drew into the ruling coalition (prompting economic interests to coalesce around sector as well as class). Finally, the Al Khalifah added their tribal retainers to this mix of merchant elites and state bureaucrats. The resulting coalition was thus structured along both old and new forms of stratification: it was rooted in the social organization of the preoil era as well as in the transformations (economic and political) catalyzed by the oil industry. While economic interests, notably class, are critical to understanding the composition of the ruling coalition, it seems in Bahrain as in Syria that class interests are necessarily expressed through existing communal organizations which in the process change both kinds of identification. Thus, when the class-based labor movement of the 1950s broke down as a result of external police pressure, it fissured along sectarian lines. After that, opposition continued to assume sectarian form and adopt religious language. As in Syria, the regime does not hesitate to use force, even as it also manipulates sectarian rivalry, tribal authority, and bureaucratic control, as well as economic interest.

So the persistence of ascriptive categories does not account for authoritarianism. Indeed, although none of the authors suggests this directly, ascriptive identities may even provide one of the few checks on authoritarianism. If the key element of repression is unchecked authority—if the mark of a nonauthoritarian state is not merely whether the police can jail innocents but, more importantly, whether a phone call will release them—then these identities offer one of the few avenues of recourse. Affective ties may not be as effective as formal systems of recourse—appeal procedures, an independent judiciary—but they are far better than nothing: if you can't call a lawyer, you can still call your cousin. These informal ties that bypass the state and link individuals directly to the political elite are tempering. They also explain, in part, why authoritarianism seems more pronounced among communally different populations and, especially, when it is directed against communal minorities: call all his cousins, a Kurd still won't find one high in the Interior Ministry—but his Sunni classmate might.

Neither the absence of modern social structures nor the presence of traditional ones accounts for authoritarian outcomes. Rather, the answer is located partly in the form of economic development: these authors agree that state-led development prompts inevitable failure. Authoritarianism also arises from the groups that integration into the world economy generates or reinvigorates, and from the mosaic ruling coalition leaders forge from these diverse elements as they emerge. The social

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dynamics behind authoritarianism are real but more complex than they first appear: it is not so much the weakness of civil society or of any one key group but rather the existence of very complicated social cleavages that explains authoritarian outcomes. Neither the basic forces that prompt authoritarianism nor the consequent degree of authoritarianism that emerges is peculiar to the Arab world.

The Persistence of Authoritarianism

Ideas

Thus far, state violence has been explained largely as a by-product of economic and social-structural transformations. These writers largely agree that rulers resort to violence, at least initially, in an effort to sustain a form of economic development and to retain the support of key coalition members; they are not acting in the name of any larger vision.

Indeed, it almost seems that these leaders have no larger idea; nor do they seek to legitimize their rule by invoking one. They plant one simple thought firmly in the public consciousness: a fear that is as important as the violence itself. And it can be induced quite crudely, even by people who share, literally, no common language. To coerce, you need not convince. Indeed, one of the attractions of repression is that violence needs no justification to be effective: fear is reason enough. A key element of this fear is its arbitrariness. Uncertainty helps create the ambient terror, the immobilizing culture of fear, that depoliticizes. It is a temporary phenomenon: caught in the headlights of the state, the eyes eventually adjust (though not always in time). But at first it is quite powerful. These rulers have, after all, survived far longer than anyone (Western observers and Arab) predicted. Perhaps it is better to be feared than loved.

Al-Naqeeb takes this position furthest: Gulf rulers are so ruthless, he suggests, because they are morally bankrupt. They have no compelling ideas, only fear and materialism. But others *do* have ideas, whether in his opinion good (Arab nationalist, prodemocratic) or bad (Islamist). To al-Naqeeb, states move from demobilizing but otherwise benign authority to authoritarianism, in part in reaction to opposition ideas, which, beginning with Arab nationalism, simply fill the moral void left by the regimes.

But central as fear is, even the most violent, unpopular regimes sustain authority through some popular appeal. What sorts of ideas are most effective? Before we can tackle that question, we must debunk the received wisdom: that authoritarianism is the necessary outgrowth of Arab

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or Islamic traditions.[19] Some of the shriller pieces linking authoritarianism to unchanging Arab and Islamic cultural norms can simply be dismissed.[20] But even sympathetic writers like Hisham Sharabi, who links authoritarianism to (what he terms) broader neopatriarchal cultural values, fall into this trap of accepting the ruler's reading of tradition as genuine.[21]

It is certainly true that rulers have long invoked tradition to justify repression. (That, at least, is a tradition, but not a particularly local one.) It is also true that Western governments have been quick to accept "this is the way of our people" arguments, especially from strategic allies. But as Mayer points out, tradition enforces itself through moral, not physical, sanction. If you must beat people to make them comply, then it is certainly not a valued tradition they are complying with. To Mayer, the invocation of Islam, in particular, in defense of authoritarianism is a cynical appeal to religious sentiment by rulers trying with the help of conservative clerics to legitimize deeply unpopular rule. That it is unconvincing is suggested by the many Muslims imprisoned for expressing disagreement and by the fact that the dominant regional language of opposition is Islam.

Of these authors, only Samir al-Khalil assigns centrality to the ideas that sustain the authoritarian state. He locates Iraqi authoritarianism squarely in Baathist teachings, secondarily in the institutional inertia of security forces. Economic transformations do not explain it, he argues. Other regimes used oil revenues to support different choices: development and/or conspicuous consumption. Nor do social-structural factors explain the regime's endurance, since the regime has devastated civil society rather than built a base there.

The fault lies primarily in Baathism and in its core elements of Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. The central emphasis on a parochial *Arab* nationalism has two dangerous consequences. First, it encourages people to see the outside world, which will never be Arab, as an inevitably and implacably hostile force, an idea reinforced by the Baathist stress on freedom (from imperialism). Vigilance thus becomes a central and permanent part of Baathism. Second, more implicitly, the stress on the Arab element of Baathism renders universal ideas irrelevant. People are to take their bearings from Baathist ideologues who seek to remake soci-

[19] This line of thought runs through many, many books on the region. For a recent example, see Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[20] E.g., David Pryce-Jones, *The Closed Circle* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

[21] Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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ety—completely and continually. The Baathists set out to change attitudes, not merely behavior, and create new people—hence their emphasis on education and youth (in fact many Baathists—Aflaq, Bitar—were educators). To change people they sought to isolate them, initially through fear, from traditional attachments of sect or family (women from husbands, children from fathers) and then reassemble them into new relationships under party tutelage. Unlike Sharabi, who sees the family structure as a pillar of authoritarianism, Baathists saw it as an obstacle to be undermined.

Fear plays an important role in this process and more than as a substitute for consent. People comply out of fear initially, but compliance breeds complicity. And from that complicity and attendant guilt grows an identification with the regime that confers on it a kind of legitimacy forged of grudging respect for power and guilty acquiescence in its expression. This legitimacy is important to the Baathists: a regime that bothers to pass public laws permitting it to pass secret laws (al-Khalil, 145) is deeply concerned with propriety! Finally, the regime consolidates support by relying on a widespread almost political stupidity: people do not think either very much or too clearly, because they are afraid to and because they have forgotten how. Baathist bombardments—years of misinformation, isolation, and lack of practice in political thinking—have left them too disoriented to trust their own moral instincts.

Al-Khalil's argument helps explain the depth of political acquiescence. It reminds us that even the most fearful regimes do not rely solely on force. Nonetheless, the argument leaves troubling questions unanswered. Why did Baathism, in the air throughout the Arab world, take root so well in Iraq? Why did its more compassionate elements not prevail? To answer these questions, one might profitably look to the region's other authoritarian Baathist state, and to the social forces that Hinnebusch uses to explain both the enthusiastic adoption of Baathism in Syria and the more grudging toleration for its excesses. Perhaps, as Hinnebusch demonstrates for Syria, there are in Iraq as well groups for whom the regime is if not wholly legitimate at least not unpopular. Certainly, as Batatu has ably demonstrated for an earlier period in Iraq, class and sectarian identity go far in explaining the embrace of communism and royalism in various quarters; why not Baathism?

To Hinnebusch, Baathism was useful primarily because it provided a cover. Class and sectarian interests hid behind its veil until they were sufficiently organized to emerge openly, at which time the regime could essentially abandon Baathism as a doctrine while retaining its shell. This view helps explain the gradual evisceration of Baathism over the decades

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in a way that al-Khalil does not, although even he acknowledges the pervasive depoliticization: "A polity whose self-definition is that 'everything is political' today comprises one of the most apolitical populations around" (p. 61). Thus, the factors identified by Hinnebusch go a long way toward explaining the decline of Baathism in both states, from a set of lively ideas to slogans and propaganda.

By contrast, in the non-Baathist oil-producing states even the slogans and propaganda are absent. It would seem, as al-Naqeeb suggests, that the rulers have tried to discourage ideological politics and have *not* tried to develop an elaborate ideological justification of their rule, a set of antidemocratic ideas. Something ideological is going on, however, but it is deliberately subtle.

Two very different kinds of ideas, I think, sustain authoritarianism, in the Gulf especially but throughout the rest of the region as well. Neither developmentalism nor neotraditionalism is exclusive to the Middle East, but each assumes a local form there. Other ideas as well are sometimes invoked in defense of force—national security, even democracy (Algeria)—but these two are the most recurrent and powerful.

Developmentalism is the belief (an act of faith, not an empirical finding) that the state must play the central role in promoting economic growth and that, to that end, individuals and social organizations must relinquish power to it, allowing it the routine if temporary use of force against enemies. At the heart of developmentalism is the idea that the deprivation of certain political rights is both necessary and temporary and that only a coercive state can promote the economic growth that will eventually sustain political freedom or render it unimportant. While it would be unfair to dismiss the massive postwar efforts at economic planning and social reform, it would be equally foolish to take announced state goals at face value, especially given the track records. It is more useful to think of these development plans as intentionally depoliticizing promises. In the Middle East developmentalism has found its primary historical expression in Arab socialism—of which Baathism is one strand. It is this element of Baathism that explains both the depoliticization, which at first seems inconsistent with the ideological zeal that al-Khalil describes, and the regime's obsession with maintaining a high standard of living, even through the first years of the Iran-Iraq War. Even al-Khalil concedes that the republic of fear oversaw one of the most dramatic improvements in living standards in Iraq's history. In the end Iraq, despite Baathism, differs remarkably little from the materialistic depoliticization al-Naqeeb describes.

Rulers in the wealthiest states offer an upscale variant of developmen-

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talism. Celebrating materialism and the regime's ability to realize its subjects' wildest shopping fantasy, these rulers work to move people from the marketplace of ideas to the marketplace. This government-sponsored orgy of consumption has indeed been largely embraced by the national populations of the oil-producing states, to the great and continuing consternation of their own social critics.

Alongside developmentalism one finds neotraditionalism as the second recurring ideological element of authoritarianism. Rulers throughout the region invoke tradition selectively, using whatever construction suits their present political needs (and often such constructions bear little resemblance to any actual historical experience). Each state celebrates a few Islamic traditions: those not cornered by the opposition, particularly those emphasizing political acquiescence rather than rebellion. As Mayer points out, of the many possible interpretations of rights consistent with Islamic teaching, rulers privilege those that grant the state the most unrestricted authority. These traditions are distributed through state-appointed imams in state mosques. Neotraditionalism is particularly evident in the Gulf, where tribalism is celebrated (although not all tribal identifications, nor the tribal norms of egalitarianism or the traditional bedouin disrespect for sovereign borders) and where rulers have created a monarchical memory where such a tradition never existed.

Both sets of ideas, developmentalism and neotraditionalism, aim simultaneously to legitimize and demobilize. They are deliberately diffuse because regimes are reluctant to set too clear a standard on which they can be judged for fear they will be. That these ideological appeals do not solve the crisis of legitimacy, however, is evident from the substantial force rulers must use alongside them. Developmentalist and especially neotraditionalist appeals fool many outsiders, unversed in the region's history and inexplicably more trusting of the public statements of other people's rulers than they are of their own, but it does not fool many within. Islamist groups across the region have won widespread public support for their challenge to rulers' readings of tradition, a point to which we shall return. Still, developmentalism and neotraditionalism do give rulers sufficient acquiescence to target their force more narrowly.

Institutions

The nature of the institutions that apply force is the final factor to consider in explaining the endurance of authoritarianism. Al-Naqeeb and Hinnebusch begin with a view of states as being fundamentally shaped, if not captured, by social forces. Once captured, however, the dynamic changes, and regimes begin to use state institutions to restructure society.

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Al-Naqeeb argues that in the Gulf the state grew by assuming new economic functions and extending its bureaucratic apparatus into once-independent social institutions and corporatizing them. After that, it relied on bureaucratic terror. Hinnebusch argues that although social forces brought the Baath to power, only state institutions—the party, the bureaucracy, and the army—keep it in power. The Baath used these institutions first to control and then to remobilize the rural population. Lawson notes the independent and new controlling function of the state administration that regulates labor unions, clubs, and religious groups.

These authors describe the workings of various parts of state bureaucracies but pay relatively little attention to the internal security forces, even while conceding them a pivotal role. Like many authors sensitive to stereotypes about the region, Hinnebusch is at pains to show that Syrian politics, although it involves force, also involves far more than force, and so he does not dwell directly on that element. Likewise, al-Naqeeb wishes to demonstrate that authoritarianism emerges from a complex economic and political dynamic, not from the soul of Arab culture.

It has been demonstrated that coercive institutions are not cultural artifacts, that they arise from economic and social conditions; nonetheless, once established these institutions may assume an independent internal dynamic. In some cases that dynamic is rooted in the origins of modern political police forces. Lawson links today's coercive apparatus to its colonial construction. He describes the emergence under British tutelage of a modern police force, largely manned by foreigners, and specifically the emergence of political police and of a special and particularly ruthless antiriot police comprised of tribal retainers. In other cases, the coercive state apparatus emerged in conscious rejection of its colonial predecessors. Al-Khalil demonstrates how the Iraqi police force, the creation of the Baath Party, was originally independent of the state. On taking power, Baathists restructured the security apparatus, staffing it with ideologues. Saddam Hussein personally oversaw the restructuring of the secret police in the 1970s. Consequently a different security service emerged: explicitly political and ideological.

Whatever their origins, once in place these institutions seem to develop their own momentum. Once force is used regularly, huge if mundane new bureaucracies of terror emerge to sustain it: political police, intelligence officers, censors, thugs. This apparatus has grown in recent decades with advances in technology: improved instruments of torture (a point to which al-Naqeeb alone is presciently sensitive) and the improved ability of the state to monitor and sanction a population increas-

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ingly in its direct employ.[22] Once established, these institutions seem remarkably durable, almost self-sustaining. Al-Khalil's picture of the Iraqi state in action suggests an Interior Ministry propelled by just this mechanical energy. Most of the Iraqi institutions organized around torture appeared *after* political opposition had been largely eliminated; the police simply created new enemies for them to target. Planned or not, a relentless state arises and simply will not stop. To a certain extent, repression is just a by-product of such institutional inertia. This is not unique to Iraq: rulers of all persuasions quickly recognize the advantages of an internal security force. Whatever its origins, the internal police is today a formidable presence in its own right.

The internal momentum of this security force is important though usually overlooked. To the extent that the security apparatus is driven by an independent, internal logic, then limited liberalization introduced by a repressive regime is likely to be a tactical maneuver to avoid rather than abet democracy and therefore unlikely to proceed very far. It would thus be wrong to view political liberalization in the conventional way—as a step, however small, toward democracy. To the contrary, political openings may have a very different meaning in regimes characterized by violence than in more benignly exclusive regimes and may indeed serve to shore up such regimes.

Alternatives to Authoritarianism

Human Rights Groups

What alternatives are there to these regimes? The writers under review here suggest two: human rights groups and Islamist groups. Too often misunderstood as the younger sister of the prodemocracy movement, the human rights movement has a slightly different focus: to stop state violence. Dwyer's book is devoted to human rights activism in the region, specifically in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. The work is organized around three themes: the public world of religion and social identity, the private world of the individual and personal liberty, and the connective space of private actors and groups working for public ends. Dwyer is especially interested in the cultural space between the family and state, and the ways in which intellectuals and activists concerned with human rights articulate issues of political entitlement within it. His optimism flows from what he sees as the emergence of human rights as a new

[22] A point made by F. Gregory Gause III, "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs* 45 (Winter 1992).

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symbol with which individuals and groups increasingly transform their personal lives into political lives. In quoting extensively from intellectuals in the region, and allowing them to speak in their own voices, the book offers a glimpse of an emerging symbolic structure that is important in sustaining a social tension with authoritarianism.

Al-Naqeeb, too, sees a key role for the human rights movement, which he hopes will establish clearer boundaries between the state and society and greater independence for social institutions, especially those that transcend communal identities. Also like Dwyer, al-Naqeeb believes education gives rise to new expectations but, al-Naqeeb warns, it does not remove the communal identities that he feels thwart those expectations. Mobility closure—the inability to rise because key private and public sector posts are earmarked for powerful families—generates frustration. In a contracting economy this frustrated drive for social mobility cannot be sublimated in material improvement. Al-Naqeeb hopes that these frustrations will express themselves in prodemocracy movements that will usher in a new era of weak political rule, strong cultural unity, and a thriving private sector and independent civil society. In other words, he envisions a new era very reminiscent of his first era, the precolonial *natural* state, when political authority was weak and the economy, civil society, and cultural life consequently flourished. Al-Naqeeb the activist is hopeful, but his own argument provides little grounds for hope.

The human rights movement faces formidable obstacles. As Dwyer notes, one is its historical association with the West, an association regimes stress in an effort to marginalize the movement. Another is its elitism. Dwyer's faith in the movement rests on shaky pillars: the mobilizing power of ideas and especially intellectuals' "growing influence on other people's views as a result of the expansion of print and electronic media" (p. 9). He does not test this remarkable proposition: his interviews are exclusively with intellectuals (among other sampling problems). Nor is there any evidence (in northern Africa or elsewhere in the region) linking societal levels of education to successful human rights efforts (although the efforts themselves may be linked). Although this elite bias accurately reflects the voice of the movement, it is not the voice of those for whom it purports to speak. Both they and the rulers know that.

Nonetheless, Dwyer raises an important point. The human rights movement offers a clear, alternative set of ideas about authority. To understand its attraction, one should recall al-Naqeeb's important if overstated point: the ideas rulers offer are often not very good, and people

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see through them. One reason for the appeal of the human rights movement, then, is that it has ideas that compete well with those offered by the rulers: ideas about how politics ought to be, about what constitutes just behavior on the part of the rulers, and on how that justice should be secured.

Islamist Groups

Clearly the dominant opposition voices in the Arab world are Islamist (using the term broadly, to encompass a range of groups who consciously organize political opposition by invoking Islamic vocabulary and principles). Islamist and human rights groups are not mutually exclusive as their rhetoric might sometimes suggest. Islamists, of course, have a very practical interest in supporting human rights: they are the favored target of state violence throughout the Muslim world; their rights are the first to be trampled. But Islamist and human rights groups also share an important, although often unacknowledged, common intellectual ground. Both oppose an element at the core of authoritarianism: arbitrariness—even an unhappy set of rules allows you to order your daily life. At the heart of both movements is a denunciation of arbitrary government and a promise to replace it with the rule of law (God's or men's). Human rights groups aim to change not just the players but also the rules and (as Migdal might say) the rules about rule making. So, too, the Islamists. The condemnation of government corruption, the call for governmental accountability, the emphasis on rule of law (Islamic) to end the arbitrary rule of capricious leaders: these are as clearly critiques of authoritarian rule as anything the human rights movement puts forward—but without the Western taint.

In opposition, then, Islamist groups offer a substantive critique of the authoritarian state. But would they act any differently in power? On this the authors part company. Al-Naqeeb will have nothing of the Islamists, seeing them as no better than the current rulers. Mayer is more cautious. Certainly Islamist ideology is no guarantee that rights will be protected: her own cases—some of the most authoritarian regimes in the region—demonstrate that. She examines the efforts of the region's few Islamic regimes: postrevolutionary Iran, Pakistan under Zia al-Haq, and the Sudan (the only Arab case) under Numairi, to codify and implement an Islamic set of human rights principles.[23] The result, she concludes, has

[23] She analyzes the following texts: the Iranian constitution; Jama'at-i-Islami's founder Abu'l A'la Mawdudi's *Human Rights in Islam*; the Azhar-affiliated Islamic Research Academy of Cairo's *Draft of the Islamic Constitution*; the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights; and Sultanhussein Tabandeh's *A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

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been a systematic limitation rather than expansion of the civil and political rights found, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international law. She argues, however, that the primary explanation for this authoritarianism lies less in Islamic teachings, which she finds rather flexible on the issue of rights, than in the rulers' cynical manipulation of Islam. She is concerned, however, about the apparent inflexibility in Islamic positions on minority and women's rights. Clearly, Islam can be manipulated to serve regimes that for entirely other reasons trample peoples' rights. However, she leaves open the door for the emergence of more progressive Islamist regimes that might protect these rights. Hinnebusch pushes that door open a bit more. Syria's Islamist opposition has called for a more open political system, promising elections, party competition, an independent judiciary, and freedom from torture and repression. It has specifically promised to protect the rights of religious minorities (in part a reaction to the sectarian favoritism of the present regime). Hinnebusch does not dismiss this as mere rhetoric. Dwyer is still more optimistic, pinning his hopes on the progressive Islamists who alone can cast human rights in local terms. He believes, not unreasonably, that a successful movement must resonate with local values and invoke local traditions—and Islamic ones are the most evocative. Islamist groups are the only opposition with sufficient mass support to ever attain power. Their progressive wing, he believes, is the best hope for a less authoritarian regime.

Islam clearly has values and traditions that are compatible with the kind of rights protections that the prodemocracy liberals endorse: equality, respect for the rule of law, a "tradition of tolerance of debate and argument" (even if, as Mayer points out, that tradition is sometimes repudiated by Islamists today; p. xiii), respect for private property, a concern for social justice. Certainly democrats have invoked consultation and other Islamic traditions to justify formal participation in decision making and the freedoms that sustain that participation. But ideas alone cannot defeat a well-armed state. Will these opposition groups ever come to power? The human rights movement, deeply reformist, has neither the strength nor the inclination to overthrow regimes, and the Islamist groups are the security state's top priority. No Arab regime appears ready to allow Islamists to come to power peacefully. For a time it looked as if Algeria might take the peaceful route, but it did not. If it had, it might have revealed the extent to which the practice of democratic politics was itself tempering. The necessary give-and-take of forming legislative coalitions or the exigencies of collecting the trash and paying the teachers might in practice temper an Islamist opposition whose positions

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on issues had been informed in the oddly ideal world of complete powerlessness. Observers have been very divided on this issue; unfortunately, it looks as if we will not soon learn the answer. Nor can Islamists defeat today's security apparatus in street battles. The question of which sort of Islamists will eventually come to power may depend on how they come to power. If not through elections, there remains one more direction for change: from within the state.

The state, of course, has always been its rulers' worst enemy. The military in the Middle East once overthrew rulers with great regularity. The development of a truly effective security apparatus may also prove ultimately a threat to the regime. If, as Migdal and Sadowski have suggested, the developmentalist state can be sabotaged, so too perhaps can the security state. Like any other bureaucracy, it is penetrated by groups with their own corporate interests. The fact that the state absorbs social groups intact, as al-Naqeeb argues, suggests that those groups have some independent strength: something to offer as well as something to gain. They retain some autonomy and interests that may allow them to resist later on. Al-Naqeeb and Lawson note the tribal base of Gulf armies and police. Syria's army was Alawite based before the Baath came to power. Once loyal to the rulers, these groups can over time develop and pursue interests independent of the rulers. Even groups the state creates can peel off to join the opposition. Quite unintentionally, the state itself may promote bureaucratic interests that can become privatized and threaten those who created them. The opposition's best strategy may thus be to destroy these authoritarian regimes from within, by infiltrating and privatizing their security forces. If the state security forces are not beating up the people the rulers want them to, this could undermine the effectiveness of rulers possessing even state-of-the-art security technology. (Since privatization would not eliminate repression, this would, of course, offer little consolation to those who do run afoul of the security forces.)

Conclusions

The literature on authoritarianism neglects the Arab world and suffers accordingly. Together the authors reviewed here offer a more nuanced explanation of the breakdown of dialogue between state and society, regime and opposition. Their work is accessible and could be read productively by scholars of any region.

As these books demonstrate, the Arab world offers several important, generalizable lessons. In notable contrast to journalistic writing on the

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region, where everyone is a cultural theorist, political scientists who study the Middle East are far more likely to use historically based economic and social-structural arguments and share certain notions embodied in dependency literature (although most depart from the core dependency arguments at some point) than to build on notions of Arab culture. On economic factors, as al-Naqeeb demonstrates, there is no simple trajectory states must follow from poor and autocratic to rich and democratic. Nor is there an easy and necessary connection between economic liberalization and authoritarian decline: authoritarian regimes may implement economic reform through a new set of authoritarian alliances and emerge from economic crises strengthened. On social-structural factors, the writers here grant central importance to colonialism and to the class system and particular classes it produced. At this level of generalization, most authors in the field (even those who eschew the connection) have accepted much of the basic dependency perspective, at least for the colonial period. But class is not the sole determinant of political outcomes. Hinnebusch, Lawson, and al-Naqeeb show that authoritarian regimes have survived by manipulating the complicated cleavages of Arab societies—sect and tribe, as well as class. The resilience of repressive institutions has also clearly contributed to the persistence of authoritarianism. The internal momentum of these institutions may be rooted in the circumstances of its creation, sometimes colonial, sometimes postcolonial. But whatever its origins, the repressive apparatus, with its various security forces, is characterized by an inertia that independently sustains authoritarianism. Finally, these cases suggest the peculiar role that ideas may play in sustaining authoritarianism. To survive, these regimes must not only embrace repressive institutions but also create an atmosphere of public toleration, although not necessarily affection, for the use of force. They do so through what many at first mistake for culture: developmentalism (really an ideology of indefinitely deferred gratification) and neotraditionalism. These appeals, to an unreal past and a surreal future, provide the ideological underpinnings of authoritarianism.

To guard against the notion that states are either repressive *or* democratic, we need a better understanding of those circumstances in which regimes choose violence over accommodation, force over dialogue. That is what these books provide: insights with passports, approaches that can be tested in other parts of the world. Both violent and accommodating state responses to opposition are patterned, and those patterns need to be studied in a way that is historically grounded as well as comparative. The study of authoritarianism now needs to build on regional works

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from the Middle East and elsewhere and to explore their common themes. Such a project, drawing its theoretical inspiration from cases throughout the world, will help integrate an unfortunately dispersed literature and deepen our understanding of the worldwide phenomenon of authoritarianism.

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


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

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

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